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The EU is experiencing a surge in solar and wind power, which frequently exceeds demand during peak hours, leading to price volatility and negative electricity prices. While renewables are growing, the lack of system flexibility—such as battery storage and interconnectors—forces a continued reliance on fossil fuels during evenings and early mornings. The report highlights that by 2030, excess wind and solar power could reach 183 TWh across the EU, potentially saving €9 billion in annual gas costs if shifted effectively. It specifically notes Germany's role as a leader in battery capacity and suggests that further additions could significantly displace hard coal and gas. The document recommends removing regulatory barriers to co-location, implementing national flexibility strategies in National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), and establishing a comprehensive EU strategy for clean flexibility.

The author contends that the rise of far-right parties, such as Germany's AfD, is partly a reaction to climate policies that lack social equity. To combat this, the text advocates for a 'post-growth' framework and the implementation of community-led energy solutions that prioritize human well-being over profit. It calls for developed nations to accelerate emission cuts and for the EU to shift fossil fuel subsidies toward carbon-free heating to ensure a just transition.

The policy brief outlines three core principles for the implementation of the EU's Social Climate Fund (SCF): ensuring meaningful public participation, prioritising structural solutions over temporary relief to avoid fossil fuel lock-ins, and mobilising additional financing beyond the mandatory 25% contribution. It argues that the SCF's budget of EUR 65 billion is insufficient to tackle the root causes of energy and transport poverty and calls for the redirection of ETS revenues and the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies to support vulnerable households.

In the first half of 2024, wind and solar power generated 30% of the EU's electricity, surpassing fossil fuels (27%) for the first time. This transition occurred despite a 0.7% increase in electricity demand. Fossil fuel generation fell by 17%, with coal dropping by 24% and gas by 14%. Renewables overall provided 50% of the EU's electricity, aided by a 21% rebound in hydro generation. Power sector emissions decreased by 17% compared to the same period in 2023, and are 31% lower than in the first half of 2022. While capacity additions are high, the report notes a gap between national ambitions and the EU's 2030 targets under the REPowerEU plan, particularly for wind energy.

The authors analyze the trend of rising defense budgets in EU and NATO member states following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, noting that spending increases are uneven and unaligned. They argue that this lack of coordination risks worsening the fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, creating mismatches between industrial supply and operational needs, and undermining the concept of strategic autonomy. Furthermore, the paper highlights potential negative economic impacts, including the 'crowding out' of civilian industries and the diversion of funds from the green transition, specifically citing proposals to cut EU renewables funding to support military investments.

The document evaluates statements from Jordan Bardella (RN), Gabriel Attal (Ensemble), and Manuel Bompard (NFP) regarding the 2024 French legislative debate. Key findings include the correction of claims about France's public debt, the impact of immigration on security and finances, and the technical and economic realities of the energy transition, such as electric vehicle costs and wind turbine efficiency.

The document argues that the EU's territorial emission reductions underestimate its true carbon footprint due to emissions embedded in imports. It identifies food, housing, and mobility as primary consumption 'hotspots' and calls for a shift from a focus on production efficiency to policies that target consumption patterns and behavioral change. Key barriers include a lack of standardized monitoring and supply chain transparency, while opportunities lie in leveraging the EU's market influence to set common CBE targets and support developing countries in transitioning to low-carbon production.

From June 11-13, 2024, over 290 million people in Northern Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East are forecast to experience extreme heat made at least five times more likely due to human-caused climate change. Maximum temperatures of 40°C or higher are expected in several countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. The document highlights risks including wildfires in Greece, damage to Bulgaria's rose oil production, and increased vulnerability for refugees in Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria.

The briefing reports that underground coal mines in the EU closed since 2015 may emit approximately 200 kt of methane per year, with Poland being the largest contributor. It notes that active coal mine emissions in the EU are likely underestimated, with GEM estimates being 36% higher than IEA figures. The report emphasizes that emissions from abandoned mines persist for years unless flooded, but data on the flooding status of over 60% of analyzed mines remains unknown, creating significant uncertainty in estimates.

The document argues that the EU's territorial emission reductions mask a growing carbon footprint driven by the import of emissions-intensive goods. It identifies food, housing, and mobility as primary consumption hotspots and recommends binding EU-level targets, mandatory reporting for member states, and enhanced trade transparency to address these emissions.

The European Parliament elections, held June 6-9, 2024, determine the legislative representation for 27 EU Member States, with the number of seats increasing from 705 to 720. The document emphasizes the role of the European Parliament in shaping the EU Green Deal and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, while warning against the weakening of environmental requirements in the Common Agricultural Policy and the dropping of chemical regulations like REACH. It advocates for closing the 'implementation gap' of environmental laws, which could save the EU economy EUR 55 billion annually in health and environmental costs, and calls for universal access to justice rights for citizens and NGOs to challenge environmental law-breaking across all Member States.

The document analyzes environmental mobilization in the Balkans, specifically focusing on the protection of the Vjosa River in Albania and the Jadar Valley in Serbia. It compares the grassroots, campaign-led approach in Albania, which led to the creation of a national park, with the mass protests and political integration seen in Serbia, which forced the withdrawal of mining permits. The text also highlights the European Union's inconsistent support, noting its strong backing for river conservation versus its more cautious approach to lithium mining due to the EU's energy transition needs.

Analysis of draft NECPs indicates that while EU member states have significantly increased wind and solar targets since 2019, the current trajectory falls short of REPowerEU goals. Renewables are projected to generate 66% of EU electricity by 2030, missing the 72% target. The report highlights a lack of data transparency in the drafts, particularly regarding power system flexibility and post-2030 decarbonisation pathways.

The text examines the role of energy communities in mitigating the 'green backlash' and far-right growth in Europe. It contrasts industrial-scale renewable projects, which often exclude rural populations in countries like Spain and Greece, with community-led initiatives that prioritize socio-environmental benefits over profit. The author highlights that community energy projects can provide up to eight times more economic benefit to local economies than private projects. Examples of innovation include agri-photovoltaic projects in Greece and North Macedonia, and a biomass heating network in Spain. The document calls for EU and member state support to ensure that the energy transition is inclusive and democratic, preventing profits from accruing only to large companies.

The report identifies 2023 as the likely peak for global power sector emissions, forecasting a decline in 2024 driven by record solar and wind additions. While electricity demand is expected to rise due to electrification, data centres, and air conditioning, the growth of clean energy is projected to outpace this demand. The document highlights that tripling renewable capacity by 2030 could halve power sector emissions. It also provides case studies of China, Brazil, and the Netherlands to demonstrate how high-level ambition, incentive mechanisms, and the removal of technical barriers can accelerate the transition regardless of geographic or economic starting points.

The report highlights that EU power system flexibility needs are expected to double by 2030 as renewables are projected to reach 66% of electricity generation. It identifies battery storage and demand side flexibility (DSF) as critical but under-utilised tools to replace fossil fuel backup and reduce renewable curtailment. While battery capacity doubled to 16 GW in 2023, the report notes a significant lack of explicit 2030 targets for storage and DSF in national policy documents. It calls for improved data transparency, the removal of regulatory barriers for distributed energy resources, and the inclusion of flexibility targets in National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs).

Global operating coal capacity increased by 48.4 GW in 2023, reaching a total of 2,130 GW, primarily driven by a surge of new plants in China. While construction starts hit record lows outside of China, China's new construction starts reached an eight-year high of 70.2 GW. Despite a growing number of countries committing to 'No New Coal', 75% of global operating coal capacity still lacks a specific closure commitment, hindering alignment with the Paris Agreement goals.

Ember reports that Germany's official coal mine methane (CMM) emissions are likely underestimated by 28 to 220 times. The current reporting relies on a single emission factor from a 1989 study that does not account for depth, geological variability, or surrounding strata. Independent estimates suggest annual emissions could be as high as 307,000 tonnes, compared to the 1.39 thousand tonnes officially reported for 2022. Ember recommends that Germany implement deposit-specific emission factors, direct measurements for active and closed mines, and pre-mine drainage to mitigate emissions.

Global coal-fired power capacity reached a record 2,130 GW in 2023, driven largely by China, despite a general global trend toward reducing new coal construction. While the EU and UK are accelerating retirements, China's new construction capacity reached an eight-year high. Turkey continues to develop coal capacity, ranking eighth globally in capacity under development, despite significant local opposition and the cancellation of numerous projects.

The document identifies numerous factual errors made by candidates from various political parties during a debate on the ecological and social transition. Key corrections include debunking claims that the EU Green Deal currently imposes norms on farmers, correcting the ranking of France as the EU's third-largest agricultural exporter rather than the first, and clarifying that France's energy mix is the second most decarbonized in Europe, behind Sweden. It also addresses misconceptions about the carbon footprint of Chinese-made renewables, the efficacy of hydrogen cars, and the actual population and migration figures in Mayotte.