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The document analyzes the current state of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) in Africa, identifying systemic barriers such as fragmented policies, significant funding gaps, and the exclusion of smallholder farmers. It highlights opportunities in digital technology, indigenous knowledge, and private sector engagement. To address these, it recommends that the South African G20 Presidency champion blended finance mechanisms, strengthen regional collaboration through Regional Economic Communities (RECs), integrate traditional knowledge into policy, improve monitoring and evaluation systems, and accelerate the adoption of agri-tech.

The document details the impact of the Restore Local initiative and TerraFund in Ghana's Cocoa Belt, where farmers are transitioning from monocropping to agroforestry. By integrating native trees, fruit trees, and beekeeping, farmers are combating soil erosion and climate instability while diversifying their income streams. The initiative has supported 15 non-profits and five local enterprises, resulting in 4.1 million trees planted and 9,300 hectares under restoration, contributing toward Ghana's national goal of restoring 2 million hectares of degraded land by 2030.

The statement contends that the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) should be implemented without further delay, as major cocoa companies and governments in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have already invested heavily in traceability and farmer mapping. It warns that postponing the law would undermine the investments of early adopters, jeopardize forest preservation, and damage the EU's credibility as a global climate leader.

The report examines four EU climate regulations—the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), the EU ETS for Shipping, and Methane Regulations—and their disproportionate effects on African economies. It highlights risks such as GDP reduction, loss of export revenue, and increased maritime costs, while calling for financial support, technical capacity building, and a shift toward global rather than unilateral regulatory frameworks.

Carbon Neobank is a digital financial vehicle designed to bridge the USD 331 billion SME finance gap in Africa by integrating international carbon markets into business banking. Headquartered in Kenya, it offers three primary products: receivables loans, unsecured working capital loans, and carbon-backed term loans, targeting a USD 1 billion total addressable market. The vehicle utilizes a digital-first model, leveraging a partnership with Ecobank for geographic reach across 33 countries and employing digital Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (dMRV) to monetize emission reductions. A USD 10.8 million pilot is planned to demonstrate the model's ability to mobilize private capital and deliver climate outcomes, including an estimated 6.097 million tCO2e in emission reductions over 10 years. The bank specifically targets the agricultural sector and women-led businesses to promote an inclusive green transition.

IREN Agri is a blended debt fund designed to support climate-smart agriculture in West Africa, starting with a cocoa-focused pilot in Côte d’Ivoire. The vehicle combines medium-term loans, multi-year offtake agreements, and digital technical assistance via the SUTTI platform to reduce investor risk and improve smallholder resilience. The fund aims to scale from a EUR 12.5 million pilot to a EUR 100 million fund by 2028, targeting a serviceable obtainable market of over EUR 500 million across six West African countries.

The report examines the role of securitisation in developing African capital markets, noting that while South Africa has a mature market, other sub-Saharan regions remain nascent. It identifies significant barriers, including fragmented legal and tax frameworks, a lack of a 'ratings culture', and limited understanding among financial institutions. Despite these challenges, the study finds a substantial supply of securitisable assets in banking, microfinance, and fintech sectors. It recommends a holistic regulatory approach, the use of anchor investors from DFIs and MDBs, and the adoption of scalable structures like warehouse facilities to mobilise private capital and bridge the private credit gap.

The report argues that tax incentives for critical mineral value addition are secondary to primary non-tax enablers such as infrastructure, regulatory stability, and clear national strategies. It analyzes the value chains of copper, lithium, and nickel, noting that while production-based, cost-based, and profit-based tax incentives can attract investment, they risk revenue loss if projects are not commercially viable. The document highlights varied national approaches, such as Indonesia's nickel export bans and Australia's production tax credits, and recommends rigorous financial modelling to ensure that downstream incentives do not result in a net loss of government revenue compared to raw ore exports.

The report argues that fiscal incentives are secondary to 'primary' non-fiscal conditions—such as stable regulatory frameworks, reliable energy and transport infrastructure, and clear national strategies—which are essential for the commercial viability of mineral processing. Using case studies from countries like Indonesia, Australia, and Zambia, it examines tools such as variable royalty rates, investment tax credits, and export restrictions. It warns that without rigorous economic modelling, policies like export bans or tax holidays can lead to significant revenue losses, deterred investment, or the support of commercially unviable projects.

The report argues that non-metallic minerals—such as sand, gravel, and potash—differ from metallic minerals due to lower revenue potential, stronger domestic economic linkages, and a lack of benchmark prices for many varieties. It proposes a typology for royalties and transfer pricing based on a mineral's export propensity, price volatility, and the availability of benchmark prices. Key recommendations include using unit-based royalties for low-value construction materials to minimize administration costs, and ad-valorem royalties for high-value exports like graphite and potash to maximize revenue. The document also addresses cross-cutting issues such as environmental taxation, the formalization of artisanal mining through lower tax burdens, and the risks associated with tax incentives and export restrictions.

The document evaluates the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) as a 'proof of concept' for the AfCFTA, analyzing the experiences of Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Tunisia, Nigeria, and South Africa. It argues that while tariff liberalisation is a start, full implementation requires addressing deep structural barriers, including inadequate productive capacity, infrastructure deficits, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The brief highlights that South Africa and Nigeria's participation is critical for scaling the initiative, but both face internal constraints like energy bottlenecks and fiscal gaps. It concludes that the focus must shift from endorsing the agreement to delivering on productive capacity and trade-enabling infrastructure to achieve projected GDP gains of $1.4 trillion.

The document examines the intersection of green technology and youth employment in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana. It finds that while these countries have established frameworks for clean energy, e-mobility, and climate-smart agriculture, there is a persistent lack of coherence between climate policies and youth employment strategies. The analysis highlights that youth are often excluded from policy-making and that interministerial cooperation is inadequate, hindering the potential for green tech to address high youth unemployment and NEET rates in sub-Saharan Africa.

Thirty-five Ivorian NGOs have issued a statement opposing Mondelez's call for a 12-month postponement of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). The NGOs argue that delays would prolong environmental and social degradation in Côte d'Ivoire, where deforestation rates exceed 80%. They reject Mondelez's claims that lack of planter identification and administrative inefficiency justify a delay, asserting instead that the EUDR provides the necessary impetus to finalize long-delayed mapping and identification processes and strengthen government systems.

A coalition of 35 Ivorian NGOs has rejected Mondelez's request for a 12-month delay in the implementation of the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). The NGOs argue that postponing the regulation would prolong environmental and social harm, specifically noting that Côte d’Ivoire has lost over 80% of its forests. They contend that challenges cited by Mondelez—such as lack of farmer identification and mapping—should be addressed through action rather than used as pretexts for delay, asserting that the EUDR provides a unique opportunity to create a more transparent and sustainable cocoa sector.

The document examines the failure of uniform utility reform models in Africa, emphasizing that success depends on local context rather than ideological blueprints like privatization or cost-reflective tariffs. It contrasts the struggles of Nigeria and Ghana with the more successful, context-specific approaches in Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire, while highlighting the tension between commercial viability and poverty-driven affordability in countries like Zambia and Ethiopia.

The World Resources Institute opposes the European Commission's proposal to postpone the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) until late December 2026, arguing that such a delay undermines the law's credibility and global climate goals. The statement emphasizes that necessary implementation tools are already available and that delaying enforcement penalizes businesses and countries that have already invested in compliance. It further warns against weakening the regulation by introducing 'no-risk' country categories, which could create loopholes for laundering deforestation-linked products into the EU market.

The document analyzes the operational resurgence of IS-WAP, highlighting its use of surveillance and combat drones, its 'Burning of the camps' campaign targeting military bases, and its logistical ties with IS-SP. It argues that a deteriorating regional security architecture, exacerbated by political instability in Niger and the withdrawal of foreign troops, is facilitating the expansion of militant Islamist groups across the Sahel and towards coastal West African states.

Carbon Market Watch warns that allowing international carbon credits in the EU's 2040 climate target could lead to the outsourcing of 140 million to 430 million tonnes of emissions. The organization highlights two interpretations of the Commission's '3% of 1990 EU net emissions' proposal: a cumulative scenario (Scenario 1) and a build-up scenario (Scenario 2). Both would result in higher EU emissions than a fully domestic approach and impose significant costs—ranging from €7 billion to over €30 billion—diverting funds from domestic decarbonization and climate finance. The document further contends that such credits undermine the 2040 target, risk exacerbating inequalities in the Global South, and contradict previous impact assessments favoring a domestic 90-95% net emission reduction.

The document examines food price volatility in South Africa, attributing it to climate change, global shocks, and corporate market concentration. It proposes a phased implementation of public buffer stocks—beginning with white maize and expanding to wheat and indigenous grains—to protect vulnerable households and support smallholder farmers. The authors suggest that such a system, if governed transparently and linked to agroecological practices, could eventually integrate into a regional SADC mechanism to strengthen food sovereignty across Southern Africa.

The report examines the intersection of Africa's blue economy and climate change, highlighting vulnerabilities in fisheries, maritime transport, and tourism. It argues for a transition toward renewable ocean energy, the expansion of blue carbon initiatives, and the implementation of integrated, regional governance to mitigate economic risks and environmental degradation.