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The global pipeline of proposed coal power plants has collapsed by 76% since the 2015 Paris Agreement, with 1,175GW of projects cancelled. While China remains the largest pursuer of coal, hosting 55% of the remaining pre-construction pipeline, many OECD and non-OECD countries have already committed to or are positioned for 'no new coal'. The report highlights that action by six countries—China, India, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Turkey, and Bangladesh—could remove 82% of the remaining global pre-construction pipeline.

The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is criticized for prioritizing fossil gas infrastructure over renewable energy, which risks locking in emissions beyond 2050 and violating the EU's Climate Law. As of July 2021, fossil gas projects outnumber renewables in the 3SI database by more than two to one. Many of these gas projects are described as 'zombie projects'—outdated relics that have failed to attract financing or remain unutilized, such as the BRUA and Eastring pipelines. The document highlights that EU gas consumption must decline sharply to meet a 55% emissions reduction by 2030. While the 3SI Investment Fund (3SIIF) recently made its first energy investment in solar developer Enery Development, the briefing argues that significant political and financial shifts, including from the US, are needed to catalyze the region's renewable energy potential and align with the 'Fit for 55' package.

The document analyzes Indonesia's National Economic Recovery (PEN) program, finding that 2020 spending heavily favored fossil fuel-related state-owned enterprises and subsidies over clean energy. It highlights a gap in renewable energy targets—reaching only 11.2% in 2020 against a 13.4% target—and recommends reforming fossil fuel subsidies and implementing conditional fiscal support to accelerate the energy transition.

The September 2021 Global Update by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) finds that global climate action continues to lag behind the requirements for limiting warming to 1.5°C. While some countries have updated their NDCs, the 2030 emissions gap remains significant, estimated at 20 to 23 GtCO2e. The report introduces a new rating system that integrates targets, policies, and climate finance, revealing that only The Gambia is overall 1.5°C Paris Agreement compatible. Most net zero targets are rated as poor or incomplete, and developed countries are failing to provide sufficient international climate finance or implement policies that align with their fair share of global mitigation efforts.

The report identifies critical transboundary climate risks in global agricultural trade, noting that a few major exporters like the US, Brazil, and China disproportionately transmit risk to dependent importers. It argues that traditional risk management, such as diversification, is insufficient against systemic climate shifts and calls for multilateral cooperation and system-level adaptation finance.

The paper surveys 29 long-term climate strategies (LTSs) submitted to the UNFCCC, representing 42 countries and 28% of global emissions. It finds a growing trend toward net-zero targets, an increasing focus on the fundamental economic and societal shifts required for transition, and a reliance on both natural and technological carbon removals. The analysis highlights that while most strategies include midcentury goals and modeling, the level of detail regarding adaptation and just transition varies, and some parties acknowledge gaps between their most ambitious scenarios and their final targets.

The study finds that new coal generation is unnecessary for energy security, more expensive than renewable alternatives, and incompatible with the Paris Agreement. Modelling shows that forcing 1.5 GW of new coal into the power system increases total discounted costs by R23 billion in a reference scenario and R109 billion in a climate policy scenario, while reducing GDP and employment.

Ember argues that the EU should lead by example in reducing coal mine methane (CMM) emissions, proposing a differentiated approach to state aid based on the type of methane project. The organization opposes state aid for 'Drained CMM' from active mines to avoid extending mine lifetimes, but supports aid for Ventilation Air Methane (VAM) destruction and Abandoned Mine Methane (AMM) capture, provided strict safeguards are in place to ensure these measures do not increase coal production or profitability.

SEforALL reports on its leadership in organizing Ministerial Thematic Forums to secure Energy Compacts, its advocacy for eradicating energy poverty within the G20, and its technical support for national energy transitions in countries such as Nigeria and Rwanda. The organization also highlights the launch of practitioner tools for mini-grid emissions and sustainable cooling, alongside diplomatic engagements with the UAE and the US to accelerate the global energy transition toward SDG7.

The report analyzes the role of hydrogen in the energy transition, contrasting 'green hydrogen' (produced via renewable-powered electrolysis) with the current industry standard of steam methane reformation (SMR) from fossil fuels. It warns that the oil and gas industry uses hydrogen rhetoric to justify continued fossil fuel infrastructure and delay electrification. The authors argue that green hydrogen should be reserved for 'hard-to-electrify' sectors like maritime shipping and high-heat industrial processes, while being rejected for use in passenger vehicles, home appliances, and gas-fired power plants due to energy inefficiency, high costs, and pollution risks.

ClientEarth argues that the draft CEEAG contains political compromises that undermine environmental ambitions, specifically criticizing the continued support for fossil gas, low-carbon hydrogen, and biomass. The organization advocates for the strict integration of the 'Energy Efficiency First' principle, the 'energy solidarity principle', and more rigorous safeguards to prevent 'carbon lock-in'. Key recommendations include limiting hydrogen aid to renewable sources, phasing out support for high-efficient cogeneration and small hydropower, and implementing stricter conditions for the closure of coal activities to ensure they occur by 2030.

The document analyzes how disruptive technologies—including AI, automation, and 5G—are transforming large-scale mining, potentially reducing low-skilled employment and eroding tax bases. It proposes a collaborative policy framework involving education reform, local innovation support, and the use of mining data to improve government oversight and community resilience.

The report examines the mechanisms used to ensure mining companies provide sufficient funds for environmental rehabilitation if they fail to meet closure obligations. It details various financial instruments, cost estimation methodologies, and policy requirements from leading jurisdictions including Australia, Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the United States.

The report examines how the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution'—including AI, automation, and IoT—is transforming large-scale mining. While these technologies improve safety and efficiency, they risk displacing low- and semi-skilled workers and reducing local procurement. The authors propose a 'New Deal' comprising updated education and skills training, innovative social impact investing, revised taxation, and the use of technology itself to benefit local communities and artisanal mining.

The report examines how digitization, AI, and automation are restructuring the mining industry, potentially reducing low-skilled employment and altering fiscal revenues for host countries. It suggests a 'new deal' based on collaboration between governments and companies, focusing on skills training, economic diversification through social impact investing, and the strategic use of technology to benefit local communities and artisanal miners.

The document examines how digitalization, automation, and AI are transforming the mining sector, potentially reducing low-skilled employment and eroding tax bases in host countries. It suggests a shift toward collaborative policies focusing on STEM education, social impact investments for economic diversification, and the use of mining data to improve fiscal governance and community safety.

The document details user experiences with three existing climate tools—the Global Climate Monitor, World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, and Copernicus Climate Information Portal—and provides a set of design recommendations for the upcoming ClimVis tool. Key user preferences include the need for national language support, intuitive layered complexity, high-quality metadata, and the ability to compare real-time weather data with long-term climate trends.

Juliane Schmidt advocates for the EU to transition from basic gender mainstreaming to a 'green feminist foreign policy' that employs an intersectional approach to address the gendered impacts of climate change, conflict, and natural disasters. The author critiques the European External Action Service (EEAS) for its male-dominated leadership and the Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) for lacking inclusive language and gender-responsive budgeting. The text suggests that the EU should follow the lead of pioneer countries like Sweden by implementing mandatory staff training, binding gender chapters in trade agreements, and systemic changes to institutional culture to ensure that women and marginalised groups are agents of change rather than mere beneficiaries.

The 47th G7 summit reaffirmed commitments to a "green revolution" and the goal of halving collective carbon emissions by 2030, while pledging to end new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy. However, the document highlights a disconnect between these goals and African realities, where fossil fuels account for approximately 80% of energy supply and many states are planning coal-fired power expansions. While the G7 welcomed the commitment of up to $2 billion via Climate Investment Funds, the document notes this is insufficient compared to the $20-30 billion per year the African Development Bank estimates Africa requires for climate action until 2030. Furthermore, the $100 billion promised by developed countries since COP15 remains unrealised.

The author asserts that the failure of developed nations to meet the 2010 commitment to mobilise $100bn per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries erodes international trust and hinders the transition to a net-zero world. Fulfilling this commitment is presented as a catalyst to trigger large-scale private investment in low-carbon solutions and climate-resilient industries, particularly within supply chains where 65-90 per cent of company emissions originate. The text emphasizes that only 21 per cent of these funds currently support adaptation, and argues that increasing this share would protect global economic stability by building resilience in developing nations. The author calls for G20 leadership to combine this funding with mandatory climate risk disclosure and carbon pricing to support the goal of halving global emissions by 2030.