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In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The document assesses the failures of the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives, noting that their voluntary nature and legal fragmentation have hindered the mainstreaming of green public procurement (GPP). It highlights that public procurement represents approximately 15% of EU GDP and 10% of its greenhouse gas emissions, presenting a significant opportunity for climate impact. The authors propose three primary reform opportunities: making GPP mandatory to simplify procedures and reduce legal uncertainty, linking 'buy European' initiatives to environmental requirements to boost green competitiveness, and implementing systemic data collection to improve monitoring and accountability.

The report analyzes the role of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in the critical minerals supply chain. It highlights a fundamental tension: exporting countries seek to maximize domestic value addition and industrialization, while importing countries prioritize stable, affordable access to raw materials. Through case studies of Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the report demonstrates that while newer agreements are beginning to incorporate ESG standards and protect policy space for producers, old-generation IIAs still pose significant risks via Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. The authors recommend that exporting countries reform outdated treaties to secure industrial policy space and that importing countries support value addition in producer nations to enhance overall supply chain resilience.

The European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) prohibits the placement or export of specific commodities—coffee, cocoa, rubber, cattle, palm oil, wood, and soy—from the EU market unless they are deforestation-free, legally produced, and covered by a due diligence statement. The regulation applies to deforestation occurring after December 31, 2020. While large companies must comply by December 30, 2025, micro and small enterprises have until June 30, 2026. SMEs benefit from specific exemptions, such as not needing to submit due diligence statements for products already covered by one and being exempt from annual public reporting. However, they remain vulnerable to indirect supply chain risks and financial repercussions if their partners fail to comply. The EU is implementing a country risk benchmarking system by June 30, 2025, to categorize countries as low, standard, or high risk. Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSSs) are recognized as supporting tools for risk assessment and traceability, though they do not exempt operators from their legal due diligence obligations. Non-compliance can lead to fines of at least 4% of a company's EU turnover, product confiscation, and trading bans.

The report finds that none of the 20 largest European and UK banks have developed a robust climate transition plan, with an average score of 41/100. While banks have improved reporting and governance to meet regulatory requirements, they lack concrete decarbonization and engagement strategies, often continuing to finance fossil fuel development. The analysis highlights a significant gap between public net-zero commitments and actual business model shifts, warning that current disclosures are more 'ESG marketing material' than actionable transition plans.

Between July 2024 and March 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) added assets from nine fossil fuel companies, totaling 12.96 billion euros, to its list of eligible collateral. This action is presented as a reversal of the ECB's 2021 climate roadmap and a failure to implement measures to limit assets from major polluters. The document calls for the ECB to exclude assets from companies involved in oil and gas exploration or those without credible coal exit plans during its strategic review ending in July 2025.

The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), a major French public investor managing 323 billion euros, is criticized for a lack of transparency regarding its portfolio composition and voting records. Despite claiming alignment with a 1.5°C trajectory, the CDC holds 9.2 billion euros in fossil fuel-related investments and lacks a strict ban on companies developing new oil and gas projects. Furthermore, the CDC delegates approximately 10 billion euros to external asset managers without applying robust climate selection criteria, potentially exposing public savings to climate-harmful strategies.

The briefing identifies capacity constraints and policy incoherence as primary obstacles to implementing the European Green Deal in Sweden and Estonia, specifically regarding CBAM, EED, LULUCF, and JTF regulations.

The document analyzes how interoperability—the bridging of differing standards and policies—can reduce trade barriers and administrative costs in climate mitigation. It details existing frameworks for emission equivalency, carbon price parity, and the convergence of international standards in sectors such as aviation, shipping, carbon removals, and climate finance. The author highlights the role of the OECD, WTO, and ISSB in creating comparable metrics and suggests that the WTO could further enhance carbon measure equivalency through a special notification system and standardized embedded carbon methodologies.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global coal fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. The report highlights a stark divergence: while the UK became coal-free and EU27 retirements quadrupled, China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW) and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Together, China and India accounted for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity in 2024. In the OECD, proposals have plummeted from 142 in 2015 to five today, though annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to meet 1.5°C pathways. The report also notes the rise of 'captive' coal plants in Indonesia and the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea as strategies to prolong coal use.

The study identifies a significant gap between the theoretical potential of individual behavior shifts to reduce emissions and the actual results achieved through behavioral interventions. While comprehensive behavioral changes could theoretically offset the average global citizen's per capita emissions, real-world interventions typically achieve only 10% of that potential. The authors identify four 'Priority Shifts'—reducing gas-powered vehicle use, decreasing air travel, lowering residential fossil fuel consumption through structural changes, and reducing animal product consumption—as the most impactful actions. Conversely, 'Supplementary Shifts' like composting have minimal impact. The research highlights a geographic imbalance, with a surplus of studies in the US and EU and a deficit in high-emitting nations like China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. The most effective behavioral tools for driving change are choice architecture and commitment devices, while information-based approaches are the least effective.

The Bioplastic Feedstock Alliance (BFA) proposes a unified framework for a circular bioeconomy, arguing that bioeconomy and circular economy strategies are often treated separately in policy, such as by the European Commission. The vision emphasizes four key integration concepts: Cascading Use, Biobased Carbon, Industrial Ecology, and Responsible Biomass Sourcing. The document highlights the need for a universal framework of principles and indicators to overcome the complexity of varying national definitions. It warns against 'sustainability tunnel vision' and calls for a use hierarchy that prioritizes long-term material uses over energy recovery. Recommendations are provided for policymakers, businesses, NGOs, and financial institutions to align their efforts, with a specific goal of conserving 30% of lands, inland waters, and oceans worldwide and reducing primary biomass use for energy by 50% by 2030.

The EU's current clean hydrogen strategy faces a significant gap between aspiration and achievement, with renewable hydrogen accounting for less than 0.4% of total supply. The authors advocate for a broader definition of clean hydrogen that includes carbon capture-enabled reforming, methane pyrolysis, and nuclear-powered electrolysis to improve scalability and affordability. They recommend prioritising hydrogen for hard-to-electrify sectors like chemicals, steel, shipping, and aviation, while steering residential heating and passenger vehicles toward direct electrification. To overcome high costs—where clean hydrogen can reach €17 per kilogram compared to €3.5 per kilogram for unabated hydrogen—the document calls for additional subsidies and the development of centralised production-consumption hubs to reduce expensive transportation.

Carbon Market Watch warns that watering down the EU ETS and Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) mandates in response to airline industry pressure would increase emissions and undermine EU clean tech competitiveness. The author calls for extending SAF funding to 2040, expanding the EU ETS to all departing international flights, and implementing penalties for fuel suppliers who fail to meet SAF targets.