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The report details the outcomes of the FSD Network Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 2025. It examines the impact of gender-responsive financial systems, the use of alternative credit scoring, the influence of societal gender norms on financial autonomy, and the role of digital public infrastructure and AI in bridging the gender gap in financial services across Africa.

The document assesses the pervasive role of the informal economy in Ethiopia, noting that it accounts for 80-90% of national employment and approximately one-third of GDP. It highlights a disconnect between official national surveys, which show a decline in informality, and international estimates that suggest the sector remains dominant. The analysis focuses on the drivers of informality—including rural-to-urban migration and structural exclusion—and the challenges of formalization, such as bureaucratic burdens and limited financial access. In Addis Ababa, the city administration has shifted from viewing informal trade as 'illegal' to implementing regulations (such as Regulation No. 184/2025) to recognize and gradually integrate street vendors into the formal economy.

The document analyzes the trajectory of institutional development in Ethiopia across imperial, military, and federal regimes. It finds that while formal structures like the civil service, parliament, and independent commissions have been established, they are frequently undermined by political control, lack of professional autonomy, and insufficient resources. The report highlights a persistent gap between liberal legal frameworks and the practical reality of state-led, top-down governance.

The report outlines nine fundamental principles of resilience science designed for decision-makers. It defines resilience as the capacity to cope, adapt, and transform, emphasizing that it is an active process rather than a passive state. Key themes include the necessity of diversity, the role of social and ecological relationships, the importance of managing trade-offs through collaborative governance, and the requirement to address power imbalances to ensure equitable outcomes. The document argues that proactive investment in resilience provides a 'triple dividend' by avoiding losses, stimulating economic growth, and delivering social and environmental benefits.

The report outlines nine 'Must-Knows' of resilience science, defining resilience as the capacity to cope, adapt, and transform. It argues that resilience is a continuous process of learning and innovation, requiring diversity in knowledge and nature, strong social-ecological relationships, and the active management of trade-offs. The document emphasizes that investing in resilience provides a 'triple dividend' by avoiding losses, boosting economies, and strengthening societies, while stressing that equitable resilience requires addressing power imbalances and historical injustices.

The document defines ring-fencing as a limitation on the consolidation of income and deductions across different projects or activities for tax purposes. It argues that while ring-fencing can discourage investment in marginal ore bodies and increase compliance costs, it is essential for capturing economic rents, preventing permanent revenue loss from unsuccessful exploration, and mitigating BEPS practices. The guide recommends ring-fencing by mining licence area and suggests that profit-based taxes like Resource Rent Tax (RRT) and Additional Profit Tax (APT) must be ring-fenced to be effective. It also provides technical recommendations on apportioning indirect and general expenditures, suggesting that capital expenditure (CapEx) is a more effective allocation key than production volumes to avoid tax deferral.

The document examines 'ring-fencing'—the practice of limiting the consolidation of revenues and deductions for different activities or projects undertaken by the same taxpayer—as a tool for governments to protect the mining tax base. It analyzes the trade-offs between accelerating public revenue and potentially discouraging investment, particularly in marginal deposits. The guide details various design options, such as ring-fencing by mining license area, activity (upstream vs. downstream), or separating mining from non-mining activities. It also provides practical recommendations on allocating indirect and general expenses, managing national transfer pricing risks, and handling permanent losses from unsuccessful exploration to balance revenue needs with investment incentives.

The document analyzes the spillover of conflict-related online risks—such as disinformation, hate speech, and technology-facilitated gender-based violence—into domestic environments. It argues that while the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and UK's Online Safety Act (OSA) were not primarily designed for conflict settings, their systemic risk assessments and crisis protocols can be leveraged to hold platforms accountable. The brief highlights critical gaps, including the erasure of war crime evidence due to over-moderation and the role of engagement-driven algorithms in amplifying harmful content. It recommends structured cross-border cooperation, the development of evidence-preservation protocols, and a shift toward outcome-based metrics in platform risk reporting.

The document examines how African youth are transforming peacebuilding through AI and digital tools, shifting from passive consumers to active knowledge creators. It highlights the decentralisation of early warning systems and the use of digital platforms for peace messaging and mobilisation. However, it warns that digital divides, gender gaps, and linguistic biases—where 88% of African languages are ignored by computational tools—threaten to marginalise rural youth and women. The brief notes a disconnect between the AU's Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security and digital strategies, urging for integrated policies and the institutionalisation of youth roles in AI governance to ensure digital peacebuilding is ethical and inclusive.

The document argues that the COP29 finance goal of US$300 billion is insufficient, covering less than 4.3% of projected global needs, and that Africa receives less than 3% of total global finance for developing countries. It highlights a critical imbalance where only 36% of Africa's climate finance is dedicated to adaptation. The brief calls for African nations to transition from passive actors to co-creators at COP30, advocating for the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap' to reach US$1.3 trillion and demanding that finance be grant-based, accessible, and channeled through African institutions. It also notes the negative impact of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the need for more inclusive participation for least developed countries in UN negotiations.

The report analyzes the integration of human mobility into National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), finding that while 83% of submitted NAPs reference mobility, most lack detailed strategies for sub-national implementation. Through case studies in Costa Rica, Senegal, and Sri Lanka, it identifies gaps in financing, data, and coordination between national and local governments, while proposing a typology of approaches for localizing mobility actions.

The document identifies a critical disconnect between macro-level transboundary water treaties and the lived realities of local water users, particularly in conflict-prone and climate-stressed regions. It argues that while 'water wars' are rare, the failure to integrate grassroots concerns into national strategies can exacerbate local tensions and undermine regional stability. The brief highlights how armed conflict destroys infrastructure and how climate-induced scarcity can reduce altruism and increase in-group bias. It recommends bridging these gaps through inclusive governance, technological innovation, and evidence-based policymaking to foster resilience and peacebuilding.

The report identifies 2024 as the year with the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946, with 61 conflicts across 36 countries. While the total number of battle-related deaths in 2024 (approximately 129,000) was similar to 2023, it remains the fourth most violent year since 1989, driven primarily by wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Ethiopia's Tigray region. The paper notes a growing complexity in conflict dynamics, where a higher share of conflict-affected countries now host multiple simultaneous conflicts. Non-state conflicts decreased slightly to 74 in 2024, with Africa becoming the region with the highest number of such conflicts. One-sided violence increased to 14,000 fatalities in 2024, with non-state actors responsible for the majority of deaths, although 14 governments also perpetrated such violence.

The 2025/26 Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index ranks 181 countries, with Denmark scoring highest (.939) and Afghanistan lowest (.279). The report highlights a global stagnation or decline in women's status, coinciding with a historic peak in armed conflict. In 2024, 676 million women lived within 50 kilometers of armed conflict, a 74 percent increase since 2010. While developed countries generally lead the rankings, significant improvements were noted in fragile states like Congo and South Sudan. The report emphasizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women, citing severe humanitarian crises in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, Myanmar, and Ethiopia, and calls for urgent investment in women to foster peaceful and resilient societies.

The Energizing Healthcare 2025 conference addressed the energy access gap affecting 1 billion people served by health facilities with unreliable or no electricity. The report highlights the need for approximately USD 5 billion in funding by 2030 to close this gap. Key discussions centered on moving beyond simple connections to focus on energy consumption, sustainable operations and maintenance (O&M), and the adoption of innovative financing models like Energy-as-a-Service and blended finance. The event also emphasized the integration of healthcare electrification into national climate plans and the critical need for energy-efficient medical equipment, noting that up to 70% of such equipment in developing countries is currently unused due to power issues.

The report finds that global progress toward SDG 7 is off track, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. While electricity access reached 92% in 2023, 666 million people remain unconnected. Clean cooking access stands at 74%, leaving 2.1 billion people dependent on polluting fuels. Renewable energy's share of total final energy consumption was 17.9% in 2022, and global energy intensity improved by 2.1% in 2022. International public financial flows to developing countries for clean energy reached USD 21.6 billion in 2023, though this remains below the 2016 peak of USD 28.4 billion.

The document examines China's role as the dominant economy in the expanded BRICS bloc, arguing that China views the group as a tool to counter Western hegemony and advance its own geopolitical goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. While the bloc has achieved significant milestones through the New Development Bank and advocacy for climate justice, the paper highlights severe internal tensions—particularly between China and India—and regional rivalries among new members like Iran and Saudi Arabia that may hinder the bloc's cohesion.

The report evaluates the Nutrition Sensitive Agriculture Capacity and System Strengthening (NSA CASE) project (2019–2024) in Ethiopia's Oromia, Amhara, and Somali regions. Using the Sustainable Asset Valuation (SAVi) methodology, the analysis finds that investing in nature-based infrastructure—such as drought-tolerant crops, perennial fruit trees, and moisture-harvesting technologies—can yield a return of up to USD 2.37 for every USD 1 invested over 26 years. This total benefit is estimated at USD 46 billion (ETB 5,161 billion), encompassing avoided costs from floods and droughts, increased agricultural productivity, carbon storage, and reduced malnutrition.

The document analyzes the factors driving the high demand for BRICS membership, introducing the concept of 'magnetic pull'—where ideas about development and systemic reform act as coalition magnets. It traces the group's expansion from South Africa's entry in 2010 to the 2023 enlargement (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE) and the 2024 introduction of a 'Partner Country' category. While the group's appeal is rooted in South-South cooperation and de-dollarization, the author notes challenges to internal cohesion and the limits of its attraction, as seen in Argentina's rejection of membership.

The research paper examines the gap between constitutional human rights declarations and actual implementation within BRICS nations. It argues that the organisation, now expanded to include several non-democratic states, may function as a shield for autocratic regimes to avoid Western-led human rights sanctions while pursuing economic and geopolitical influence. The author highlights systemic violations across member states, including democratic backsliding in Brazil and India, war crimes in Russia, state-sponsored forced labour in China, and systemic corruption and xenophobia in South Africa, concluding that BRICS members often instrumentalise human rights rhetoric to assert regional dominance.