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The report finds that European supermarkets generally exhibit low ambition and transparency regarding plastic pollution, with a global average score of only 13.1%. Most retailers prioritize recyclability over waste prevention and reuse, often relying on voluntary commitments and 'greenwashing' tactics rather than systemic changes. While some UK and Irish retailers score higher, there is significant inconsistency within international groups, and very few support binding government targets or comprehensive deposit return systems.

The report finds that European supermarkets generally perform poorly in managing plastic pollution, with a mean score of 13.1% across transparency, commitments, and policy support. While some UK and Irish chains like Aldi score higher, many others show minimal transparency and a preference for voluntary commitments over systemic changes like reuse and mandatory deposit systems. The analysis highlights instances of greenwashing, where plastic waste collected in stores was exported and illegally dumped in Turkey.

The report contends that fossil gas cannot be considered a transition fuel due to significant methane leakage and the need for rapid decarbonisation by 2030. It argues that the EU's Complementary Delegated Act threatens the credibility of the EU Taxonomy by allowing fossil gas as a transitional activity. The document advocates for a rapid shift to low-carbon hydrogen, prioritised for hard-to-abate sectors, and warns against 'gas blending' as an inefficient decarbonisation strategy. It recommends the use of additionality requirements for electrolysers to prevent them from cannibalising renewable energy growth and suggests various financial mechanisms, including Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) and green public procurement, to mobilise investment. The report also emphasizes the need for a Just Transition to protect workers and low-income households from the regressive effects of carbon pricing.

The report argues that Canada's electrical systems must become "plus grands, plus propres et plus intelligents" (larger, cleaner, and smarter) to support national carbon neutrality by 2050. It identifies 'safe bets' (valeurs sûres)—such as expanding wind and solar capacity, improving energy efficiency, and phasing out unabated fossil fuels—and 'risky bets' (paris risqués), including small modular reactors and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The analysis emphasizes that while technical solutions exist, significant social, institutional, and political barriers remain, particularly regarding interregional grid integration and Indigenous leadership in the energy transition.

The document examines the limitations of GDP as a measure of progress, noting that the pursuit of material gain leads to social inequity and environmental degradation. It identifies systemic roadblocks to redefining prosperity—including national reliance on GDP for revenue, cultural associations of success with consumption, and business models based on consumerism. The authors propose a suite of actions, such as the adoption of complementary well-being indicators, the potential introduction of wealth taxes to decouple growth from resource use, and a shift in corporate marketing to reshape societal values. Case studies from countries like Bhutan, Australia, and the UK illustrate various ways beyond-GDP indicators have been implemented.

The report examines the global and regional context of oil and gas transitions, focusing on the North Sea region. It identifies a significant 'ambition gap' between national net-zero targets and actual industrial strategies in the UK and Norway, while noting Denmark as a first-mover with a 2050 phase-out date. Using a scorecard analysis based on seven just transition principles, the report finds that while Scotland leads in support for workers and communities, the UK and Norway struggle with carbon lock-in due to continued licensing and a lack of comprehensive regional support policies.

The document proposes 'multifunctionality'—the simultaneous provision of multiple functions across natural and human traits—as a systemic approach to climate adaptation. It identifies roadblocks in current nature-based solutions (NbS), such as a lack of awareness regarding power relations, insufficient data on co-benefits and costs, and financing gaps. The authors advocate for 'hybrid solutions' that combine green, blue, and grey infrastructure and outline four leverage realms for action: defining beneficiaries, designing for interoperability, monitoring across scales, and governing for connectivity and justice.

The paper examines the historical roots of the human-nature divide, particularly in 'WEIRD' (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) countries, where nature is often viewed instrumentally. It contrasts this with indigenous worldviews that see humans as integral to the biosphere. The authors argue that human-nature connectedness (HNC) is a contextual ability that can be fostered through nature accessibility, authentic education, and the legal recognition of the Rights of Nature to move toward a biocentric model of sustainability.

The Arctic is warming up to four times faster than the global average, leading to rapid sea ice loss and permafrost melt. These changes disrupt global weather patterns and increase risks from commercial shipping, resource extraction, and pollution. While the Arctic Council provides a framework for cooperation and the Stockholm Convention has successfully reduced persistent organic pollutants, current governance is hindered by weak legal structures and geopolitical tensions, specifically following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The document advocates for stronger greenhouse gas mitigation and the potential establishment of an Arctic sanctuary.

The policy brief contends that Germany cannot achieve climate neutrality by 2045 without carbon management technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS), direct air capture (DAC), and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). It highlights that current industrial emissions reductions are insufficient and that a lack of CO2 transport infrastructure and storage sites within Germany necessitates a strategy to connect to regional hubs in Northern Europe. The document further argues that carbon management is essential for decarbonizing the hydrogen economy—specifically through the use of blue hydrogen—and for producing the low-carbon industrial materials required for the renewable energy transition.

The briefing analyzes 1,047 energy policies adopted between January 2020 and November 2021, finding that most governments prioritize short-term poverty reduction over long-term inequality reduction. While 60% of policies could reduce poverty, only 11% are likely to decrease inequality. The authors identify 'win-win' policies (e.g., energy efficiency in social housing) and 'lose-lose' policies (e.g., fossil fuel extraction support), arguing that the social outcomes of energy transitions depend heavily on policy design, contextual factors, and complementary social protections.

The author examines the electoral impact of government participation for European Green parties, arguing that while simple 'before and after' comparisons often show a drop in vote share, this is frequently a reversion to a party's base performance rather than a punishment for governing. The analysis finds no significant correlation between electoral outcomes and the number of portfolios held, party ideology, or the ideology of coalition partners. However, a strong link is identified between 'defecting' (leaving government early) and poor election results, suggesting that internal divisions and perceived incompetence during premature exits lead to voter punishment.

In 2021, wind and solar generated over 10% of global electricity for the first time, but record-high electricity demand led to a record rise in coal power and the largest absolute increase in power sector CO2 emissions ever recorded.

In 2021, wind and solar power reached a record 10.3% of global electricity generation, but this growth was insufficient to offset a historic surge in electricity demand. Consequently, global coal generation and power sector CO2 emissions both hit all-time highs, with coal meeting 59% of new demand. While 50 countries now derive over 10% of their power from wind and solar, the report warns that the global energy transition is significantly off track from the IEA's net-zero pathway, which requires wind and solar to grow by 20% annually through 2030.

In 2021, global electricity demand grew by 5.4%, the fastest rate since 2010. While solar and wind generation continued to rise, coal generation reached an all-time high, leading to a 7% increase in power sector CO2 emissions. This resulted in the first increase in global electricity carbon intensity since 2011, moving the sector further away from the IEA's 1.5 degree pathway.

The document analyzes how Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland created a highly integrated electricity market, notably through the Nord Pool exchange, to balance variable renewable energy with hydroelectric storage. It argues that Canada's 'balkanized' grid, characterized by provincial control and political resistance, could benefit from similar bilateral exchanges—specifically linking hydroelectric-rich provinces like Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia with those transitioning from fossil fuels—to lower costs and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.

The document analyzes the Nordic model of electricity co-operation—characterized by two-way trade, market harmonization via Nord Pool, and regional governance—as a blueprint for Canada. It argues that Canadian provinces could lower decarbonization costs by using hydro-rich provinces as 'batteries' to back up variable renewable energy in other regions, provided they overcome political resistance and regulatory misalignment.

The document details EU member state reactions to the proposed extension of the Emission Trading System (ETS) to road transport and buildings (RTB). While many delegations support the measure to meet the -55% emission target by 2030, significant concerns persist regarding socio-economic impacts on vulnerable groups, the sufficiency of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), and the timing of implementation. The briefing also notes discussions on the Effort Sharing Regulation, LULUCF targets, and CO2 standards for vehicles.

The South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) outlines a framework to localise the wind, solar PV, and battery energy storage value chains. It argues that localising 70% of components and 90% of Balance of Plant (BoP) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) could create 36,500 direct jobs and contribute R420 billion to GDP by 2030. The plan emphasizes the need for market certainty through consistent public procurement and the transition to a points-based local content scoring system to incentivize high-value manufacturing over simple CAPEX spend. It specifically targets 'Just Transition hotspots' like Mpumalanga to pivot coal-sector workers into the green economy.

In 2021, EU-27 electricity demand nearly returned to 2019 levels, with renewables reaching a record 1068 TWh and accounting for 37% of production. A critical shift occurred in the second half of 2021 when soaring gas prices made fossil gas more expensive than coal, leading new renewable output to predominantly replace gas rather than coal. While wind and solar output hit record highs (547 TWh), overall power sector emissions fell by an average of 2.5% per year since 2019, which is less than half the 6% annual decline required to align with a 1.5C pathway. Nuclear power continued a long-term structural decline, accounting for 26% of production in 2021.