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The document provides a detailed analysis of the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which aims to secure the EU's supply of 17 strategic raw materials by 2030. It highlights the risks of fast-tracked permitting for 'Strategic Projects', the potential for 'greenwashing' through private certification schemes, and the challenges facing Indigenous Peoples and local communities in exercising their rights to participation and consent. The guide also examines the interaction between the CRMA and existing EU environmental directives, such as the Habitats and Birds Directives, and outlines the limited access to justice available to stakeholders.

The report argues that artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is an underestimated but significant contributor to the global supply of critical minerals, particularly cobalt, tin, and tantalum. It highlights that while some minerals like lithium have high potential for ASM extraction in pegmatite deposits, others like graphite are less viable due to low value per unit of weight. The document emphasizes that the sector's deep informality, lack of geological data, and restrictive licensing frameworks hinder its potential. It presents case studies from the DRC, Indonesia, and Chile to demonstrate both the challenges of informality and the success of formalization models like Chile's ENAMI. The report concludes that for ASM to become a reliable supplier, governments must streamline licensing, provide geological foundations for small-scale plots, and create tailored regulatory frameworks specifically for critical minerals rather than relying on generic gold or gemstone policies.

The document argues that Africa-EU and Africa-Germany relations are still defined by 'coloniality', manifesting as power imbalances that marginalise African agency. It critiques the EU's security-development nexus and the 'Samoa Agreement' for prioritising European interests, and examines German development aid through the GIZ as often intrusive or tokenistic. The author highlights the exploitation of raw materials and the use of intelligence services to acquire indigenous medicines as contemporary colonial practices. To decolonise, the paper recommends respecting African demands on trade and resource beneficiation, ending the 'Europeanisation' of security missions, and shifting from development aid to industrialisation projects.

The ninth FOCAC Beijing Summit signaled a recalibration of China-Africa relations, moving toward a partnership defined by African agency and a focus on quality outcomes over quantity. Despite a period of declining lending since 2016, China committed USD 50.7 billion over three years, focusing on agricultural market access, mineral processing, and infrastructure. The summit highlighted Africa's desire for value addition and industrialization, as well as China's assertive push to promote its governance model and Global South leadership through the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. This shift poses a competitive challenge to the EU and US, as African nations increasingly prioritize partnerships that offer tangible utility and respect for sovereignty.

India aims to indigenize battery manufacturing through the PLI-ACC scheme to install 50 GWh of capacity by 2026, yet remains heavily reliant on imports for cells, components, and machinery. The report identifies six primary challenges: skilled labour shortages, a lack of testing and validation centres, dependence on imported critical minerals, insufficient recycling infrastructure, the need for ESG standards to ensure export competitiveness, and high import dependence for manufacturing equipment. It recommends prioritizing the localization of synthetic anodes, electrolytes, and LFP cathodes, while expanding R&D for next-generation technologies like sodium-ion batteries.

The report examines the potential for mining companies to share their digital infrastructure—such as high-speed connectivity and data processing technologies—with host communities to catalyze economic diversification and social benefits. It identifies significant barriers, including the 'usage gap' driven by digital illiteracy and a lack of devices, and a pronounced gender digital divide. The document provides policy recommendations to integrate digital connectivity into local content strategies, improve inter-ministerial coordination, and establish public-private partnerships to ensure the long-term sustainability of these networks beyond the mine's life cycle.

The report analyzes the complex landscape of African migration governance, highlighting the role of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in promoting free movement and regional integration. It identifies significant gaps between the adoption of policy frameworks—such as the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 2018 Free Movement Protocol—and their actual implementation. The document emphasizes the growing impact of climate change as a driver of mobility and the risks posed by the increasing use of immigration detention. It concludes that while subregional progress exists, overlapping memberships in RECs and a lack of compliance monitoring hinder the achievement of a borderless continent.

The DRC and Zambia are attempting to transition from extractive economies to value-added battery producers to support the global green transition. While they possess critical reserves of cobalt and copper, their efforts are complicated by a history of privatization, problematic governance, and a geopolitical tug-of-war between the USA and China. To succeed, both nations must expand local processing capacity and improve infrastructure, such as the Lobito Corridor, while managing the social and environmental impacts of mining.

The report uses a GTAP-E model to find that a USD 100/t carbon levy would generally reduce GDP and household incomes across Africa, increase global food prices, and reduce the supply of maritime services. It highlights that African importers already face disproportionately high freight rates, which a carbon tax would exacerbate. The authors recommend that the IMO implement a redistribution mechanism based on climate vulnerability and historical emissions, providing direct grants for out-of-sector projects like green hydrogen and resilient agriculture.

Climate finance in Africa grew by 48% between 2019/20 and 2021/22, reaching USD 43.7 billion, yet this remains only 23% of the annual funding required to meet 2030 NDC goals. Public finance dominates the landscape, providing 82% of total flows, while private finance is heavily concentrated in energy systems and a small number of countries. The report highlights a critical 'trilemma' where climate-vulnerable countries are often simultaneously debt-distressed and conflict-affected, further hindering their access to grants and affordable capital. Key recommendations include reforming domestic fiscal policies to remove fossil fuel subsidies, scaling the use of guarantees to de-risk private investment, and leveraging domestic institutional assets, such as pension funds, to reduce reliance on international debt.

The document examines the role of migrant remittances as a resilient financial flow to Africa, highlighting their potential to bypass bureaucratic barriers in climate adaptation. It notes that while remittances reached US$100.1 billion in 2022, high transaction costs and low climate literacy hinder their effectiveness. The brief recommends lowering remittance costs, enhancing diaspora engagement through mechanisms like diaspora bonds, and improving climate literacy to empower local communities in building resilience.

The document examines Africa's potential to enter the solar PV manufacturing value chain, highlighting its abundance of critical minerals like copper and tin and high solar irradiance. It identifies significant barriers, including China's dominance of over 80% of the global value chain, high capital requirements for polysilicon production, and a lack of domestic technological capacity. The authors argue that individual African countries lack the resources to compete and instead recommend a regionalized strategy to pool resources and achieve economies of scale.

The document examines Zimbabwe's position as Africa's largest holder of lithium reserves amidst a global surge in demand for critical raw materials for electric vehicle batteries. It argues that while lithium mining offers a path to upper-middle-income status by 2030, the country faces significant risks from corruption, resource leakage, and a lack of industrial capacity for local beneficiation. The paper highlights the dominance of Chinese investment and the challenges of artisanal mining conflicts. It recommends strengthening tax regimes, mandating technology transfer, and pursuing regional collaboration to move beyond the export of unprocessed ores.

The document analyzes the potential for African nations to move beyond the "pit to port" model of mineral extraction by building integrated battery mineral value chains. It highlights Africa's significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, and vanadium, and examines the macroeconomic shift from fossil fuel revenues to transition mineral revenues. The paper identifies Morocco as a leader in integrating automotive assembly with battery material production and discusses the potential for South Africa to act as a regional integrator. It concludes that while a continent-wide strategy is unlikely, sub-regional strategies and national policy instruments—such as strategic non-alignment and targeted industrial policies for e-mobility—can help African countries capture more value from their mineral endowments.

The EU CRMA and UK CMS aim to reduce dependence on China and secure supplies for the green transition, but their domestic focus may hinder African industrialization. While the EU targets 10% domestic mining and 40% processing by 2030, its international partnerships are criticized as extractivist. The brief highlights a misalignment in 'criticality' definitions, where African states prioritize regional industrialization and specific minerals like gold or coal, which may conflict with Western climate goals or sanctions. It concludes that without a shift toward supporting in-country processing and reducing certification costs for local firms, these strategies will fail to create mutually beneficial partnerships.

In 2023, Global Witness documented 196 murders of land and environmental defenders, contributing to a total of 2,106 since 2012. Latin America remains the most dangerous region, accounting for 85% of 2023 cases, with Colombia recording the highest number of killings (79). The report highlights a systemic pattern of violence including forced disappearances in Mexico and judicial harassment in Asia. Mining is identified as the primary industrial driver of these killings. The document argues that indigenous peoples, who protect 80% of the world's remaining biodiversity, are disproportionately targeted. It calls for the implementation of the Escazú Agreement and greater inclusion of indigenous knowledge in global climate negotiations.

The document analyzes China's dominance in Africa's critical minerals landscape, highlighting its role as a primary investor and buyer. It argues that while Africa's reserves are vital for the global energy transition, the current model of exporting raw materials without local processing limits socioeconomic benefits and risks environmental degradation. The brief recommends that African governments pursue strategic partnerships, invest in research and development, and build energy infrastructure to move up the value chain, while urging international partners to support technology transfer and local capacity building.

The document analyzes the global race to secure critical minerals, detailing the subsidy-driven strategies of the US, EU, UK, and Canada, and the dominant market position of China in battery production. It argues that African nations can leverage their mineral wealth to drive sustainable structural transformation by adopting a 'climate-resilient developmental regionalism' framework under the AfCFTA, which integrates climate adaptation and mitigation with regional industrialization.

Since 2014, the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance has supported 78 instruments that mobilized over USD 4 billion, including USD 1.6 billion from the private sector. The report highlights the necessity of balancing innovation with 'actionability'—ensuring projects are bankable and scalable. Key strategies for unlocking private capital include blended finance to mitigate chronic risks, aggregation to handle small-ticket investments, and the use of Theory of Change (ToC) frameworks to quantify social and environmental impacts. Case studies illustrate successes like Brazil's Green FIDC, which achieved 100% private funding, and challenges like South Africa's Climate Adaptation Notes, which stalled due to an unreliable project pipeline. The document also emphasizes the importance of gender-responsive finance and the need for systemic regulatory shifts to make low-carbon investment the default for institutional investors.

The Landbanking Group (TLG) is introducing Nature Equity Assets (NEAs), a new asset class that uses real-time Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) technology to value the ecological uplift of High Integrity Forests (HIFs) and regenerative agriculture. The instrument employs a blended finance approach, providing discounted loans to land stewards—primarily Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs)—who repay the capital through commodity sales and outcome-based payments from corporate or government funders. Initial pilot projects are targeting the soy and cacao value chains in Brazil, with future expansions planned for Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Quantitative modeling suggests that regenerative agriculture is more profitable for land stewards than conventional methods, though standalone conservation projects currently require concessional grants to be viable.