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The Minsk process, led by France and Germany from 2014 to 2021, failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict and ended with Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The author argues that the process was doomed by a fundamental gap in strategies: while Russia used the agreements to manipulate the West and prepare for war, and Ukraine struggled with politically impossible domestic demands, the mediators remained blind to these tensions, prioritizing a 'frozen' conflict to protect economic interests and demonstrate European diplomatic autonomy.

An attribution study by the World Weather Attribution initiative found that human-induced climate change doubled the likelihood of the heavy precipitation associated with Storm Bettina and increased its intensity by approximately 5 percent. In contrast, the study found no clear evidence that climate change influenced the wind speeds of the event, attributing observed decreases in wind speed to natural variability. The analysis notes that warming increases the proportion of precipitation falling as rain rather than snow, exacerbating flood damages, and that the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war increased the vulnerability of affected populations.

The document defines water weaponization as the exploitation of the human need for water by deliberately rendering it scarce or insecure. It applies a six-category matrix—Strategic, Tactical, Coercive, Unintentional, Psychological Terror, and Extortion/Incentivization—to the Russia-Ukraine war. Key findings include Russia's draining of the Kakhovka Reservoir, which threatens the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power station, and the use of water denial in cities like Mariupol and Mykolaiv. Ukraine is also noted for strategic water denial in Crimea (2014) and tactical flooding in the Demydiv region. The authors argue for the expansion of U.S. climate finance for water adaptation, the use of the International Court of Justice to prosecute water infrastructure destruction as war crimes, and the integration of water management into the Global Fragility Act.

The document examines Ukraine's pursuit of EU and NATO integration, contrasting the assertive rhetoric of the Poroshenko administration (2014-2019) with the more pragmatic, technocratic approach of the Zelensky administration (2019-present). It details the 'three pillars' of Poroshenko's strategy—pro-integration rhetoric, technical harmonisation with EU/NATO standards, and expanding third-country partnerships—and notes that Zelensky has shifted priority toward sectoral integration in digital, energy, and customs markets. The text also discusses the challenges of the war in Donbas, the Normandy Four diplomatic framework, and the potential for the European Green Deal to serve as a framework for future Ukraine-EU cooperation.

The briefing examines the first EU-South Africa summit since 2013, highlighting the importance of attracting foreign direct investment and leveraging the EU's External Investment Plan. It notes that while the EU is South Africa's largest investment partner and a primary destination for manufactured exports, the partnership has struggled due to internal crises in both regions. The agenda includes economic cooperation, sustainable energy, multilateralism, and climate change.

The author contends that the Russian leadership's 'imperial rationality' and aggression in Ukraine have invalidated previous EU hopes that economic cooperation would foster Russian democratization. The text highlights a lack of unity among EU member states, where some maintain ties with Russian energy entities while others impose restrictions. It argues that energy security requires moving beyond simple route diversification toward systemic energy efficiency and renewable energy to reduce financial, technological, and fuel dependencies, including those in the nuclear sector.

The document defines a Green foreign policy as a holistic approach that prioritizes human rights, democracy, and environmental sustainability over narrow economic interests. It advocates for the reform of international organizations like the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions to increase transparency and representation for the Global South. The framework emphasizes the strengthening of international law, specifically the International Criminal Court, and supports restrictive weapons export policies and UN-mandated military interventions. It also calls for a development agenda that links environmental sustainability with social inclusion and conflict prevention through the 'Responsibilities to Protect' (R2P) framework.

The signatories argue that Russia has escalated its conflict in Ukraine through the deployment of regular troops and heavy military equipment, specifically targeting industrial hubs like Mariupol to create a land bridge to Crimea. They contend that the Russian leadership seeks to destabilize Ukraine to prevent it from becoming a successful, democratically reformed state. The authors urge the EU to impose new sanctions, provide humanitarian aid, secure energy supplies, and offer financial assistance to prevent economic collapse, while calling for the suspension of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens as a sign of solidarity.

Following the 2014 removal of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia intervened militarily in Ukraine, leading to the annexation of Crimea via a disputed referendum. The author argues that Russia's justification of protecting the 'Russian world' sets a dangerous precedent for further aggression against other former Soviet states.

The document analyzes the 2014 annexation of Crimea, arguing that while Russia violated the political commitments of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the Crimean authorities violated Ukrainian constitutional law, the legal status of the annexation is complex due to the nature of 'memorandums' versus treaties and the restrictive application of the 'right to self-determination' in international law. It concludes that the Security Council is unable to act due to Russia's veto, leaving the region in a state where it is legally considered part of Ukraine by most states but practically controlled by Russia.

The author calls for the EU to leverage its economic influence over Russia to end the occupation of Crimea and provide Ukraine with a structured support package. This package includes ten priorities focusing on electoral integrity, institutional reform, energy diversification, and economic modernization to prevent national bankruptcy and ensure long-term stability on the EU's eastern border.

The report examines the domestic contexts of Ukraine and Kazakhstan regarding clean energy investment. It identifies a shared legacy of high energy intensity and a common struggle with corruption, bureaucracy, and insufficient legal frameworks. While both countries possess significant renewable potential, they remain heavily reliant on conventional sources—Ukraine on nuclear and imported gas, and Kazakhstan on domestic coal and oil. The study highlights that the lack of market-based incentives, such as feed-in tariffs, and low electricity prices are primary obstacles to private investment. It also analyzes the role of the Kyoto Protocol's Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism as a potential financial driver, noting Ukraine's relative success in this area compared to Kazakhstan's delayed ratification process.

The document analyzes 38 Russian and 15 Ukrainian JI projects submitted to the JISC by September 2007. It finds that while Russia has a larger total volume of projected emission reductions, Ukraine's portfolio is more diverse and shows a higher rate of technology transfer and foreign investment relative to its economy. Russia's portfolio is heavily dominated by gas pipeline refurbishment, whereas Ukraine's is led by industrial energy saving and coal mine methane projects. The author attributes these differences to institutional readiness, with Ukraine having established a more effective project approval system than Russia.

The Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) is launching the TECH 4 Resilience Challenge to identify and scale AI innovations that enhance humanitarian preparedness and response to climate shocks. The initiative targets entrepreneurs and organisations operating in low- and middle-income countries, offering winners up to US$50,000 in funding, alongside mentoring, a virtual Leadership Academy, and investment mobilisation support. Eligible solutions must address extreme climate events or strengthen Anticipatory Action frameworks, with a priority on locally led innovations benefiting women and youth. The challenge opens on 1 August 2025, with final winners announced in November/December 2025 for implementation throughout 2026.

A joint investigation by Global Witness and Radio Free Europe (RFE) identifies a supply chain connecting Wintershall Dea's gas condensate production in Western Siberia to the Salavat refinery, which in turn supplies diesel to companies with Russian military contracts. While the report notes it is not possible to determine if a specific barrel of diesel contains Wintershall's condensate, it highlights that the refinery's output reaches suppliers for the Federal Guard Service (FSO) and other military units. The report criticizes Wintershall for its continued shareholding in these ventures and its pursuit of German government compensation despite these connections.

The briefing argues that European and U.S. energy companies provided nearly USD 100 billion to the Russian government through oil and gas projects from 2014 to 2021. Using Rystad Energy data, the report identifies BP as the largest contributor, accounting for 80% of the total. The authors contend that these investments provided critical technological expertise and capital to Vladimir Putin's regime, persisting from the 2014 Crimea annexation until the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.