FALSE HOPES AND BROKEN PROMISES ON THE ROAD TO WAR: THE MINSK PROCESS TO MANAGE THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT, 2014-2021

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The Minsk process, led by France and Germany from 2014 to 2021, failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict and ended with Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The author argues that the process was doomed by a fundamental gap in strategies: while Russia used the agreements to manipulate the West and prepare for war, and Ukraine struggled with politically impossible domestic demands, the mediators remained blind to these tensions, prioritizing a 'frozen' conflict to protect economic interests and demonstrate European diplomatic autonomy.

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  • The Minsk process failed because the mediators, France and Germany, ignored the incompatible strategies of Russia and Ukraine, mistakenly believing the conflict was satisfactorily 'frozen'.
  • Russia's strategy involved manipulating the Minsk agreements to mislead mediators, put pressure on Ukraine, and secure material benefits, including the 'centrally-planned looting' of industrial assets from the Donbas region.
  • Ukraine viewed the implementation of the Minsk agreements as nearly impossible due to a lack of public support for granting special political status to the Donetsk and Luhansk quasi-republics.
  • The mediators' decision to exclude the United States from the process was a weakness, as Russia viewed US engagement as the primary factor of importance, leaving the Minsk deal open to abuse.
  • The Minsk-2 agreement was politically meaningful but not legally binding, as it was signed by an OSCE representative rather than the presidents of Russia and Ukraine.
  • France and Germany adopted an ambivalent stance that allowed Russia to pretend it was a mediator rather than a party to the conflict, which camouflaged the inter-state nature of the aggression.

Cite the original document

APA
Baev, P. K. (2024). FALSE HOPES AND BROKEN PROMISES ON THE ROAD TO WAR: THE MINSK PROCESS TO MANAGE THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT, 2014-2021. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/f987ab10-af59-4d55-b775-bdd37aeacc27/FCDO grant case_Minsk.pdf?inline=true
Chicago
Baev, Pavel K. FALSE HOPES AND BROKEN PROMISES ON THE ROAD TO WAR: THE MINSK PROCESS TO MANAGE THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT, 2014-2021. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2024. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/f987ab10-af59-4d55-b775-bdd37aeacc27/FCDO grant case_Minsk.pdf?inline=true.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Baev |first1=Pavel K. |title=FALSE HOPES AND BROKEN PROMISES ON THE ROAD TO WAR: THE MINSK PROCESS TO MANAGE THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT, 2014-2021 |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=December 2024 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/f987ab10-af59-4d55-b775-bdd37aeacc27/FCDO grant case_Minsk.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{baev2024false, author = {Baev, Pavel K.}, title = {{FALSE HOPES AND BROKEN PROMISES ON THE ROAD TO WAR: THE MINSK PROCESS TO MANAGE THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT, 2014-2021}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2024}, month = dec, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/f987ab10-af59-4d55-b775-bdd37aeacc27/FCDO grant case_Minsk.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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