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In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The assessment finds that electrifying Ulaanbaatar's bus fleet is economically viable, with a discounted net benefit of MNT 93,355 million (USD 26.3 million) and a benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) of 1.09 over 25 years. The primary economic drivers are avoided fuel costs and lower maintenance requirements. These benefits increase substantially if electrification is paired with a modal shift from private vehicles to public transport; a 10% shift would raise the BCR to 3.63 and net benefits to USD 774.8 million. The analysis emphasizes that traditional valuations often underestimate such projects by ignoring environmental and social externalities like air and noise pollution.

The report identifies 47 unchallenged cases of climate misinformation across six German TV channels (Sat.1, ZDF, ProSieben, RTL, Das Erste, and Kabel Eins) from April 2025 to April 2026. It finds that misinformation is often reactive, peaking around political events like the 2025 federal elections and the 2026 Climate Action Programme. The most dominant narratives target the economic and technical reliability of the Energiewende, while others focus on nuclear energy inaccuracies and the deflection of national responsibility. Politicians and guests are the primary vectors, accounting for 70% of cases, though journalists and commentators also contribute nearly 30%. Both public (ZDF) and private (Sat.1) broadcasters show vulnerability, with ZDF's risk linked to political talk shows and Sat.1's to the loosely structured format of morning shows. The report recommends journalist training on obstruction mechanisms, real-time fact-checking for live panels, and the creation of an independent media observatory.

The report finds that TotalEnergies' investment strategy heavily favors fossil fuels, with 4.8 dollars invested in oil and gas for every dollar spent on integrated power in 2025. The company's 2030 production targets are projected to be at least 59% higher than levels required for NZE alignment. While diversifying into renewables, the report notes this is largely through acquisitions and remains marginal, with oil and gas expected to represent 83% of the energy mix by 2030. Additionally, the company is expanding its LNG capacity and gas power production, while relying on CCUS and offsets to meet emissions targets it has recently modified, including a statement in 2026 that it could no longer commit to a 'net zero' objective.

The document argues that the energy transition within the expanded BRICS bloc is a contest of power between incumbent fossil-industrial interests and emerging green regimes. It identifies a 'grey space' of hybrid compromise where ambitious climate rhetoric masks continued fossil fuel expansion. To navigate this, the authors introduce the BRICS Climate and Energy Compass and a strategic action plan focusing on financial architecture reform, investment in hard-to-abate sectors, and the localisation of climate finance.

The briefing argues that while climate and sustainable development goals are theoretically synergistic, actual policy coherence is hindered by political inequality, vested interests, and the prioritization of economic growth. Through analysis of nine countries and global NDC data, the research demonstrates that coherence is not a neutral technocratic exercise but a political process with significant distributional consequences, often burdening vulnerable groups when political will for equity is absent.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While the number of countries pursuing new coal projects dropped to 32, China and India continue massive expansions. In Indonesia, the growth of captive coal plants for nickel and aluminium processing contradicts national climate commitments, with the RUPTL 2025-2034 continuing to plan for on-grid coal investment despite a formal moratorium.

The document argues that Indonesia's legal framework fails to align with OECD Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct, specifically regarding the recognition of Indigenous Peoples' land rights and the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). It highlights how 'national strategic projects' and the 'Omnibus Law' facilitate investment at the expense of human rights, often supported by military deployment. The coalition recommends that the OECD demand a timeline for the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Bill, accelerated land recognition, and the cessation of military involvement in development projects.

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) developed a spatial analysis using dasymetric mapping and source-specific buffers to quantify population exposure to freight pollution in the contiguous US. The research found that over 66 million people live near freight facilities and corridors, with higher concentrations of facilities strongly correlating with increased cancer risk, diesel particulate matter, and social inequities. To address this, the document reviews indirect source rules (ISRs), which require facilities to mitigate the pollution attracted by their operations through options such as zero-emission vehicle deployment, charging infrastructure, and on-site renewable energy.

The report identifies that over 66 million people in the U.S. live near freight facilities and corridors, with those near clusters of 11 or more facilities facing a 32% higher cancer risk from air toxics than the national average. It advocates for Indirect Source Rules (ISRs), which require facilities to mitigate the pollution attracted by their operations, as a tool to address these disparities. The author details best practices for ISR design and proposes various compliance options, including the deployment of zero-emission vehicles, charging infrastructure, and innovative solutions like using wastewater treatment plant methane for port power.

The briefing argues that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) uses financial intermediaries (FIs) like Clifford Capital to bypass restrictions on fossil gas investments. While the ADB committed to Paris Agreement goals in 2017 and stopped financing coal, it provided approximately $4.48bn for oil and gas infrastructure in Asia Pacific between 2017 and 2025. The document highlights Clifford Capital, which received a $95m equity investment from the ADB in 2020, as a channel for funding fossil gas projects, including the Tangguh LNG project in Indonesia and Bhola-2 in Bangladesh. The authors call for greater transparency in FI lending, a prohibition on new fossil gas infrastructure funding, and a time-bound fossil fuels exit plan.