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Between 2021 and 2023, commercial banks in G7 countries provided US$101 billion to the coal industry, with American and Japanese banks contributing over US$73 billion. The report highlights that this financing exceeds the G7-led pledges for Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and calls for stricter capital requirements and prohibitions to ensure a phase-out aligned with 1.5°C goals.

Between 2021 and 2023, commercial banks from G7 countries provided $101 billion to the coal industry, with US and Japanese banks leading the funding. The report highlights that this financing far exceeds the G7-led funding promised for Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in developing nations. It criticizes the G7's goal of phasing out coal by the first half of the 2030s as insufficient to meet the 1.5°C warming limit and calls for strict capital requirements and bans on coal developers.

The document explores the application of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-P) in Colombia, analyzing international experiences from South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal. It identifies a significant financing gap, noting that public investment currently represents only 0.01% of required resources. The brief proposes a country platform to attract international public and private capital, while emphasizing the need for grants over loans to avoid increasing public debt. It prioritizes strategic projects such as energy communities and the phase-out of coal plants, while arguing against financing fossil fuel infrastructure or inefficient subsidies.

The report identifies a systemic link between Indonesia's coal industry, political elites, and national banks, which continues to fund fossil fuel expansion despite global climate commitments.

The EU has deployed various climate partnerships, including the Global Gateway and Just Energy Transition Partnerships, to bolster its climate diplomacy and counter global influences like China's Belt and Road Initiative. However, the report finds these efforts are hindered by fragmented communication, a lack of coherent vision across EU institutions and Member States, and insufficient resource allocation. To improve effectiveness, the report recommends aligning EU and Member State priorities, developing a long-term strategic vision, and securing high-level political leadership to ensure sustained commitment and resources.

The document argues that Mexico's power sector transition requires a shift to entirely renewables-based capacity, estimating investment needs of approximately $180 billion USD for two separate decades leading up to 2040. It highlights the complexity of calculating compensation for the early retirement of fossil gas plants, noting that needs could range from negative values to $9 billion USD depending on the methodology. Finally, it emphasizes that a socially just transition for workers and regions must be country-driven and tailored to specific local contexts through stakeholder engagement.

The report argues that Southeast Asia is at an energy crossroads, where planned gas infrastructure expansion could lock the region into economically volatile fuels and high capital costs, while renewable energy offers a cost-competitive and sustainable alternative. It highlights that in-development gas power and LNG projects would require over $220 billion in investment and could double the region's gas-fired capacity. The document details specific national strategies in Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, noting a trend of viewing gas as a 'transitional fuel'. It further critiques the role of international finance, particularly from Japan and South Korea, and the promotion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as potential delays to the energy transition. Conversely, it presents data showing that utility-scale solar and wind could meet nearly two-thirds of the projected increase in energy demand by 2030, provided that grid infrastructure and cross-border electricity trade, such as the ASEAN Power Grid, are developed.

The report analyzes Senegal-Germany bilateral relations between 2012 and 2022, noting that while German imports of Senegalese goods tripled, they remain small compared to France's. It highlights a shift from donor-recipient dynamics toward trade partnerships, exemplified by the Compact with Africa and Just Energy Transition Partnerships. However, German foreign direct investment in Senegal remains low compared to other West African nations like Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and significant data gaps persist regarding service exports and product granularity.

The report finds that global coal capacity reached a record high in 2023, totaling 2,130 GW, driven largely by China. While new construction starts reached a nine-year low outside China, they hit an eight-year high within China. Only 15% of global operating coal capacity has retirement commitments aligned with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal. In Indonesia, the transition is hindered by the rapid growth of 'captive' coal plants for nickel smelting, a reduction in renewable energy targets, and a financial taxonomy that classifies captive coal as 'transition' activities.

The report alleges that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a $600 million loan to Indonesia's state-run utility, Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), which lacks a 'no-coal' clause and may be used to fund coal expansion, including the Java 9 & 10 project. This contradicts ADB's public climate pledges and its October 2021 Energy Policy. The report highlights the severe health and environmental impacts of coal in Banten Province, where the Suralaya Power Station operates, and criticizes the lack of financial transparency as loan proceeds are mixed into PLN's general account.

The report finds that global coal capacity reached a historic high in 2023, increasing by 48.4 GW to a total of 2,130 GW. While new construction starts reached a nine-year low outside of China, China saw an eight-year high in new starts. Only 15% of global operating coal capacity has commitments to close in line with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal. In Indonesia, the report highlights a surge in 'captive' coal plants supporting nickel smelting, noting that 27.5% of Indonesia's operating coal capacity is captive. Despite the US$20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), Indonesia's early retirement targets for coal plants shrank from 5.5 GW to 1.7 GW in late 2023.

The report finds that while most countries are reducing coal proposals, global operating capacity grew by 48.4 GW in 2023, primarily driven by China. It highlights a stark divergence between China's construction surge and a record low in new starts elsewhere, while noting that only 15% of global operating coal capacity has a Paris-aligned retirement commitment.

The report finds that while Southeast Asia has increased its operating utility-scale solar and wind capacity by 20% since January 2023 to 28 GW, the transition is hindered by low construction rates for prospective projects and continued reliance on fossil fuels. Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand are regional leaders, but only 3% of the region's 220 GW prospective capacity is currently under construction. Despite these hurdles, the report suggests the ASEAN collective target of 35% renewable energy capacity by 2025 is attainable given existing capacity and pipelines.

The document argues that current climate finance models, particularly the 'Billions to Trillions' (B2T) agenda, prioritise private profit and neoliberal de-risking over human rights and public goods. It proposes a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to climate finance, organised into six clusters: national responsibilities, obligations to others, national sovereignty, financial flow responsibilities, crisis management, and procedural fairness. The toolkit specifically critiques South Africa's JET-IP for its heavy reliance on loans over grants and its focus on infrastructure over social justice elements like skills development. It provides 'How-to' guides for advocating for climate-responsive budgeting, technological transfer reform, parliamentary oversight of IFI loans, and the establishment of a progressive sovereign debt workout mechanism based on UNCTAD principles.

Between 2015 and 2021, Indonesia's financial sector committed USD 41.7 billion in climate-aligned investments, representing 15% of the country's total climate finance needs. Public and private financial institutions contributed nearly equal annual averages (USD 3.5 billion and USD 3.4 billion, respectively), though private contributions represent only 3% of their total investments. While public finance is dominated by Development Finance Institutions targeting renewable energy, private finance is concentrated in the AFOLU sector, particularly certified sustainable palm oil. To meet 2030 targets, Indonesia faces a climate finance gap of approximately USD 145 billion, requiring climate-aligned investment to scale by at least 4.5x this decade.

Reclaim Finance asserts that the 'transitioning away from fossil fuels' agreement at COP28 must be backed by concrete action from rich countries. It calls for the EU, US, Canada, Norway, the UK, and Australia to end domestic oil and gas production, stop their financial institutions from enabling global fossil fuel expansion, and provide concessional finance for just coal retirements and renewable energy deployment in the Global South.

The report argues that Senegal's strategy to fund its 2035 emerging economy goals through fossil fuel exports faces significant stranded asset risks due to declining global LNG demand and the competitiveness of renewable energy.

The policy brief argues that existing coal retirement mechanisms (CRMs) in Asia and Africa are failing to translate pledges into funding and effective plant closures. It identifies barriers such as the prevalence of non-concessional loans, the risk of 'emission leakage,' and the moral hazard of incentivizing new coal build-out. To address these, Reclaim Finance and 11 partner organizations propose ten principles, which include an immediate stop to coal expansion finance, the replacement of coal with renewables rather than gas, the prohibition of tradeable carbon offsets, and the requirement for transparent, auction-based retirement processes.

The policy brief argues that existing coal retirement mechanisms (CRMs) in Asia and Africa, such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), are failing due to insufficient funding, reliance on non-concessional loans, and lack of transparency. To address these failures, the authors propose ten principles. These include aligning phaseouts with 1.5°C pathways, immediately stopping all coal expansion finance, replacing coal only with sustainable renewables, and prohibiting the use of tradeable carbon offsets. The brief emphasizes that financing must be concessional to avoid increasing national debt and that the process must include social and environmental remediation for affected communities and workers.

The REIPPPP has successfully added 6,308.68 MW of renewable electricity to South Africa's grid and supported local industry, but it has been hindered by policy uncertainty, grid capacity bottlenecks, and a six-year gap between Bid Windows 4 and 5. The document argues that for the programme to reach the Integrated Resource Plan 2019 goals for solar PV and wind by 2030, South Africa must unbundle Eskom, establish an Independent Systems Market Operator (ISMO), and optimise transmission infrastructure. It recommends streamlining bid windows, enhancing regulatory transparency, and leveraging the South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) to promote strategic localisation and job creation.