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The report projects that Viet Nam's power sector labour force will grow from approximately 300,000 full-time employees (FTE) today to 500,000 FTEs by 2035. While coal-related jobs will decline, job creation in renewable energy—specifically solar PV and wind—is expected to outweigh these losses, with wind and solar accounting for over half of the direct labour force (around 300,000 FTEs) by the 2030s. The analysis emphasizes that the JETP scenario offers a more gradual build-up of technologies to reduce market volatility and suggests that increasing local content shares and implementing reskilling programmes are essential for a stable transition.

The report examines Indonesia's energy transition through a lens of national interest, highlighting a significant gap between the high investment needs for Net Zero Emissions (NZE) and the limited availability of domestic and international funding. It argues that foreign climate finance often arrives as debt rather than grants, potentially exacerbating Indonesia's chronic fiscal deficits and public debt. The document analyzes the capacity of the Indonesian banking sector to fund renewable energy projects, finding that while capital adequacy is generally high, systemic bottlenecks in foreign exchange liquidity and long-term stable funding persist. It also evaluates the nascent Indonesian carbon market, noting a lack of clear emission caps (PTBAE) and low carbon prices. The authors propose 'The Indonesian Way,' a strategy focusing on eight action paths, including the dekarbonization of transport and electricity, targeted subsidies, and the development of a domestic green manufacturing ecosystem to reduce technological dependency.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.

The report argues that Indonesia's promotion of natural gas as a 'transitional fuel' and the continued financing of gas projects by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) lock the country into fossil fuel dependence and hinder its climate commitments. It highlights significant environmental, social, and governance risks associated with gas infrastructure, including methane emissions, corruption, and human rights violations, while calling for an immediate shift toward renewable energy.

The report argues that promoting LNG as a 'transition fuel' in Indonesia creates a long-term dependency on fossil fuels and contradicts climate commitments. It highlights that Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), including the World Bank Group and ADB, continue to support gas infrastructure through technical assistance and policy loans despite their public Paris Alignment pledges. The document details numerous negative impacts of gas projects, including corruption in LNG procurement, human rights violations in Aceh, and environmental disasters such as the PHE ONWJ oil spill in Karawang. It concludes that gas is not a clean alternative due to high methane emissions and calls for an immediate shift to truly renewable energy.

The report evaluates how national, provincial, city, and corporate entities in South Africa incorporate social justice into their net zero commitments. It finds significant disparities in ambition and implementation, with wealthy urban centres leading and less affluent provinces lagging. While the financial sector and some state-owned enterprises show strong just transition frameworks, many private companies and multinational corporations rely on vague offsetting strategies with limited socio-economic integration.

The San Giorgio Group's 11th meeting focused on redirecting climate finance strategies amidst geopolitical uncertainty. Key recommendations include empowering National Development Banks (NDBs) to leverage domestic capital, reforming Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to prioritize private capital mobilization over direct project finance, and scaling adaptation finance through better insurance coordination and risk reduction. The group emphasizes shifting the climate narrative from 'doom and gloom' to one of economic opportunity and 'kitchen-table issues' to better engage policymakers and citizens. A concrete 2025 agenda includes launching 10-15 additional country platforms, operationalizing the Baku-to-Belem Roadmap for the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), and creating a network of insurance regulators for climate.

The South African Climate Finance Landscape 2025 reports an annual average of ZAR 188.3 billion in climate finance for 2022–2023, though this remains well below the estimated annual need of up to ZAR 499 billion. Investment is heavily skewed toward the energy sector, which receives 74.1% of total flows, primarily for renewable electricity generation. In contrast, adaptation finance is lagging, accounting for only 11.3% of tracked flows. While domestic sources provide nearly 60% of funding, international flows are dominated by public development finance institutions, particularly from Western Europe. The report highlights significant barriers, including grid bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, and a lack of concessional capital for high-risk or non-revenue-generating adaptation and just transition projects.

The Production Gap Report 2025 finds that governments are planning more fossil fuel production than in 2023, with projected 2030 levels exceeding 1.5°C-consistent pathways by over 120%. While some countries are advancing clean energy transitions, 17 of 20 profiled major producers still plan to increase the production of at least one fossil fuel by 2030, undermining global climate commitments.

South Africa's carbon-intensive export model is increasingly vulnerable as 78% of its exports are sold to countries with net zero targets. The report highlights acute risks in the basic metals, automotive, and agricultural sectors due to high embodied CO2 emissions compared to global competitors. While the EU's CBAM and shifting US trade policies pose immediate threats, South Africa's reserves of critical minerals and renewable energy potential offer a strategic path toward 'carbon competitiveness'. The report argues that success depends on decarbonising the national electricity grid, implementing the Climate Change Act 2024, and securing international support through the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP).

The document argues that while 'ecological security' is not yet widely recognized in Southeast Asia, it is essential for addressing interconnected threats like the Mekong polycrisis, green transition externalities, and environmental crimes. It highlights the tension between security services and civil society, the influence of US-China competition on resource extraction and infrastructure, and the need for a holistic framework that bridges the gap between political-security and environmental specialists.

The document reflects on the 'Reimagining Development Cooperation: Pragmatic Pathways for Africa-Germany Relations' event held in Berlin on January 24, 2024. It argues that the current relationship is rooted in a 'neocolonial model' characterized by unequal raw materials acquisition and a lack of value addition within African economies. Key discussions centered on the need to move beyond 'North-South' labels, the importance of industrialisation, and the necessity of shifting from a 'help partnership' to one based on mutual benefit and African leadership in agenda-setting. While the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) suggests 'refocusing' the relationship via its Africa Strategy, other participants called for a complete 'uprooting and disruption' of the current system to address colonial legacies and debt issues.

The report finds that Indonesia's captive coal capacity tripled between 2019 and 2024, reaching 15.2 GW, with projections to hit 26.2 GW by 2026. This growth is primarily driven by the nickel, aluminium, and iron and steel industries. The authors argue that this trend contradicts Indonesia's climate goals and will cause significant public health burdens, including an estimated 27,000 additional deaths if captive plants are excluded from a 2040 coal phase-out. While some companies are adopting solar and hydro, the report emphasizes that renewable energy solutions are now cost-competitive with coal.

Reclaim Finance outlines the stakes for COP29, emphasizing that the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for North-South climate finance should be at least a trillion dollars and provided as grants or grant-equivalents. The organization warns against allowing private finance or carbon offsets to count toward these public obligations, noting that private capital often bypasses the poorest communities and adaptation projects. While acknowledging the role of private finance in tripling renewable energy, the document criticizes the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) for its failure to restrict fossil fuel financing and the methodological flaws in Net-Zero Banking Alliance targets. It further highlights the failure of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam due to a lack of concessional funding and private sector risk aversion.

The document examines South Africa's transition from coal, noting that while the country is a global leader in planning, it faces significant implementation hurdles. Key issues include a misalignment between the low ambitions of national government and foreign funders versus the high expectations of local communities and unions. The brief identifies limited local institutional capacity and inadequate conventional financing as major barriers. It specifically discusses green hydrogen projects, where social goals are often treated as secondary to cost and technical feasibility. The authors argue that transparent decision-making and addressing local priorities—such as basic services and food security—are essential to maintain public legitimacy and ensure the transition's success.

The report finds that Australia, Canada, and the UK (the "Big Three") have historically and currently dominated fossil fuel extraction emissions within the Commonwealth. While these wealthy nations have the highest emissions, they are the least economically dependent on fossil fuel rents. In contrast, lower- and middle-income countries like Nigeria and Papua New Guinea are more exposed to financial risks from carbon liabilities. The report concludes that Commonwealth production plans are inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal, with the Big Three's share of the gap between Business as Usual and Net Zero scenarios exceeding 50%.

The BRICS group is approaching a critical transition point where non-fossil power capacity is expected to eclipse fossil fuels by the end of 2024. While the bloc possesses a vast pipeline of wind and solar projects—enough to potentially triple renewable capacity by 2030—nearly all members continue to develop new coal, oil, or gas plants. China dominates the group's transition, leading in both renewable additions and the construction of new coal capacity. Other members show divergent paths: Brazil and Ethiopia are heavily hydropower-reliant, while the UAE, Iran, and Russia remain deeply dependent on oil and gas, though the UAE is rapidly diversifying via nuclear and solar power.

The report examines the Rempang Eco City project, a National Strategic Project (PSN) in Indonesia's Riau Islands, which is promoted as a green industrial zone for solar panel glass manufacturing. It argues that the project, linked to the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) framework, has resulted in forced evictions, human rights violations, and the marginalization of indigenous Malay, Orang Laut, and Orang Darat communities. The analysis reveals a lack of transparency in the PSN designation process and suggests that the project is driven by a network of global and local elites, specifically citing the involvement of Xinyi Group and the use of shell companies in the British Virgin Islands to obscure beneficial ownership. The report concludes that the transition to green energy is being used as a cover for land grabbing and corruption, calling for the recognition of customary land rights and a re-evaluation of JETP's social justice criteria.

The report examines the Rempang Eco City project, a National Strategic Project (PSN) in Indonesia's Riau Islands, which is promoted as a green industrial zone for solar panel glass production. It argues that the project contradicts the principles of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) by causing forced evictions, human rights abuses, and social conflict among indigenous Malay, Orang Laut, and Orang Darat communities. The analysis reveals that the project's primary investor, Xinyi Group, plans to use a 2 GW coal-fired power plant, undermining its 'green' label. Furthermore, the report alleges systemic corruption and a lack of transparency, identifying PT Makmur Elok Graha (PT MEG) as the concession holder and tracing its ownership through shell companies in the British Virgin Islands to hide the beneficial ownership of figures like Tomy Winata. The document concludes that the project prioritizes elite profit and foreign investment over the rights and basic needs of local residents, who continue to face electricity shortages while the region is developed for energy exports to Singapore.