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The paper analyzes infrastructure finance in Brazil and India, finding that despite different structural models—Brazil's centralized development bank approach versus India's decentralized system—both remain dominated by public financing and lack the financial innovation seen in developed economies. It concludes that policy environments, such as Brazil's integrated regulatory and banking systems, are more influential than the finance models themselves, though centralized models demonstrate a greater ability to achieve scale and meet national policy targets.

The report argues for the creation of specific 2°C-compatible investment criteria to guide the shift of capital from high to low carbon investments. While many international financial institutions currently use climate considerations, the document notes that these existing approaches do not explicitly link to the 2°C limit.

The report estimates that China provided USD 21-38 billion to overseas coal power projects between 2005 and 2014, with a further USD 35-72 billion planned. This financing is primarily debt used to support Chinese equipment exports and construction contracts, driven by domestic overcapacity and strategic political goals. The report analyzes China's September 2015 commitment to control public investment in high-carbon projects, estimating that up to USD 18 billion in planned investment could be discontinued, though it warns that other international lenders or export credit agencies might fill the void.

The Center for International Environmental Law and other organizations advocate for the AIIB to implement a transparent, independent, and accessible accountability framework. They specifically call for an Oversight Mechanism aligned with UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and caution against over-reliance on potentially weak Country and Corporate Systems for grievance redress.

The IMF's October 2015 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa describes a 'gloomy picture' for the region driven by falling commodity and oil prices, high energy costs, and a weak global financial environment. South Africa is highlighted as having the worst growth projection among its middle-income peers, with its economic performance hindered by critical electricity supply failures, poor export growth despite currency depreciation, and social unrest. The IMF recommends fiscal adjustments, currency depreciation, and long-term investments in productivity-enhancing infrastructure and education to counter these trends.

The document examines how hard currency loans create asset-liability mismatches in infrastructure projects within emerging and frontier markets. It argues that IFIs should move away from direct lending and instead use guarantees and credit enhancements to leverage private capital and stimulate local currency financing. The paper details specific financial tools, such as local currency bonds and derivatives, to mitigate currency, political, and project risks.

The document argues that while public and private sectors have inherently different goals and cultural perspectives, these differences can be leveraged through specific procurement and implementation mechanisms. It highlights 'best value' bid evaluation and performance-linked payment systems as critical tools for aligning interests. Additionally, it suggests informal collaboration methods, such as partnering sessions and joint offices, to reduce conflict and build trust during the long-term lifecycle of infrastructure projects.

The paper argues that South Africa is currently on a 'Bafana Bafana Redux' trajectory characterized by modest growth and structural unemployment due to an electricity supply crisis and poor governance. While a more positive 'Mandela Magic Lite' scenario is possible through improved leadership and policy coherence, the author suggests the country is likely to remain in a middle-income trap in the near term. The analysis highlights a critical generational shift as 'born-free' voters increase in number, potentially reducing the ANC's dominance and pushing the country toward a more competitive multiparty democracy.

The document outlines a framework called 'Planetary Economics' to address the inadequacy of traditional neoclassical economics in solving climate change. It proposes three domains of socio-economic processes: the First Domain (Satisficing), focusing on human behaviour and efficiency gaps; the Second Domain (Optimising), focusing on market trade-offs and pricing; and the Third Domain (Transforming), focusing on innovation and systemic change. These domains map to three policy pillars: standards and engagement for efficiency, markets and prices for carbon reduction, and strategic investment for infrastructure and innovation. The author concludes that only an integrated strategy combining all three pillars can effectively decarbonise energy systems and overcome systemic 'lock-in' and behavioural inertia.

The document analyzes Turkey's G-20 presidency priorities—inclusiveness, investment, and implementation—and their application to Africa and LIDCs. It highlights a historical shift in Turkish foreign policy toward Africa, characterized by increased diplomatic missions and official development assistance. The authors argue that the G-20 suffers from a lack of African representation and a disconnect between its finance and development tracks. To address this, the brief suggests that Turkey align the G-20 agenda with UN sustainable development goals, facilitate private infrastructure investment through new asset classes, and include African policymakers in G-20 working groups.

The We Mean Business coalition welcomes the G7's agreement to deep greenhouse gas emission cuts to decarbonize the global economy this century, noting that limiting global warming to 2°C requires limiting cumulative carbon emissions to one trillion tons. The coalition emphasizes that over US$90 trillion will be invested in infrastructure, land-use, and energy over the next 15 years, and argues that a net zero greenhouse gas emissions target in the Paris Agreement is necessary to shift this capital toward low-carbon investment. The coalition also supports the G7's commitment to long-term national low-carbon strategies and the mobilization of climate finance for renewable energy in developing countries.

The Climate Bonds Initiative argues that the EU must go beyond supporting market guidelines to actively scale the green bond market. It recommends using the Capital Markets Union framework to increase issuance volume, provide credit enhancement via the European Fund for Strategic Investments, and develop 'green securitisation' to aggregate small-scale low-carbon assets. The document emphasizes that institutional investor demand is high but requires financially competitive products and clear standards, such as the Climate Bonds Standard, to ensure transparency and discoverability.

The Climate Development and Finance Facility (the Facility) is a proposed investment structure designed to overcome financing barriers for renewable energy projects in developing countries. It integrates three stages of support: a Development Fund for early-stage due diligence, a Construction Fund that uses equity to finance construction costs and avoid expensive early-stage debt, and a Refinancing Fund to attract institutional investors once projects are operational. The pilot targets projects between 25-75 MW in specific low- and lower-middle income countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To launch, the Facility requires USD 150 million in donor capital, which is projected to mobilize USD 2 billion in private capital, install approximately 300 MW of clean energy, and reduce annual CO2 emissions by around 600 kt.

The document examines the evolution of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China, highlighting 2014 as a pivotal year due to a surge in official guidelines and a strategic shift toward market-led resource allocation. It identifies high local government debt and massive infrastructure needs for urbanization as primary drivers. However, it notes significant barriers, including political and regulatory uncertainties, poor risk allocation, and a lack of 'value for money' (VFM) evaluations. The paper recommends shifting the focus from PPPs as mere funding sources to tools for efficiency and innovation, advocating for performance-based specifications and life-cycle asset management to ensure sustainable development.

The 2015 South African budget proposes austerity measures, including progressive tax structures and increased sin taxes, to combat a debt-to-GDP ratio that rose from 26% in 2009 to 43.9% by 2014. The author argues that these measures may be insufficient due to sluggish growth, rising interest payments that crowd out infrastructure and human capital spending, and potential budget drains from state-owned enterprises and public-sector wage disputes. The document concludes that the Treasury's target to stabilise debt at 43.7% by 2017/2018 is overly ambitious given the required primary surplus.

The Indonesian government implemented significant energy subsidy reforms starting in November 2014, transitioning from fixed prices to a more market-responsive pricing mechanism. While initial price hikes in November 2014 led to inflation and public protests, a sharp decline in global oil prices allowed the government to lower fuel prices in January 2015 while simultaneously removing subsidies on Premium gasoline in the Java-Madura-Bali region. The government aims to reallocate an estimated IDR 194.2 trillion in savings toward productive sectors, including infrastructure and state-owned enterprises. Additional reforms targeted LPG and electricity tariffs, supported by social assistance programs like the Indonesia Smart Card to mitigate impacts on vulnerable populations.

The document analyzes India's transition from a borrower to an owner in multilateral financial institutions, its internal development finance structure, and its strategic use of development assistance to project soft power and counterbalance China's influence in South Asia. It highlights the tension between India's global aspirations and its domestic infrastructure deficit, which is estimated at $1 trillion under its 12th Five-Year Plan.

The document examines the increasing role of BRICS countries in international development finance, specifically focusing on lending to neighboring regions. It highlights a gap between public loan announcements and actual spending, and argues that understanding the terms of these loans—whether commercial, concessional, or tied to resources—is critical to determining if they offer a true alternative to traditional institutions like the World Bank. The author applies theories of regional economic integration to suggest several possible motivations for this finance: market-driven efficiency, collective hedging against global institutions, the pursuit of non-market-oriented development autonomy, or the strategic ambitions of regional hegemons. Finally, the brief suggests that the national lending patterns of BRICS members may serve as a primary indicator for the future operations of the collective New Development Bank (NDB).

The 2014 G-20 Summit, hosted by Australia, focuses on 'growth and resilience' to address a 'fragile, sluggish global economy'. A key objective is the 'Brisbane Action Plan', aiming to boost G-20 GDP by at least 2 per cent above projections over five years, potentially adding over $2 trillion to global GDP. The G-20's broader agenda includes financial regulation, international tax reform, and energy market resilience. For South Africa, the summit is critical as it seeks to align global growth outcomes with its National Development Plan's goal of over 5 per cent GDP growth, while advocating for inclusive and sustainable growth across Africa.

The report analyzes government subsidies for the Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe projects in the Russian Arctic. It finds that Yamal LNG would be uneconomic without state-funded infrastructure and tax breaks, while Prirazlomnoe received substantial tax breaks after most capital expenditures were already sunk, effectively acting as a rent transfer to Gazprom. Both projects are associated with significant environmental risks, including salinity changes in the Bay of Ob and potential oil spills in the Pechora Sea.