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The research examines how green industrial policies and subsidies affect the cost of low-carbon steel production in the US and EU, concluding that subsidies have a more significant impact on cost reduction than renewable energy costs, which creates a tension between maintaining a level playing field and accelerating climate action.

The research paper advocates for South Africa to move away from a market-led 'blended finance model' (BFM) for its just energy transition, arguing that market failures necessitate a state-led approach. The author proposes a 'climate response fund' to be financed by a combination of carbon tax increases, earmarking the General Fuel Levy and Mineral and Petroleum Resource Royalty, and implementing public sector efficiency reforms and retirement tax deduction caps. Together, these measures could generate over R100 billion annually for adaptation and equity. The paper also suggests the issuance of sovereign green bonds to fund renewable energy grid infrastructure, arguing for a gentler fiscal deficit glide path to accommodate this strategic investment.

The policy brief contends that South Africa must move beyond the blended finance model for its just energy transition due to market failures and risks of insufficient or unpredictable private capital. It proposes a suite of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) measures—including sovereign green bonds, carbon tax reforms, and earmarking existing revenues—to generate approximately R100bn annually for climate priorities. These funds would be pooled into a central climate response fund dedicated to adaptation, equity, and supporting displaced workers, particularly in Mpumalanga. The author argues that this assertive domestic commitment is essential for maintaining state control over infrastructure and for unlocking larger-scale international finance between 2030 and 2050.

The report examines the intersection of trade and climate sustainability from an African perspective, focusing on the economic impacts of energy transitions, the risks and opportunities of voluntary carbon markets, and the challenges of transition mineral value chains. It critically analyzes the role of the WTO in green trade and provides specific policy recommendations to ensure that climate-related trade measures, such as Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM), do not disproportionately harm developing nations.

The report outlines a strategic framework for the EU's external partnerships, proposing four core principles—mutual benefit and just transition, inclusivity, robust financial commitment, and transparency—alongside five operational considerations: scope, partner selection, governance, support mechanisms, and monitoring and evaluation. These guidelines are intended to be applied to initiatives such as the Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships.

The DRC and Zambia are attempting to transition from extractive economies to value-added battery producers to support the global green transition. While they possess critical reserves of cobalt and copper, their efforts are complicated by a history of privatization, problematic governance, and a geopolitical tug-of-war between the USA and China. To succeed, both nations must expand local processing capacity and improve infrastructure, such as the Lobito Corridor, while managing the social and environmental impacts of mining.

In 2021/22, Nigeria received USD 2.5 billion in climate finance, a 32% increase from 2019/20, yet this remains far below the estimated annual need of USD 29.7 billion. Public actors provided 70% of the funding, led by multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs), while private finance accounted for 30%, primarily driven by corporate investments in solar PV. Mitigation efforts, particularly in energy systems, dominated the landscape, while adaptation finance reached only USD 735 million, covering just 6% of annual needs. The report highlights a heavy reliance on debt-based financing, which is concerning given Nigeria's high debt-servicing costs. Key barriers include the high cost of capital, a lack of bankable projects, and data gaps. The authors recommend operationalizing the National Climate Change Fund, prioritizing anticipatory adaptation, and pursuing innovative financing such as green bonds and debt-for-climate swaps.

The document analyzes the potential for African nations to move beyond the "pit to port" model of mineral extraction by building integrated battery mineral value chains. It highlights Africa's significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, and vanadium, and examines the macroeconomic shift from fossil fuel revenues to transition mineral revenues. The paper identifies Morocco as a leader in integrating automotive assembly with battery material production and discusses the potential for South Africa to act as a regional integrator. It concludes that while a continent-wide strategy is unlikely, sub-regional strategies and national policy instruments—such as strategic non-alignment and targeted industrial policies for e-mobility—can help African countries capture more value from their mineral endowments.

The EU CRMA and UK CMS aim to reduce dependence on China and secure supplies for the green transition, but their domestic focus may hinder African industrialization. While the EU targets 10% domestic mining and 40% processing by 2030, its international partnerships are criticized as extractivist. The brief highlights a misalignment in 'criticality' definitions, where African states prioritize regional industrialization and specific minerals like gold or coal, which may conflict with Western climate goals or sanctions. It concludes that without a shift toward supporting in-country processing and reducing certification costs for local firms, these strategies will fail to create mutually beneficial partnerships.

The document outlines the necessity of reforming international and African financial institutions to bridge the climate finance gap. Based on policy dialogues held in February and July 2024, it emphasizes the need for increased African representation in Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), improved credit rating methodologies, and deeper collaboration among African financial entities to drive green industrialization.

The document analyzes the global race to secure critical minerals, detailing the subsidy-driven strategies of the US, EU, UK, and Canada, and the dominant market position of China in battery production. It argues that African nations can leverage their mineral wealth to drive sustainable structural transformation by adopting a 'climate-resilient developmental regionalism' framework under the AfCFTA, which integrates climate adaptation and mitigation with regional industrialization.

In a speech delivered on 4 July 2024, WTO Deputy Director-General Jean-Marie Paugam outlines the evolving relationship between the WTO and environmental protection. He notes a paradigm shift where climate change is now actively disrupting trade, citing examples like the Panama Canal drought. While the WTO has made progress through the 2022 Ministerial Declaration and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement, Paugam warns that uncoordinated national actions—such as the nearly 70 carbon tax schemes in development and varying green steel standards—risk fragmenting world trade. He advocates for a "reglobalization" approach that combines green industrialization with trade cooperation, suggesting the WTO may need to adopt new rule-making models, including plurilateral commitments or non-binding frameworks similar to the Paris Agreement, to remain relevant.

The document argues that while the WTO has historically neglected the environment, there is a current paradigm shift toward recognizing trade's role in addressing climate change and biodiversity loss. It assesses the outcomes of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference (MC13), highlighting failures in fisheries subsidies and the absence of explicit climate commitments in the Ministerial Declaration, while noting progress in plurilateral initiatives like the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution. Experts propose reforming subsidy rules for fossil fuels and agriculture, leveraging 'Aid for Trade' for just transitions, and adopting the legal principle of 'Common Concern of Humankind' to guide trade law. The report emphasizes the need for regulatory alignment on circular economy principles and the ability of the WTO to coordinate trade-related climate measures, such as Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, to avoid global trade fragmentation.

The report examines the role of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) in preventing carbon leakage, focusing on stakeholder views from five diverse economies. It analyzes the design of existing mechanisms like the EU and UK CBAMs, explores alternatives to BCAs such as output-based allocation and green industrial policy, and details the challenges faced by exporting nations, including emissions measurement complexities and the need for technology transfers.

The 2024 barometer identifies a shift toward embedding social justice in climate action and the rise of green macroeconomic governance, while warning against the 'gold rush' for critical minerals and the use of climate as a political 'wedge' issue.

The author argues that the Thirteenth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC13) failed to produce tangible progress on climate-related trade issues due to geopolitical tensions and opposition from members like India. While some plurilateral initiatives and external coalitions showed modest activity, the document suggests that success should now be measured by the revitalization of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment and the development of non-binding codes of conduct rather than binding multilateral agreements.

Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi argues that the global financial system, established in the 1940s, must be reformed to meet current complexities and support Africa's development. She emphasizes the need for more concessional finance, fairer debt frameworks, and increased climate finance to enable green industrialization. The speech highlights the role of both international financial institutions and African multilateral institutions in achieving the goals of Agenda 2063.

The document analyzes COP 28 outcomes for Africa, noting a gap between high-level agreements and the actual financial resources provided for adaptation and loss and damage. While it highlights the historic agreement to transition away from fossil fuels and new food system initiatives, it argues that the scale of funding remains insufficient for Africa's urgent needs.

The report identifies a global shift toward embedding social justice in climate action and the rise of green macroeconomic policies like the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Green Deal. While renewable energy capacity and electric vehicle sales are hitting records, the transition faces significant hurdles, including a 'gold rush' for critical minerals often lacking governance, inadequate private sector investment in nature, and a trust deficit between citizens and institutions. The document argues for a new 'eco-social contract' based on participatory governance and a fundamental reform of the multilateral financial system to support low- and middle-income countries.

The document examines the systemic barriers preventing developing countries from moving beyond simple technology acquisition to endogenous climate technology development. It analyzes the role of the UNFCCC and WTO frameworks, the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR), and the limitations of trade liberalization. The author argues that effective technology transfer requires a combination of financial support, technical know-how, and 'green industrial policy' to ensure sustainable low-carbon structural transformation.