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The GCHA submission argues that Nepal's climate action should be explicitly linked to public health outcomes to maximize co-benefits and protect vulnerable populations. It recommends strengthening the draft NDC 3.0 by aligning conditional emissions targets with 1.5°C limits, establishing specific targets for black carbon reduction, and creating a dedicated section on air quality. The document highlights significant health risks in Nepal, including a 68% increase in heat stress exposure since the 1990s and rising transmission potential for dengue. It also emphasizes the economic burden of climate-related health issues, noting that heat exposure caused an estimated US$2.8 billion in annual potential income loss between 2014 and 2023, with the agricultural sector bearing 91.5% of that impact.

The guide evaluates four green bank models—standalone green banks, green-focused policy development banks (PDBs), green facilities within PDBs, and country platforms—based on a country's economic position, governance, and product needs. It specifically highlights that country platforms are most suitable for low-income countries (LICs) and debt-distressed nations due to international financial institution (IFI) support. Additionally, the guide proposes three international support mechanisms: a new green bank design accelerator providing technical and seed funding, the expansion of existing platforms like the FiCS Innovation Lab, and the formation of a coalition of existing initiatives for knowledge exchange.

The Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), the operational arm of the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), provides long-term concessional loans to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to implement macro-critical climate reforms. While the RSF creates fiscal space and improves investment conditions, its impact is often hindered by limited engagement with sectoral ministries, overlapping climate initiatives, and inconsistent coordination with development partners like the World Bank and regional development banks. The document recommends institutionalizing inter-ministry platforms, aligning RSF reforms with national climate plans, and utilizing joint diagnostic tools. It also highlights the role of IMF Climate Finance Roundtables in aligning investments with national priorities, though these have yet to mobilize significant private capital. Case studies from Bangladesh, Barbados, and Senegal illustrate both the potential and the challenges of these coordination mechanisms.

The report examines the role of green banks in bridging the USD 7.4 trillion annual climate funding gap. It identifies four main structures: standalone de novo banks, enhanced public development banks (PDBs), green facilities within PDBs, and country platforms. While standalone banks are more common in advanced economies, EMDEs frequently utilize green facilities as transitional mechanisms. The report emphasizes that success depends on financial, environmental, and political sustainability, and proposes three international support options: a new design initiative, expanding the FiCS Innovation Lab, or forming a coalition of existing initiatives.

The report outlines a systematic approach to estimating top-down climate finance needs, distinguishing them from bottom-up needs derived from Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). CPI's methodology involves collecting data from nearly 100 reports, standardizing sector classifications using its Global Landscape of Climate Finance (GLCF) taxonomy, and harmonizing timeframes, currencies, and value types. The document emphasizes that annual climate finance flows must increase significantly, reaching USD 7.5 trillion per year by 2030 and over USD 8.8 trillion per year from 2031 to 2050. It also addresses data gaps in sectors like aviation and wastewater, the inclusion of non-climate solutions like fossil fuel deployment, and the necessity of redirecting capital from high-carbon activities to meet net-zero targets.

The policy brief argues that meeting Paris Agreement goals requires a fivefold increase in urban climate finance to USD 4.3 trillion per year by 2030. It identifies critical barriers to subnational integration, including political misalignment, capacity gaps, and creditworthiness constraints. To address these, the authors present a five-stage 'Urban-inclusive Country Platform Framework' moving from initial engagement to implementation. The brief applies this framework to case studies in Egypt, Brazil, and India, highlighting opportunities to shift from fragmented project-based funding to strategic, programmatic approaches that empower cities as active partners in climate action.

In 2021/22, Nigeria received USD 2.5 billion in climate finance, a 32% increase from 2019/20, yet this remains far below the estimated annual need of USD 29.7 billion. Public actors, led by multilateral development finance institutions, provided 70% of the funding, while private contributions reached 30%, primarily driven by corporate investments in solar PV. Mitigation efforts dominated the landscape, particularly in energy systems, while adaptation finance reached only USD 0.74 billion, covering just 6% of estimated needs. The report highlights critical barriers including high capital costs, a lack of bankable projects, and heavy reliance on debt, which is concerning given Nigeria's substantial debt burden. Key recommendations include operationalizing the National Climate Change Fund, prioritizing anticipatory adaptation, and developing a domestic green industry to reduce import dependence.

The report examines Indonesia's energy transition through a lens of national interest, highlighting a significant gap between the high investment needs for Net Zero Emissions (NZE) and the limited availability of domestic and international funding. It argues that foreign climate finance often arrives as debt rather than grants, potentially exacerbating Indonesia's chronic fiscal deficits and public debt. The document analyzes the capacity of the Indonesian banking sector to fund renewable energy projects, finding that while capital adequacy is generally high, systemic bottlenecks in foreign exchange liquidity and long-term stable funding persist. It also evaluates the nascent Indonesian carbon market, noting a lack of clear emission caps (PTBAE) and low carbon prices. The authors propose 'The Indonesian Way,' a strategy focusing on eight action paths, including the dekarbonization of transport and electricity, targeted subsidies, and the development of a domestic green manufacturing ecosystem to reduce technological dependency.

The report examines Indonesia's path toward net-zero emissions by 2060, highlighting a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated annual need of USD 73–76 billion. It argues that foreign climate finance is often debt-heavy and unreliable, urging a shift toward domestic funding and structural reforms. The analysis covers the banking sector's limited capacity to finance renewable energy, the underperformance of the national carbon market, and the socioeconomic disparities in energy access. It proposes an "Indonesian Way" consisting of eight strategic actions, including targeted subsidies and the development of a domestic clean-tech ecosystem, to ensure a just and sovereign transition.

The document examines the 'climate-debt trap' facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where escalating external debt—reaching nearly US$6.5 trillion in 2023—crowds out climate investment. It analyzes existing financial mechanisms such as Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDCs), Catastrophe (CAT) bonds, and debt swaps, while critiquing the G20 Common Framework for its inadequacy. The authors advocate for the cancellation of 'odious debt' linked to fossil fuel projects and propose that a Fossil Fuel Treaty could establish a Debt Resolution Facility to help member nations renegotiate debts in exchange for phasing out fossil fuels.

The report identifies Iraq as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries globally, facing severe water scarcity, rising temperatures, and desertification. It proposes a strategic framework to prioritize GCF funding across key sectors, including energy, agriculture, water, and urban development. The document details a prioritized list of 19 projects, with high-priority initiatives focusing on climate-resilient livelihoods in southern Iraq and the transformation of the agricultural and water sectors. It emphasizes the need for international financial support, technology transfer, and the mobilization of private sector investment to bridge significant development gaps and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from the energy sector, which accounts for 85% of national emissions as of 2019.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The document examines how international human rights law can reshape sovereign debt restructuring to protect socio-economic rights in the Global South. It identifies key principles—including the right to development, self-determination, and good faith—that should replace the current 'non-system' of contractual negotiations. The authors advocate for a legally binding statutory mechanism under the United Nations to ensure transparency, prevent abusive holdout litigation by vulture funds, and prioritize minimum standards of living over creditor interests.