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The paper examines the transition of African carbon market engagement from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) legacy to the operationalisation of Article 6.4 and 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. It warns against a continued reliance on exporting low-cost credits, which risks 'carbon grabs' and price asymmetry, where credits have been offered as low as USD 1-3 per tonne. The author proposes a 'Paris mindset' where domestic use of credits for national carbon taxes or sectoral targets is prioritised, and exports are used only for calculated surpluses. To achieve this, the document outlines five pillars of readiness: Policy & Institutions, Registry & MRV, Authorisation & Corresponding Adjustments (CAs), Safeguards & Benefit-sharing, and Finance & Market Access. It provides a comparative analysis of several African nations, noting that South Africa and Egypt are adopting a domestic-focused 'Paris' approach, while Ghana and Rwanda remain more export-led, and Kenya and Nigeria are in hybrid transitions.

The paper examines the transition of African carbon markets from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) legacy to the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It contrasts an 'export-led' approach, which risks exploitative 'carbon grabs' and low pricing (USD 1-3 per tonne), with a 'sovereign-first' approach that uses carbon markets as tools for national decarbonization. The author proposes a five-pillar readiness framework—covering policy, registries, authorization, safeguards, and finance—to help countries move toward domestic compliance markets. Current progress varies across the continent, with South Africa and Egypt adopting domestic-focused 'Paris' mindsets, while Ghana and Rwanda remain more export-led, and Kenya and Nigeria occupying hybrid positions.

The report argues that G20 countries have failed to meet their 2009 pledge to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, with spending reaching USD 665 billion in 2023. It introduces a categorization framework that divides subsidies into 'quick phase-out' (within 1 year), 'phase-out with a robust strategy' (2-4 years), and 'time-limited exemptions' (4+ years). Applying this to Brazil, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and South Africa, the authors find that while a significant number of measures (30-55%) can be removed quickly, the majority of fiscal value is tied to deeply embedded structural subsidies requiring sequenced reform and mitigation measures.

The document asserts that diversifying export markets is essential for Canada's economic prosperity, particularly to reduce vulnerability to US trade decisions. It argues that because many lucrative global markets are rapidly implementing climate policies and energy transitions, Canadian firms need transition plans to maintain market access, attract capital, and avoid being outperformed by international competitors.

The document provides a toolkit on carbon finance, detailing the use of carbon taxes, credits, and trading systems to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It categorizes instruments into commercial options like Voluntary Carbon Markets and public systems such as the EU ETS and Colombian Carbon Tax, while specifying the capacity requirements and timelines for establishing these mechanisms.

The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to prevent carbon leakage and encourage global decarbonisation by imposing levies on high-emitting imports. While facing criticism from BRICS nations as a protectionist barrier, the CBAM's design allows for the deduction of carbon prices already paid in the country of origin. This has led several countries, including India, China, Brazil, and Vietnam, to strategically develop or expand domestic carbon markets or taxes to ensure that carbon revenues are retained domestically rather than paid to the EU. Modelling indicates that if domestic prices reach 50% of the EU's price, countries like India could retain EUR 676 million annually.

The report examines eight innovative financial instruments—including the Adaptation Benefit Mechanism, biodiversity credits, carbon taxes, carbon trading, credit guarantees, debt-for-nature/climate resilience swaps, pooled investment funds, and sovereign green/sustainability-linked bonds—to bridge the climate finance gap in developing countries. It identifies common barriers such as limited institutional capacity, lack of robust project pipelines, and underdeveloped local capital markets. The document emphasizes that while these instruments can signal a government's commitment to climate action, their success depends on a supportive enabling environment characterized by effective leadership, clear taxonomies, and robust climate data. For least developed countries (LDCs), the report suggests a phased approach, first strengthening basic financial and legal prerequisites before focusing on 'climate investability'. It concludes with specific recommendations for donors and development partners to provide technical assistance, anchor investments, and pilot projects to scale up private sector mobilization.

The report argues that non-metallic minerals—such as sand, gravel, and potash—differ from metallic minerals due to lower revenue potential, stronger domestic economic linkages, and a lack of benchmark prices for many varieties. It proposes a typology for royalties and transfer pricing based on a mineral's export propensity, price volatility, and the availability of benchmark prices. Key recommendations include using unit-based royalties for low-value construction materials to minimize administration costs, and ad-valorem royalties for high-value exports like graphite and potash to maximize revenue. The document also addresses cross-cutting issues such as environmental taxation, the formalization of artisanal mining through lower tax burdens, and the risks associated with tax incentives and export restrictions.

The framework, co-produced with COSATU, argues that South Africa's transition must be treated as a public good to avoid the risks of private financing, such as increased inequality and higher energy costs. It advocates for an 'eco-socialism' approach and suggests specific financial mechanisms, including a Climate Response Fund and the reorientation of Development Finance Institutions, to ensure the transition creates jobs and reduces poverty.

The report finds that by 2031, total federal and provincial support for the BC LNG sector will amount to CAD 3.93 billion. This support includes CAD 1.62 billion in federal public finance and CAD 2.16 billion in provincial support through foregone revenue, reduced electricity rates, and enabling infrastructure. The authors argue that these subsidies shift risk from the private sector to the public and undermine British Columbia's climate targets by failing to uphold the polluter pays principle.

The document examines the 'twin transition' of digital and green transformations, highlighting how digital technologies can both enable climate action and contribute significantly to global greenhouse gas emissions. It identifies critical gaps in infrastructure and financing for developing countries and proposes five priority decarbonization levers: green infrastructure, energy-efficient operations, sustainable supply chains, circular economy models, and climate-compatible infrastructure. The authors argue for coordinated international cooperation, targeted financial incentives, and the integration of environmental provisions into digital trade agreements to ensure an inclusive transition to net zero.

The report examines how people in Britain perceive the financial impact of climate policies, noting that while many fear costs, few believe scrapping these policies would save them money. It highlights a strong public desire for a 'just transition' where the least well-off are protected and big polluting companies are held accountable. The findings suggest that framing climate action as an investment in a prosperous future is more compelling than technical terminology.

The report argues that allowing African exporters to use Article 6 carbon credits to reduce their EU CBAM liabilities would address equity concerns, retain climate finance within Africa, and provide policy flexibility. It notes that current CBAM regulations only permit deductions for explicit carbon prices (taxes or ETS), making Article 6 credits ineligible. The document highlights the significant economic risks CBAM poses to African GDP and the specific challenges African nations face in implementing traditional carbon pricing due to their emissions profiles and administrative constraints. It concludes with recommendations for the EU to amend its regulations to include high-integrity international credits, specifically those from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Africa, to align with the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

The report argues that existing financing for South Africa's just transition, such as the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP), prioritises private profit over social justice and is insufficient in scale. It proposes a cohesive framework anchored in worker demands and a new macroeconomic structure. Key recommendations include the creation of a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a shift toward 'promotional' monetary policy by the South African Reserve Bank to incentivise green lending, and the recapitalisation of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital for public goods.

The report argues that South Africa's current Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) relies too heavily on private finance and de-risking, which may increase energy costs and fail to ensure a socially just transition. It proposes a cohesive framework based on worker demands, featuring a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a promotional monetary policy to direct credit toward green industrialisation, and the reform of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) like the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital.

The document argues that G20 climate finance often prioritizes private profit over public welfare, trapping vulnerable nations in debt through loan-based funding and 'de-risking' strategies. It calls for a shift toward grant-based funding and public investment based on the 'polluter pays' principle to ensure a just energy transition.

The report analyzes the sources of development finance for low-income countries (LICs), identifying tax revenues as the primary source but highlighting systemic risks such as cuts to official development assistance (ODA), trade fragmentation, and an impending external debt crisis. It argues that while domestic resource mobilization (DRM) is essential, it must be balanced with 'external revenue mobilization' through export diversification to avoid balance of payments crises. The authors propose a pragmatic approach to the Financing for Development (FfD) agenda, recommending specific international reforms—such as separating poverty-reduction ODA from global public goods funding—and national reforms, including the removal of fossil fuel subsidies and the implementation of wealth and natural resource taxes.

Trend Asia criticizes the new PP KEN for extending the use of fossil fuels until 2060, lowering renewable energy targets for 2030, and promoting high-risk or non-renewable 'new energy' sources like nuclear, hydrogen, and ammonia. The report highlights the environmental and social risks of bioenergy, specifically co-firing and Energy Plantation Forests (HTE), which it links to deforestation and land grabbing. It further argues that the policy lacks transparency, excludes community-scale renewable energy, and prioritizes industrial interests over human rights and ecological sustainability.

The PELP 2023-2027 report outlines three development scenarios for Chile: Slow Recovery, Carbon Neutrality, and Accelerated Transition. It projects a significant shift toward renewable energy, primarily wind and solar photovoltaic, and identifies critical transmission expansion needs. A key innovation is the introduction of Electric Generation Development Poles (PDGE) in the provinces of Antofagasta and Tocopilla to optimize renewable energy deployment. The report also analyzes the role of green hydrogen, energy storage, and the phased retirement of coal-fired power plants to meet 2050 carbon neutrality goals.

The U.S. steel industry is already less carbon-intensive than other major regions due to a high reliance on electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which account for 70% of production. However, the remaining 30% relies on integrated blast furnace/basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) routes to produce high-quality steel. Decarbonization requires transitioning these integrated mills to direct reduced iron (DRI) and submerged arc furnaces (SAF) or implementing carbon capture and storage (CCS). While clean electricity offers a 'quick win' for EAFs, deep decarbonization is hindered by the high cost of green hydrogen and the need for extensive CCS infrastructure. The report argues that because steel is a low-margin commodity, government policy—including carbon taxes, border adjustment mechanisms, and demand-side incentives—is essential to offset the increased costs of low-carbon production.