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The briefing argues that biological weapons remain a viable and rational strategic option for some states due to their low cost, potential for deniability, and asymmetric impact. It challenges the notion that these weapons are tactically useless or too risky to develop, noting that historical precedents and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that leaders may prioritize state status or regime survival over the risks of blowback. The authors further contend that bioweapons programs are not always top-down initiatives and that current international norms, specifically the Biological Weapons Convention, lack the enforcement and verification mechanisms necessary to effectively stop such programs.

The report highlights the potential for e-mobility, specifically low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs) and micromobility, to provide affordable transport in the SADC region. It identifies infrastructure gaps and a lack of political will as primary barriers, while suggesting that the region's strategic mineral reserves could provide global bargaining power. The author advocates for the use of existing frameworks like the SADC RISDP 2020–30 and the Green Economy Strategy to accelerate the transition and recommends that South Africa join the IEA's Electric Vehicles Initiative.

The report examines the AU's efforts to adapt counter-terrorism operations through the African Standby Force, the impact of COVID-19 on election observation, and the need for incumbents to step down during elections to ensure fairness. It also analyzes the tension between the principle of inviolable colonial borders and secessionist movements, such as in Ghana, and discusses the complexities of harmonizing a common African position in negotiations with the European Union.

The report asserts that 'business as usual' is an unsustainable strategy for industrial sectors, as over 40 percent of annual greenhouse gas emissions originate from energy-intensive industries. It warns that failure to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 threatens the global economy with supply chain disruptions and value destruction for major commodities. The author argues that achieving a 1.5°C pathway requires not only technological shifts—such as the adoption of hydrogen and carbon capture—but also a reduction in the demand for materials like steel, cement, and plastic. The text emphasizes that an orderly transition is preferable to disruptive 'black swan' events and notes a shifting balance of market power away from fossil fuel industries toward climate-aligned corporations.

The document argues that individual African countries often lack the resources to transition to green energy, but regional integration via the AfCFTA can create a larger market to attract investment and skilled labor. It highlights the role of regional power pools and suggests that a strategic shift in EU development assistance toward regional rather than bilateral support, combined with knowledge and technology sharing, could further fast-track the transition.

The document argues for a comprehensive AU-EU partnership that integrates the green transition with Africa's broader developmental goals, such as industrialisation and employment. It highlights the critical gap in energy access—with 600 million Africans lacking electricity as of 2018—and the underutilisation of Africa's solar resources. The authors recommend using public finance to de-risk private investment in renewables and addressing 'nexus issues' linking energy to agriculture, the digital economy, and trade. It also notes the tension in countries like Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique, which are pursuing renewable energy while continuing to develop fossil fuel reserves.

The policy brief examines how the shift toward variable renewable energy and distributed energy resources (DERs) challenges traditional grid planning paradigms. It argues that the historical reliance on the Planning Reserve Margin (PRM) heuristic is increasingly inadequate for ensuring reliability in a high-renewables system. Furthermore, it warns that fossil fuel incumbents are exploiting these planning uncertainties to protect their market share by framing technical challenges as insurmountable barriers to decarbonization.

The paper examines the 'valley of death' in industrial innovation, specifically for the HYBRIT initiative's transition to fossil-free steel. It compares two hypothetical demonstration plant scales: a 'small' option (200,000 t/annum) and a 'large' option (800,000 t/annum). The authors argue that a larger plant is preferable because it better addresses non-technical risks such as supply chain coordination, grid integration, and business model validation, despite higher capital costs and regulatory hurdles regarding permitting.

The report contends that US ICBM policy is outdated, as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) now match or exceed ICBM capabilities while remaining invulnerable at sea. It argues that the continued deployment of ICBMs on high alert creates a dangerous risk of mistaken launch due to compressed decision timelines. The authors assert that the retention of the ICBM force is driven by non-security factors, including the economic interests of the 'ICBM Coalition' of senators and lobbying by defense contractors like Northrop Grumman. The report recommends retiring the ICBM force, eliminating 'launch-on-warning' options, and extending the life of existing Minuteman III missiles instead of spending $100 billion on the new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system.

The authors argue that COVID-19 and climate change are direct threats to U.S. national security and act as 'threat multipliers' that amplify geostrategic competition and local conflicts. They contend that the U.S. should not simply reallocate funds away from national defense but instead expand the defense toolkit to include biodefense, climate adaptation for military bases, and support for international cooperation to prevent the collapse of global governance systems.

The document examines South Africa's strategic positioning in global nuclear security amidst domestic economic decline and budget cuts to its foreign affairs and defence sectors. It highlights the risks posed by nuclear tensions in Iran and the Korean Peninsula, and suggests that South Africa can maintain its global relevance through 'niche diplomacy' and strategic partnerships. The author recommends using the 2020 NPT Review Conference and AU chairmanship to build a unified African position on nuclear disarmament and exploring informal 'Friends of the Chair' diplomatic models to bypass political impasses.

The paper outlines three primary areas where South Africa can exert leadership as AU chair: 'Silencing the Guns' by mediating conflicts in Libya and South Sudan; ensuring the timely implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) by July 1, 2020; and revitalizing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to improve continental governance.

The report examines the technical, legal, and strategic landscape of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), arguing that current technology is often ineffective and hindered by outdated legal frameworks. It assesses specific risks to Norwegian infrastructure, such as airports and oil platforms, and explores how Norway can leverage EU and NATO initiatives to enhance its capabilities while avoiding the over-securitization of civilian airspace.

Political scientist Félix Blanc argues that the EU lacks a unified security voice and remains overly dependent on the US, particularly regarding nuclear deterrence and military infrastructure. He contends that current initiatives like the European Defence Fund and the military mobility plan risk reinforcing this dependence rather than fostering strategic autonomy. Blanc proposes a Franco-German led initiative for nuclear disarmament and the creation of a new collective security architecture based on multilateralism and preventive disarmament to address threats from Russia, China, and regional instabilities.

The report argues that climate change is a vital national security risk that requires a whole-of-government response. It proposes a 'Climate Security Plan for America' structured around four pillars: demonstrating leadership through a new White House Office on Climate Security, assessing risks via a Climate Security Crisis Watch Center, bolstering international resilience to compete with adversaries like China and Russia, and building domestic infrastructure resilience. The plan emphasizes the need for the U.S. to remain in the Paris Agreement and to integrate climate foresight into military doctrine and intelligence assessments.

The European Defence Fund (EDF) represents a significant shift in EU policy, marking the first time the Union directly invests public funds into military technologies. With an estimated 13 billion euro allocated for 2021-2027, the fund aims to enhance the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and achieve 'strategic autonomy' by funding cutting-edge research and interoperable capabilities. A specific portion (4% to 8%) is dedicated to 'disruptive technologies,' such as artificial intelligence and robotics. However, the initiative faces criticism over the potential for 'corporate capture' by the defence industry, a lack of transparency in fund management, and a perceived shift in the EU's identity from a peace project to a military investor.

The document analyzes the energy partnership between Russia and South Africa, noting that while a $76-billion nuclear deal was declared unlawful and abandoned, both nations maintain a strategic need for cooperation. Russia seeks to diversify its export markets through a 'Pivot to the East' to reduce vulnerability to global commodity shocks, while South Africa seeks to resolve a chronic electricity crisis. Current cooperation has shifted toward smaller-scale projects, such as an agreement between Rosatom and the South African government to build mini hydropower plants in Mpumalanga to power rural areas.

The author examines the tension between maintaining the US-led 'nuclear sharing' system and pursuing European strategic autonomy. While some propose a Franco-German nuclear cooperation to replace the US umbrella, the author warns against European militarism and instead advocates for a diplomatic strategy of preventive denuclearization, drawing on the Rapacki Plan to reduce nuclear stockpiles in Europe and move toward a world without nuclear weapons.

The document examines how the BRICS nations can better support African development priorities, specifically industrialisation and infrastructure. It highlights the role of South Africa in leveraging the BRICS forum for continental interests and discusses the potential of the New Development Bank (NDB). The briefing identifies critical challenges, including rising external debt, lack of transparency in lending, and unequal trade patterns where Africa primarily exports primary commodities. It recommends the creation of a dedicated BRICS–Africa strategy, a specialized BRICS unit within the African Union Commission (AUC), and improved coordination between bilateral BRICS initiatives and the AU's Agenda 2063.

South Africa is attempting to leverage its unique geographic position to grow an 'oceans economy' through initiatives like Operation Phakisa, while simultaneously managing maritime security and international partnerships. However, the report finds that progress has been modest, hampered by eroding naval capabilities, a lack of an integrated national maritime strategy, and a policy focus that has disproportionately favored the Indian Ocean over the Atlantic. The document emphasizes the need for better coordination between government departments and stronger alignment with African Union and Indian Ocean Rim Association strategies to ensure sustainable 'blue economy' growth.