Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles

The report contends that US ICBM policy is outdated, as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) now match or exceed ICBM capabilities while remaining invulnerable at sea. It argues that the continued deployment of ICBMs on high alert creates a dangerous risk of mistaken launch due to compressed decision timelines. The authors assert that the retention of the ICBM force is driven by non-security factors, including the economic interests of the 'ICBM Coalition' of senators and lobbying by defense contractors like Northrop Grumman. The report recommends retiring the ICBM force, eliminating 'launch-on-warning' options, and extending the life of existing Minuteman III missiles instead of spending $100 billion on the new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system.

• The original technical justifications for maintaining ICBMs—specifically their superior accuracy and power compared to early submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and unreliable submarine communications—are no longer valid. Modern Trident II SLBMs are more accurate than Minuteman III ICBMs and carry more powerful warheads, such as the W88, which has a yield of 455 kilotons compared to the 300- and 335-kiloton yields of Minuteman warheads.
• Maintaining ICBMs on high alert creates a significant risk of accidental nuclear war because the 30-minute flight time of a missile from Russia to the US forces a highly compressed decision process. This process allows the president at most 10 minutes to confer with military briefers and decide whether to launch, increasing the likelihood of a mistaken response to false alarms, which have occurred multiple times over the last 40 years.
• The retention of the ICBM force is largely driven by non-security factors rather than military necessity. These include the Air Force's desire to maintain a major weapons program and funding, the economic impact of Air Force bases on local labor forces in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, and the financial interests of defense contractors.
• The 'ICBM Coalition,' consisting of senators from Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Utah, has actively blocked efforts to reduce the ICBM force. This includes pushing to keep 400 missiles fielded under the New START treaty and using legislative provisions to prohibit the Department of Defense from conducting environmental assessments required to eliminate ICBM silos.
• The proposed Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) replacement program, estimated to cost $100 billion, is unnecessary because the existing Minuteman III fleet can be maintained for decades. The Air Force has already demonstrated the ability to extend the service life of these missiles through refurbishments, and some analyses suggest they could be maintained through the 2060s.
• Air Force estimates for the operational lifetime of ICBM rocket motors are likely overly conservative. Data from retired Minuteman II motors showed a 96 percent success rate in firings for motors aged 25 to 40 years, suggesting that actual lifetimes may be two to three times longer than official estimates.
• The current stockpile of Minuteman III missiles is sufficient to support the Air Force's average flight testing rate of three missiles per year until approximately 2050. The report suggests that reliability could be assessed with even fewer tests by using advanced monitoring, sensors, and nondestructive testing methods.
• Security goals cited by ICBM proponents—such as the 'sponge' effect to soak up Russian warheads or the 'tripwire' effect to deter small attacks—can be achieved with an ICBM force that is off-alert. De-alerting can be done quickly using existing safety switches in the silos.

APA

Wright, D., Hartung, W. D., & Gronlund, L. (2020). Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/rethinking-land-based-nuclear-missiles.pdf

Chicago

Wright, David, William D. Hartung, and Lisbeth Gronlund. Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/rethinking-land-based-nuclear-missiles.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Wright |first1=David |last2=Hartung |first2=William D. |last3=Gronlund |first3=Lisbeth |title=Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=June 2020 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/rethinking-land-based-nuclear-missiles.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{wright2020rethinking, author = {Wright, David and Hartung, William D. and Gronlund, Lisbeth}, title = {{Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2020}, month = jun, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/rethinking-land-based-nuclear-missiles.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }