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Turkey aims for 120 GW of wind and solar capacity by 2035, but grid capacity limits and bureaucratic hurdles pose significant risks. The report highlights that the $8.7 billion earmarked for domestic coal support through 2030 exceeds the 362 billion TL (approx. $5.7 billion) needed for a five-year grid renewal plan by 53%. To meet the 76.9 GW solar target, Turkey must install an average of 5.3 GW annually over the next decade, utilizing floating solar on dams, hybrid systems, storage, and rooftop solar to reduce grid pressure and ensure system stability.

The report analyzes a Turkish government incentive providing a $75 USD/MWh purchase guarantee for 60% of electricity generated by domestic coal plants until 2030, estimated to cost $8.7 billion. It highlights that this guarantee is 12% higher than recent average market prices and 27% higher than the total costs determined by the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ). Additionally, these plants continue to receive payments under a capacity mechanism that covers fixed and variable costs regardless of generation.

The report finds that international adaptation finance for SIDS is severely insufficient, averaging just over USD 2 billion annually in 2021–2022, while assessed needs are approximately USD 12 billion. It highlights that 44% of this finance was provided as debt, posing macroeconomic risks, and notes a high concentration of funds, with 10 SIDS receiving 67% of tracked finance. The document calls for a six-fold increase in flows, a shift from ODA eligibility to a multidimensional vulnerability index, and improved tracking of both public and private investments.

Colombia saw a significant increase in solar and wind capacity to approximately 9% of its electricity matrix in 2024, driven primarily by solar expansion. While the government aims to establish 20,000 energy communities by 2026 and has approved substantial future capacity (13.5 GW solar and 2.8 GW wind for 2023-2033), the sector faced a nearly 70% drop in investment between 2022 and 2023. The transition is further complicated by the suspension of several major wind projects and the need for approximately USD 92.4 billion to meet long-term National Energy Plan targets.

The report details how the Asian Development Bank, World Bank Group (IFC), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have provided direct and indirect financing for the Tangguh LNG project since 2005. It asserts that the project locks Indonesia into fossil gas dependence, causes environmental destruction, displaces Indigenous communities, and increases greenhouse gas emissions. The document concludes by urging MDBs to end all fossil fuel funding and reject the 'gas as a transition fuel' narrative, specifically opposing the proposed expansion into a fourth production facility and a carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) facility.

The document highlights a misalignment in climate finance, noting that less than 10% of agricultural climate finance reaches the livestock sector in LMICs. It argues that livestock are multifunctional assets providing 'triple wins'—climate mitigation, adaptation, and socio-economic benefits—but are often viewed narrowly as sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The authors identify barriers to funding, including poor data, complex measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) procedures, and institutional fragmentation. To address this, the brief recommends that the G20 promote blended finance instruments, scale carbon credit standards for rangelands, update climate fund eligibility criteria, and develop standardized climate-smart livestock indicators.

The report examines the financial and regulatory incentives needed to accelerate the decarbonisation of China's steel industry. It highlights a significant investment gap, noting that while pilot regions like Hebei have introduced sector-specific taxonomies and transition plan templates, national-level frameworks remain underdeveloped. The document argues that current incentives are insufficient for steelmakers due to high upfront costs and for financial institutions due to a lack of unified identification standards. It recommends expanding public subsidies, refining the capacity replacement policy to include carbon intensity criteria, and creating demand-side incentives for purchasers of low-carbon steel.

Indonesia is the world's sixth largest methane emitter, yet investment in methane reduction remains critically low, with only USD 1.5 billion received against an estimated USD 2.5 trillion needed for the Agriculture and Waste sectors. The author proposes that the upcoming TKBI Version 3 (expected Q1 2026) should include granular technical screening criteria (TSC) for high-impact activities—such as leak detection and repair in fossil fuels, alternate wetting and drying in rice paddies, and anaerobic digestion in waste management—to make these projects bankable for private investors. By aligning with global benchmarks like the EU Taxonomy and the Singapore-Asia Taxonomy, Indonesia can pre-emptively meet international requirements, such as the 2024 EU Methane Regulation, and mobilize capital through its sustainable finance framework.

The document examines the practice of gas line extension allowances, where the cost of connecting new buildings to the natural gas system is funded through the bills of existing customers. It argues that this model is failing as customers shift toward electric alternatives, creating a financial risk of stranded investments. Eight US states have already taken action to reduce or phase out these subsidies, which RMI estimates could save up to $750 million in annual utility costs across those states. Evidence from California and Colorado suggests that removing these subsidies encourages developers to choose all-electric options over gas.

The document identifies significant barriers preventing Indonesian local governments from accessing climate finance, including the inability to directly access international funds and a lack of technical expertise in project preparation. It suggests that Indonesia can unlock over USD 3 billion in potential climate finance by strengthening institutional capacity, improving the 'bankability' of projects through comprehensive feasibility studies and ESG standards, and utilizing blended finance and public-private partnerships. The brief highlights specific transport projects in Jakarta, Bandung, Makassar, Medan, and Semarang, noting a heavy reliance on central government funding.

The document argues that current development and climate finance is insufficient to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, noting a $4 trillion annual investment gap for SDG implementation in developing countries. It promotes the work of the Global Solidarity Levy Task Force (GSLTF), which has proposed 16 levy options targeting undertaxed sectors responsible for carbon emissions, including aviation, fossil fuels, and financial transactions. The GSLTF estimates that these levies could potentially generate over $500 billion in annual revenue, with specific examples such as a 0.1% levy on trading stocks and bonds potentially raising $418 billion. The brief calls for developing countries to engage in the design and assessment of these levies to ensure equitable access to funds, as the recovery of these taxes generally occurs through individual national tax systems, leaving the allocation of grants to developing countries to the discretion of developed nations.

The proposal seeks USD 1,141,325 over 30 months to strengthen Paraguay's resilience in the agriculture and forestry sectors. It identifies five primary barriers: limited climate data, insufficient integration of adaptation into national policy, inadequate response to impacts on marginalized groups, deficient implementation of climate-resilient practices, and weak private sector participation. The project aims to establish a National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a Climate Data Platform, and a National Framework for Climate Services (NFCS). Key financial initiatives include the development of a NAP Private Sector Financing Strategy and technical assistance to the Paraguay Development Finance Agency (AFD) to structure the country's first resilience bond. The project will also develop two high-quality private sector-led concept notes for submission to international funding sources and implement a 'Train-the-Trainer' program for extension agents to promote climate-smart agriculture (CSA).

The document examines the 'climate-debt trap' facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where escalating external debt—reaching nearly US$6.5 trillion in 2023—crowds out climate investment. It analyzes existing financial mechanisms such as Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDCs), Catastrophe (CAT) bonds, and debt swaps, while critiquing the G20 Common Framework for its inadequacy. The authors advocate for the cancellation of 'odious debt' linked to fossil fuel projects and propose that a Fossil Fuel Treaty could establish a Debt Resolution Facility to help member nations renegotiate debts in exchange for phasing out fossil fuels.

The report assesses Colombia's solar and wind energy landscape, noting a rise in solar capacity to 9% of the electrical matrix by 2024 but significant challenges for wind energy. It details the government's goal of 20,000 energy communities by 2026 and highlights a 70% drop in renewable investment between 2022 and 2023. The document outlines the legal incentives, financing mechanisms, and the socio-environmental challenges related to equity and community benefits in the energy transition.

The document assesses the limitations of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) in South Africa, noting that its focus on infrastructure may sideline workers. It proposes reallocating bank lending and retirement funds to unlock billions for onshore developmental projects and recommends implementing a Green Financial Taxonomy and targeted credit allocation to support a worker-centred transition.

The report argues that the EU ETS continues to reward heavy polluters through free allowances, which in 2023 alone amounted to approximately 40 billion euros. It highlights that sectors like steel, cement, and chemicals often receive more allowances than they emit, reducing the incentive for decarbonisation. The authors critique the Innovation Fund for over-financing carbon capture technologies (CCS/CCU) rather than scalable zero-emission technologies. To accelerate the transition, the report recommends phasing out free allowances by 2030, fully implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and reforming the Innovation Fund to prioritise material savings and renewable energy solutions.

The research paper assesses the capacity of public DFIs and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to mobilise climate finance, focusing on a case study of South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). It argues that the IDC's current self-financing model and commercial risk appetite hinder its ability to provide the 'patient capital' necessary for a just transition. The authors propose recapitalising the IDC through fiscal and monetary instruments, scaling concessional lending, and democratising its governance to better align with green industrialisation and worker-centric goals.

The briefing identifies five priority areas for Canada to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies: reforming major tax credits, addressing losses from the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion, ending support for carbon capture and storage, stopping LNG infrastructure subsidies, and ensuring low-carbon funds do not benefit fossil fuel companies. It highlights a lack of transparency, noting Canada failed to publish a promised inventory of subsidies by December 2024. The document also details provincial-level subsidies, including fuel tax cuts and infrastructure support, and calls for a comprehensive inventory of all financial supports to the sector.

The report identifies three core pillars for scaling transition finance in China's steel sector: robust identification frameworks, financial incentives, and multi-party coordination. It highlights that while pilot regions like Hebei have made progress with specific standards and templates, the broader industry faces high costs, a lack of precise incentives for financial institutions and downstream buyers, and a gap between funding needs and available high-quality transition assets.

The guide outlines the landscape of renewable energy in South Africa, emphasizing the shift toward private procurement and the dominance of solar PV. It details two primary implementation models—embedded generation and wheeling—and provides a comprehensive breakdown of financing options, including bank-specific instruments and power purchase agreements. The document also highlights the strategic role of backup storage for peak shaving and load shifting, lists available South African tax incentives for energy efficiency and renewable assets, and identifies critical grid and regulatory hurdles businesses may encounter.