Search Climate Insights Directory

The report argues that the end of fossil fuel advertising is inevitable and that marketing agencies must proactively 'off-ramp' these clients to avoid financial and reputational damage. It estimates that the top 29 oil majors spent $6.97 billion on media, creative, and PR in 2024, with $3.03 billion going to major holding companies and $3.94 billion to independent agencies. The document highlights the risks of retention, citing Havas' loss of B Corp certification and Edelman's 5% revenue decline in 2024. It proposes a phased exit strategy ending in 2030, suggesting agencies pivot toward high-growth sectors including healthcare (projected $36.4 billion marketing value by 2030), renewables, and the circular economy (a $4.5 trillion global opportunity by 2030).

The report identifies a conservative USD 4.4 trillion pipeline of creditworthy sustainable bonds from 12 climate-leader countries through 2035. It argues that global megatrends—such as electrification, urbanisation, and the rise of AI—will further accelerate this pipeline beyond current projections. The document also outlines policy levers, including taxonomies and monetary policy, that governments can use to channel capital into mitigation and resilience projects.

ClientEarth outlines three legal imperatives for COP30: combating climate disinformation, translating the ICJ's Advisory Opinion into 1.5°C-compatible domestic laws, and establishing enforceable corporate accountability for environmental harms. The brief emphasizes the transition from voluntary pledges to mandatory legal compliance to ensure the goals of the Paris Agreement are met.

The report examines the role of social media platforms in spreading climate disinformation, highlighting how algorithmic systems and revenue-sharing models incentivise misleading content. It specifically assesses the compliance of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) with the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), concluding that most have failed to identify or mitigate climate disinformation as a systemic risk.

The document argues that civic space in the EU is narrowing due to restrictive laws, exclusion from decision-making, and the criminalisation of peaceful activism. It highlights specific threats such as SLAPPs, funding cuts to the LIFE programme, and national laws in France, Hungary, Poland, and Italy that curtail CSO operations. ClientEarth calls for a pro-CSO narrative, transparent access to decision-making, and stable long-term financial support to safeguard environmental democracy.

ClientEarth warns that further delays to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), currently set to apply to the private sector on 30 December 2025, would cause significant environmental damage and create legal vulnerabilities. The document asserts that such delays lack proper impact assessments and conflict with EU environmental protection principles, the principle of legitimate expectations for businesses that have already invested in compliance, and international law regarding State climate obligations as clarified by a 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion.

The document asserts that Canada is falling behind its 2030 and 2035 emissions targets and should utilize Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) to achieve cost-effective reductions. It suggests that Canada can leverage its strengths in methane detection, clean electricity, and carbon removal technologies to create bilateral agreements, similar to Japan's Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM). The report warns that simple liquefied natural gas (LNG) export deals are unlikely to meet strict Article 6 additionality requirements and recommends establishing a national coordination mechanism to integrate climate finance with trade and sustainable development goals in the Global South.

The document assesses Canada's current emissions trajectory and proposes the adoption of a structured ITMO framework, modeled after Japan's Joint Crediting Mechanism, to help Canada meet its 2030 and 2035 climate targets while promoting its clean-tech sector globally.

The Just Transition Compass serves as a non-prescriptive guide to move Just Transitions from high-level dialogue to concrete implementation. It defines core principles of distributive, procedural, and restorative justice, identifies systemic barriers to national implementation—such as limited subnational capacity and siloed finance—and analyzes the political tensions within the UNFCCC's Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). The report advocates for a permanent international coordination mechanism to align fragmented efforts, manage the cross-border impacts of unilateral trade measures like the EU's CBAM, and mobilize private capital through sustainable finance taxonomies.

The Just Transition Compass establishes a framework to move from high-level climate commitments to scalable, justice-focused implementation. It identifies four core elements of a just transition—restorative, distributive, procedural, and climate justice—and argues that domestic transitions require international cooperation to avoid economic spillovers and financial inequalities. The document proposes the creation of a permanent Just Transition Coordination Unit within the UNFCCC to reduce fragmentation, align financial flows, and provide capacity support to countries.

The document analyzes Brazil's position as a top global oil producer, noting that while its current production is economically resilient to most climate scenarios, the pursuit of new frontiers like the Equatorial Margin carries high stranded asset risks. It highlights Brazil's potential to lead in low-carbon fuels and critical minerals but warns that a lack of coordinated industrial policy and investment in innovation may limit its competitiveness. The author recommends using advanced modeling to optimize investments in refining and green fuels and suggests leveraging diplomatic ties with China and the EU to diversify the economy post-fossil fuels.

The Net Zero Finance Tracker (NZFT) Methodology 2025 describes a framework for assessing the Paris Agreement alignment of 1,500 global financial institutions, representing approximately USD 286 trillion in assets. The methodology employs a three-dimensional approach—Targets, Implementation, and Impact—using a mix of qualitative tiered scoring and quantitative metrics. Key updates for 2025 include expanded institutional coverage, the integration of new frameworks such as the TPT and OECD, and the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) for primary data extraction from corporate reports. The document details how the NZFT tracks mitigation targets, climate risk management, and financial flows to clean energy and fossil fuels, while introducing an ownership attribution approach to link financial holdings to real-economy emissions and physical risks.

The report argues that while tracking the quantity of climate finance is established, tracking its quality remains nascent. It proposes a three-level conceptual framework—project, market, and system—to move beyond one-off project outputs toward sustained transformational change. At the project level, it emphasizes core indicators like tCO2e for mitigation and beneficiaries reached for adaptation. At the market level, it focuses on creation, scalability, and inclusiveness, highlighting private finance catalyzation and job creation. At the system level, it identifies three catalytic pathways (singular, centralized, and decentralized) to track structural shifts in paradigms, policies, and institutional arrangements. The report concludes by identifying nine key indicators as a starting point for a common reporting approach across public climate finance actors.

The guidance document details how the Net Zero Finance Tracker (NZFT) monitors financial institutions' (FIs) transition to net zero. It maps NZFT indicators against nine global and regional frameworks—including GFANZ, UN HLEG, and the TPT—to ensure a robust tracking approach. The NZFT aims to exceed standard recommendations by applying more stringent criteria for target coverage, accountability, and evidence of positive climate engagement. While it covers most key transition elements, the document notes current data gaps regarding Just Transition and specific 2030 emission reduction thresholds.

The document argues for a shift from the 'compensation' model of carbon offsetting to a 'contribution' model known as beyond value chain mitigation (BVCM). It examines several climate impact funds—including 1% for the Planet, Frontier, and Milkywire—finding that while they generally support high-impact climate action and avoid misleading neutrality claims, there is a systemic need for clearer BVCM metrics and more explicit guidance on corporate claims to prevent greenwashing.

The document challenges the narrative that carbon credits drive corporate climate ambition, asserting that existing studies showing a correlation between credit use and decarbonisation suffer from methodological flaws, including sample bias and confounding factors. It highlights risks such as the 'investment effect' and 'target effect,' where credits compete with or substitute for internal abatement. The brief recommends that companies, regulators, and standard setters treat carbon credits only as complementary contributions (Beyond Value Chain Mitigation) and maintain a strict firewall between credit use and internal emission reduction targets.

The report evaluates the IMO Net-Zero Framework (NZF), a hybrid measure combining a GHG Fuel Intensity (GFI) standard with a two-tier carbon pricing system. It concludes that the NZF is likely to result in modest emission reductions of 10-15% by 2030, falling short of the 1.5°C-compatible requirement of a 45% cut. The analysis highlights a weak effective carbon price of approximately USD 10–15/tCO₂eq, which is insufficient to make zero-emission fuels competitive and risks locking in fossil LNG. Revenue generation is projected to be limited (around USD 15 billion annually), significantly lower than a high flat levy scenario. The report also examines the distributional impacts, noting that SIDS and LDCs may not receive sufficient funding, and proposes integration pathways for the EU to maintain its climate ambition while participating in the global scheme.

The document analyzes the IMO's Net-Zero Framework (NZF), which was delayed by one year in October 2025 due to pressure from the US and oil-producing nations. A study by Cincera Consulting finds the NZF is inadequate, projecting emission reductions of only 8-10% by 2030, far below the 45% required by the Paris Agreement. The brief criticizes the NZF's hybrid approach—combining a GHG fuel standard with limited carbon pricing—noting that the effective carbon price of $14/tCO2eq is too low to drive a transition to green fuels. It recommends that the EU expand its Emissions Trading System (ETS) to cover 100% of emissions for voyages entering or leaving the European Economic Area and urges the IMO to adopt a universal levy to address absolute emissions.

The report examines climate adaptation in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mexico, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea. It finds that while instability often leads to risk-averse site selection and implementation delays, projects that integrate conflict-sensitivity and community-led approaches can mitigate these challenges and potentially contribute to peacebuilding. The analysis highlights the necessity of flexible implementation, the use of fragility assessments, and the importance of addressing root causes of vulnerability to avoid maladaptation and 'backdraft'—unforeseen negative spillover effects.

The report critiques the 'firm fixation' approach where utilities meet surging data center demand by adding gas plants or refurbishing coal units. It identifies six defining features of data centers—agency, clustering, consumption profiles, flexibility, backup requirements, and modularity—that make them unsuitable for simple one-to-one matching with firm power plants. Instead, the author advocates for a 'system of systems' approach combining clean energy portfolios, battery storage, and demand-side flexibility. Key recommendations for policymakers include using the interconnection process as leverage to ensure cost causation and exploring demand-side resources, such as sponsoring household energy upgrades, to free up grid capacity.