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The paper examines Ethiopia's position regarding the COMESA FTA, concluding that while trade liberalisation could increase general welfare through cheaper imports, it poses significant risks to Ethiopia's infant manufacturing sector, potentially leading to job losses and revenue reductions. It highlights that Ethiopia is pursuing regional integration through bilateral infrastructure and energy projects—such as the LAPSSET Corridor and hydropower exports—rather than formal trade liberalisation.

The relationship between South Africa and China has evolved from formal diplomatic recognition in 1998 to a 'comprehensive strategic partnership' by 2010. While bilateral trade has grown rapidly, with China becoming a primary trading partner, the structure remains imbalanced, characterized by South African raw material exports and Chinese manufactured imports. Investment patterns are unique compared to other African nations, with South African firms historically investing more in China than vice versa, although Chinese FDI is increasing in mining and infrastructure. Diplomatic cooperation is strong in multilateral forums like BRICS and the UN Security Council, though tensions exist regarding commercial competition and public perceptions of Chinese business practices.

The document examines the state of corporate governance in Africa, noting that while it is generally underdeveloped and embryonic, a distinctively African approach is emerging. This approach, exemplified by South Africa's King Code, emphasizes socio-economic outcomes and the principle of ubuntu over purely financial or shareholder-centric metrics. The author highlights significant barriers to implementation, including a lack of professional skills (particularly accountants), poor institutional environments, and the prevalence of small, family-owned businesses. The briefing recommends that governments reform the business climate, nurture independent corporate governance infrastructure, and encourage cross-border cooperation to support business growth without imposing unrealistic regulatory burdens.

The report examines corporate governance across six SADC countries, finding a significant gap between the adoption of formal legal frameworks and their practical implementation. While South Africa and Mauritius possess sophisticated systems, others struggle with rudimentary architectures, corruption, and poor infrastructure. The author argues for a principles-based approach to governance that facilitates rather than restricts business growth, particularly for small and medium enterprises.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a US-Africa trade agreement established in 2001 that provides duty-free access to the US market for qualifying sub-Saharan African states. While exports from AGOA countries to the US grew by 78% between 2001 and 2014, the trade is heavily dominated by energy and commodities, with mineral fuels and oils accounting for 68% of imports. South Africa is a primary beneficiary, contributing an estimated 62,395 jobs and exporting high-end manufactured goods such as vehicles, unlike many other AGOA partners who rely on raw materials.

The document examines South Africa's economic struggle to transition from an upper-middle-income to an upper-income country, a process hindered by historical structural dualism and a trend toward de-industrialisation. It highlights similarities between South Africa and Brazil regarding commodity-based export profiles and internal debates over industrial policy. While South Africa maintains a diversified industrial base, the legacy of Apartheid-era segregated development has distorted the skills base and hampered innovation. The author argues that escaping the 'middle income trap' requires high investment, industrial competitiveness, and the resolution of structural inequality. Within the BRICS context, the document notes competitive pressures from India and China, suggesting that the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Fund may provide neutral channels for cooperation.

The research paper argues that India's foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi should shift from the 'strategic confusion' of the previous decade toward a pragmatic, non-doctrinaire approach. It suggests that India must redefine national security to include the 'food-energy-water-climate change nexus' and prioritize regional connectivity and infrastructure in South Asia over military dominance. The author posits that India should leverage BRICS and IBSA to promote a more equitable system of global governance and South-South dialogue to support its domestic developmental priorities.

The document examines the BRICS contingent reserve arrangement (CRA), a US$100bn pool designed to provide liquidity during balance of payments or short-term liquidity crises. While the CRA serves as a political challenge to the perceived undemocratic structure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it also provides an 'Argentinian floor' to prevent total currency collapse during market volatility, such as that caused by US Federal Reserve tapering.

The document outlines the initial capital, governance, and operational goals of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. The NDB is intended for infrastructure and development projects with an initial capital of $50 billion, while the CRA is a $100 billion foreign exchange pool designed to support BRICS governments during liquidity or balance of payments crises.

The paper examines why elections in Africa often trigger violence and fail to legitimise power, attributing this to high stakes regarding access to state resources. It argues that technical fixes are insufficient and that stability requires inclusive political settlements, credible election management bodies (EMBs), and robust domestic observation and mediation systems involving civil society and traditional leaders.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides duty-free US market access to eligible sub-Saharan African countries, is set to expire on 30 September 2015. While the US Executive Branch conducts impact investigations and makes recommendations, the US Congress holds the central role in determining the timing and content of reauthorisation legislation. The document warns that a swift renewal is unlikely due to a partisan stalemate in Washington, the 2014 congressional elections, and opposition from US agricultural and business interest groups. It advises African leaders to prioritize advocacy with the US Legislative Branch, specifically members of committees with jurisdictional interest, rather than focusing solely on the US Executive Branch during the 2014 US–Africa Leaders Summit.

The document evaluates South Africa's third APRM implementation report (SAIR3), noting improvements in reporting quality and honesty compared to previous reports. However, it argues that the APRM remains largely a foreign policy tool with little domestic impact, as the NPoA is not integrated into national policies like the National Development Plan (NDP) and governance challenges identified in 2007 persist.

The paper examines electoral management in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, highlighting a trend toward independent or hybrid EMB models. It identifies critical challenges including the high cost of elections, executive interference in appointments and tenure, and the complexities of electoral dispute adjudication. The author argues that the effectiveness of EMBs is often undermined by a political culture of impunity and zero-sum politics, despite formal legal guarantees of independence.

The document analyzes how comprehensive 'WTO-plus' agreements like the TPP and TTIP influence South Africa's regional trade goals. It argues that while direct GDP impacts may be modest, these agreements create risks of preference erosion—particularly in clothing and textiles—and set new global benchmarks for regulatory coherence, intellectual property, and investment that South Africa and TFTA members must adapt to avoid isolation.

The document examines the role of 'emerging powers'—specifically China, India, Russia, and Brazil—in the two Sudans following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan's 2011 independence. It highlights China as the most dominant actor, particularly in the oil and infrastructure sectors, while India's role is significant but more limited. The analysis argues that the 'South-South cooperation' rhetoric used by these states masks a reality of extractive economic interests that reinforce Sudan's unbalanced political economy. The paper details how the 2011 secession of South Sudan stripped Sudan of 75% of its oil production, leading to economic decline and shifting the strategic focus of Asian investors. It also discusses the impact of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile on foreign investments and the role of these powers in peacekeeping and arms transfers.

The author argues that South Africa's economic growth is hindered by energy constraints, untenable industrial relations, and low private investment. While the president's address identifies these pressures, the author contends that powerful vested interests and parastatal red tape block necessary structural changes, such as the Independent System Market Operator (ISMO) Bill and the Independent Power Producers (IPP) Programme. The text criticizes the reliance on coal-fired mega projects and a costly nuclear fleet programme, suggesting that greater IPP procurement is a more efficient way to diversify the energy mix. Additionally, it calls for institutional changes to the Labour Relations Act to democratise industrial relations and warns that social interventions in mining communities must be balanced with efforts to attract private investment to revitalise the sector.

The document presents findings from a 2013 South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) survey of 60 diplomats and experts in Pretoria and Addis Ababa. It argues that while South Africa's commitment to an 'African Agenda' and peace resolution is respected, its overall strategic direction has become 'confusing' and 'obfuscated' under President Zuma. The briefing warns against 'trophy diplomacy'—attempting to project global influence before maturing as a geopolitical entity—and recommends reviewing the Foreign Policy White Paper to better balance relations between Africa, the West, and the emerging South. It specifically suggests that South Africa leverage shared priorities between East and Southern Africa to resolve stalled negotiations for the Tri-Partite Free Trade Area between COMESA, the ECA, and SADC.

The paper examines the shift in global trade governance from the WTO toward 'mega-regional' agreements like the TPP and TTIP, which establish new norms on issues such as the environment and labour. It warns that South Africa risks investment deflection and isolation if it continues a blocking strategy in the WTO while other BRICS nations, particularly China, consider engaging with these new frameworks. The author recommends that South Africa use regional initiatives like the Tripartite Free Trade Area to experiment with new regulatory agendas and proactively propose plurilateral initiatives within the WTO.

The research examines the potential for a 'resource curse' in four African nations soon to become oil-dependent. Using a game-theoretic model and the concept of 'limited access orders,' the author argues that oil rents typically disrupt political incentives, undermining economic performance and potentially destabilizing the state. While Ghana is identified as a potential exception due to its robust democracy and lower projected oil-to-tax revenue ratio, the other cases show higher risks of repression or predatory behavior. The paper concludes that radical policy interventions like 'cash-to-citizen' transfers are implausible because they ignore the domestic political equilibria and patronage networks that maintain stability.

The document examines the evolution of democratic governance in Africa from the OAU era to the AU era, focusing on the APRM and ACDEG. It argues that while the continent has shifted from 'politics of the bullet' to 'politics of the ballot', significant challenges remain, including 'illiberal democracies' and slow implementation of governance reviews. The author advocates for stronger synergies between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), increased domestic funding for National Programmes of Action (NPoAs), and a balanced role for non-state actors to prevent 'state capture' of these initiatives.