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The research paper advocates for centering human rights in ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) by aligning implementation with Section C of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF). It highlights that while EbA can be more cost-effective and equitable than top-down approaches, it requires a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to avoid maladaptation and the displacement of communities. Through case studies in Benin (sacred forest protection) and Kenya (rangeland restoration in Mount Marsabit), the document illustrates how integrating Indigenous knowledge and participatory governance enhances resilience. The author recommends establishing national coordination mechanisms to track EbA across sectors and leveraging global networks to scale rights-based evidence, noting that currently less than 0.2% of climate finance specifically targets locally led outcomes.

The document argues that major private credit rating agencies (CRAs) employ subjective, biased, and procyclical methodologies that unfairly increase the cost of capital for African nations. This 'credit rating impasse' hinders debt restructuring, limits the capacity of regional development banks, and obstructs the deployment of climate finance. To counter this, the African Union has endorsed the creation of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) in Mauritius. The brief recommends that African states improve data transparency, enhance debt management capacity, and maintain macroeconomic stability to challenge inaccurate ratings and reduce borrowing costs.

The document advocates for a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA), emphasizing that biodiversity-led climate strategies are most effective when they address power imbalances and protect the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities. It highlights Section C of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) as a critical guide for ensuring equity and avoiding maladaptation. Case studies from Benin, focusing on the protection of sacred forests through Indigenous knowledge, and Kenya, focusing on rangeland restoration in Mount Marsabit via pastoralist stewardship, demonstrate how inclusive practices enhance resilience. The brief recommends establishing national coordination mechanisms to track EbA across sectors and increasing climate finance for locally led actions, noting that currently less than 0.2% of such finance specifically targets locally led outcomes.

The document argues for a global debt restructuring mechanism to replace the voluntary and often delayed processes of current frameworks. It suggests that such a mechanism should be housed closer to debtor nations, be linked to the African Union (AU) and African financial institutions, and be grounded in principles of fiscal legitimacy and human rights. To overcome political resistance, the brief recommends that African states form a 'Debtors Club' and transition to the African Credit Rating Agency to reduce reliance on unregulated US-based agencies.

Minister Ronald Lamola's address details South Africa's strategic approach to foreign policy, emphasizing the need to address the root causes of irregular migration among Africa's youth and the necessity of reforming the global financial architecture to ensure debt sustainability. He highlights South Africa's leadership roles in the G20 and BRICS to advance African priorities, including climate finance and inequality, while committing to regional peace and security efforts in Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC.

This executive summary describes a roundtable discussion involving 42 journalists, scholars, and civil society representatives focused on the challenges of journalism in authoritarian contexts across Africa. The report examines the nature of intimidation, newsroom dynamics, psychological impacts, and coping strategies used by reporters facing state pressure.

The report argues that the expanded BRICS bloc is not a coherent actor but a collection of competing interests, where fossil-industrial interests often conflict with climate rhetoric. It categorizes members into five functional actor groups and proposes a five-axis 'Climate and Energy Compass' and a focus on climate finance reform to facilitate a just and sovereign energy transition.

The document argues that major private credit rating agencies (CRAs) employ subjective, biased, and procyclical methodologies that unfairly inflate the risk premiums for African nations. This 'credit rating impasse' increases the cost of capital, hinders debt restructuring, and obstructs the deployment of climate finance. To counter this, the author supports the African Union's endorsement of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) to be based in Mauritius. The brief recommends that African nations improve data transparency, build debt management capacity through partnerships with the IMF and AfDB, and implement legislative oversight via debt sustainability laws to improve their macroeconomic fundamentals and challenge inaccurate ratings.

The document argues that the energy transition within the expanded BRICS bloc is a contest of power between incumbent fossil-industrial interests and emerging green regimes. It identifies a 'grey space' of hybrid compromise where ambitious climate rhetoric masks continued fossil fuel expansion. To navigate this, the authors introduce the BRICS Climate and Energy Compass and a strategic action plan focusing on financial architecture reform, investment in hard-to-abate sectors, and the localisation of climate finance.

The report argues that the abrupt closure of USAID in 2025 has had catastrophic short-term effects on funding-dependent newsrooms in Africa, leading to mass layoffs and a decline in investigative capacity. It highlights the role of Internews as a primary implementer of these projects and warns that the loss of funding increases the risk of 'media capture' by political actors, the 'juniorisation' of newsrooms as senior staff leave, and a shift toward commercial rather than public service reporting. The author concludes that the resulting vacuum in public accountability work may accelerate democratic backsliding in fragile states.

The report argues that rising geopolitical instability and the military occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant have exposed gaps in nuclear safety norms. It suggests that the Pelindaba Treaty may be insufficient for contemporary armed conflicts and recommends strengthening international regulations, expanding the IAEA's mandate, and protecting nuclear personnel and infrastructure to safeguard nuclear energy in Africa and globally.

The study finds that while Ethiopia, Senegal, and South Africa generally maintain cautious, non-aligned international postures, their regional approaches vary significantly. Ethiopia has adopted a highly assertive posture regarding sea access and geostrategic relevance; Senegal demonstrated assertive interventionism during the 2017 Gambian crisis to protect internal security; and South Africa maintains a 'reluctant hegemon' image, experiencing setbacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to military and agency constraints.

The document analyzes the transition of South Africa from dominant-party rule to a coalition-based political landscape. It examines the formation and fragility of the 10-party Government of National Unity (GNU), provincial coalitions in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Northern Cape, and the chronic instability of municipal coalitions. The authors argue that while coalitions can broaden representation and introduce checks and balances, South Africa's current reliance on informal, non-binding agreements leads to gridlock and a reliance on courts for dispute resolution. The paper recommends formalizing coalition pacts, limiting motions of no confidence, and establishing transparent monitoring mechanisms to restore public trust.

The document argues that African diplomacy at the UN is evolving into a distinct form of realpolitik that blends enduring values with strategic calculation. This approach is evidenced by voting patterns on conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, where states use abstentions to maintain strategic autonomy. The brief highlights key institutional gains, such as the AU's permanent G20 seat and UN Security Council Resolution 2719 for financing AU-led peace operations, while noting that challenges in coordination, capacity, and consistency persist. Ultimately, it posits that Africa uses moral and legal narratives not to cloak domination, but to resist it and negotiate influence within an asymmetrical international system.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical liberation-era ties and anti-Western rhetoric to maintain influence in Southern Africa, but faces significant constraints. While it maintains security cooperation and diplomatic links with several SADC members, its economic footprint remains modest, accounting for barely 1% of the region's external trade in 2024. The document highlights a gap between Moscow's symbolic gestures—such as debt forgiveness and limited grain shipments—and tangible developmental results, noting that sanctions and economic weakness hinder its ability to compete with China, the EU, and the US.

The document argues that the multilateral system, particularly the UN Security Council, is experiencing a 'rupture' characterized by paralysis and legitimacy deficits. While the AU seeks immediate structural changes—including permanent seats and veto power—the EU generally favors gradual procedural reforms. Despite these differences, the briefing identifies key areas of convergence: improving UNSC working methods, strengthening EU-AU-UN cooperation, and implementing UN Resolution 2719 to provide predictable financing for AU-led peace operations. It suggests that both continents must move beyond rhetorical alignment toward tangible delivery to maintain influence in a fragmented geopolitical order, especially given the US's increasing disengagement from international organizations.

The briefing identifies critical areas of focus for the 2026 Mining Indaba, specifically the impact of US, EU, and Chinese geopolitics on critical minerals, the struggle to establish domestic mineral value chains in Africa, the role of transport infrastructure like the Lobito Corridor, the viability of regional battery value chains between the DRC and Zambia, and the potential for engagement between the main event and the civil society-led Alternative Mining Indaba.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Russia has restructured its African security engagements, moving from the high-profile combat deployments of the Wagner Group to a more centralised model controlled by the Kremlin and the GRU. This new approach prioritises 'regime survival' services, including elite protection, training, and intelligence sharing, while expanding covert information warfare through entities like Russia House and the African Initiative. Despite these efforts, Russia's footprint is constrained by the resource demands of its war in Ukraine and risks of 'blowback' from African governments due to human rights abuses and deceptive recruitment schemes like 'Alabuga Start'.

The research argues that Ethiopia, Senegal, and South Africa generally adopt a 'cautious' posture internationally—characterized by non-alignment and partnership diversification—while tending toward more 'assertive' approaches regionally. However, South Africa serves as a partial exception, exhibiting assertiveness internationally (notably regarding Gaza) and a more cautious or less effective approach regionally (such as in the DRC). The paper uses these cases to argue for a plural conception of 'African agencies' driven by national interest and the goal of strategic autonomy.

The document examines how Chinese firms in Zimbabwe are coupling mining investments with energy infrastructure to overcome local power shortages and support mineral beneficiation, particularly in the lithium sector. While this model has increased Zimbabwe's lithium revenues from $70 million in 2022 to over $600 million in 2024, it has raised significant concerns regarding environmental degradation, lack of community consultation, and the risk of perpetuating an extractive 'pit-to-port' model where high-value refining remains in China.