Search Climate Insights Directory

The briefing reveals that German financial institutions continue to pour billions into LNG expansion despite climate pledges. Between 2021 and 2023, nine German banks provided US$7.6 billion in financing, with Deutsche Bank and LBBW accounting for 65% of this total. Additionally, eight German investors held US$5.8 billion in assets of top LNG developers as of May 2024, led by Allianz and Deutsche Bank/DWS. The report highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero commitments and their actual financial activities, noting that Deutsche Bank's financing to LNG expansion rose by 35% between 2021 and 2023. Reclaim Finance argues that this infrastructure locks in long-term fossil fuel dependence and risks creating stranded assets, especially in Europe where gas consumption is declining.

The report examines the role of Italian financial institutions in funding the global expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG). It finds that between 2021 and 2023, 12 Italian banks provided US$6 billion to the top 150 LNG developers, with Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit accounting for over 85% of this total. The document highlights a gap between these banks' net-zero pledges and their continued financing of LNG projects, including support for Eni and Enel. It warns that this support risks creating stranded assets and locking in long-term fossil fuel reliance, particularly in Europe where gas consumption is declining.

The report finds that Japanese financial institutions are among the world's largest supporters of LNG expansion, providing billions in financing despite public commitments to carbon neutrality. It highlights a significant gap between these climate pledges and actual financial flows, particularly from four major banks and the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). The document argues that this support locks in long-term fossil fuel dependence and risks creating stranded assets, especially in Europe and South Korea where gas demand is declining.

The report details how 18 South Korean investment banking institutions provided US$7.4 billion to LNG expansion between 2021 and 2023. It specifically highlights DB Financial, Kyobo Life Insurance, and KDB Financial Group as the primary contributors, accounting for 44% of this total. The document argues that this support fuels a climate disaster by locking in long-term fossil fuel dependence and increasing the risk of stranded assets, particularly through the financing of the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS).

The report finds that US financial institutions are primary drivers of global LNG expansion, providing billions in financing and investments despite climate pledges. Between 2021 and 2023, 85 US banks provided US$51.2 billion to LNG expansion, with six major banks accounting for 80% of this total. US investors held US$179.6 billion in assets of top LNG developers as of May 2024. The document highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero commitments and their actual policies, which lack restrictions on LNG. It warns that new LNG infrastructure risks creating stranded assets, particularly in Europe, and contributes to substantial greenhouse gas emissions, including high levels of methane leakage from US shale gas fields.

The report finds that French financial institutions are among the top global supporters of LNG expansion, with four banks providing nearly all of the US$14 billion in financing between 2021 and 2023. It highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero pledges and their continued funding of LNG export and import terminals, including support for TotalEnergies. The document argues that current sector policies are insufficient due to loopholes regarding corporate financing and import terminals, and calls for a comprehensive end to financial services for new LNG projects.

The 2024 Scorecard by Insure Our Future argues that the global insurance industry is in a 'vicious cycle,' where it continues to underwrite fossil fuel expansion while simultaneously withdrawing coverage from communities facing the resulting climate risks. Using climate attribution science, the report estimates that over one-third of weather-related insured losses between 2002 and 2022—approximately $600 billion—are attributable to human-caused climate change. The analysis reveals a stark mismatch in underwriting, with renewable energy premiums representing less than 30% of the size of the fossil fuel insurance market in 2023. For 15 of the 28 major property and casualty insurers analyzed, estimated climate-attributable losses exceeded the premiums they collected from fossil fuel clients. While Generali is noted as the first insurer to restrict oil and gas expansion across the entire value chain, the report concludes that voluntary corporate leadership has stalled, necessitating urgent regulatory intervention to mandate 1.5°C-aligned transition plans and higher capital requirements for fossil fuel exposure.

The document establishes a reference framework for financial actors to evaluate power utility transition plans across four categories: emissions reduction, energy planning, capital expenditure (CAPEX), and climate planning. It argues that for a plan to be 1.5°C-aligned, utilities must commit to a carbon-neutral power sector by 2035 in Europe and OECD countries (2040 elsewhere), implement plant-by-plant closure plans for fossil fuels without sales or conversions, and dedicate over 86% of CAPEX to sustainable technologies by 2030. The guide also recommends that financial institutions implement sectoral exclusion policies for fossil gas and achieve a 6:1 financing ratio in favor of sustainable power over fossil fuels by 2030.

The Citizen Forum for Economic Justice opposes the European Commission's plan to use an "Omnibus" directive to review and potentially roll back the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the Green Taxonomy. The authors contend that private sector lobbies are using "competitiveness" and "administrative simplification" as pretexts to weaken corporate responsibility, specifically threatening the principle of civil liability and the requirement for science-aligned climate transition plans. They argue that these regulations are essential for meeting Paris Agreement commitments and protecting human and environmental rights.

The document argues that the European Commission's plan to use 'Omnibus' legislation to revise the CS3D, CSRD, and EU Taxonomy is a response to private sector lobbying under the guise of 'competitiveness' and 'administrative simplification'. The authors warn that this could undermine corporate accountability for human rights and environmental abuses, weaken civil liability for multinational companies, and jeopardize the EU's goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the Paris Agreement objectives.

The document highlights the significant influence of French banks on the automotive market, noting that five major groups control 34% of leasing contracts. It criticizes these banks for lacking a phase-out date for internal combustion engine rentals and for a low proportion of electric vehicles in their fleets compared to market averages, particularly at BNP Paribas and Société Générale.

The document outlines a two-step process for choosing climate scenarios that effectively guide greenhouse gas emission reductions. It advises avoiding scenarios produced by entities with conflicts of interest, such as oil and gas companies, and instead prioritizing independent sources like the IEA and IPCC. A robust scenario must have at least a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C with low or zero 'overshoot' and must rely on limited negative emissions to avoid risking irreversible climate tipping points.

The guide outlines a two-step process for choosing climate scenarios that accurately reflect the requirements for climate mitigation. First, it advises avoiding scenarios from entities with conflicts of interest, such as oil and gas companies, in favor of independent bodies like the IEA or IPCC. Second, it mandates that a robust scenario must have at least a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or low temperature overshoot to avoid irreversible tipping points. Finally, the guide warns against scenarios that rely heavily on negative emissions technologies, such as BECCS and CCS, suggesting specific IPCC feasibility thresholds (e.g., 3 Gt CO2/year for BECCS by 2050) to filter out unrealistic pathways that may delay the phase-out of heavy emitting industries.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and McKinsey have proposed using 'transition credits' (carbon offsets) to attract finance for the early retirement of coal plants in Asia. Reclaim Finance argues that this approach replicates the failures of the broader offset industry, specifically regarding the inability to prove 'additionality' and the risk of inflated emission reduction estimates. The document asserts that offsets create perverse incentives that may deter governments from enacting national coal phaseout policies or providing concessional finance. It concludes that a successful transition requires increased public concessional funding and accelerated investment in sustainable power alternatives rather than a reliance on tradeable offsets.

The document challenges six common arguments used to justify financial support for gas expansion, asserting that new gas projects are incompatible with a 1.5°C warming limit and that global gas demand will peak by 2030.

Reclaim Finance outlines the stakes for COP29, emphasizing that the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for North-South climate finance should be at least a trillion dollars and provided as grants or grant-equivalents. The organization warns against allowing private finance or carbon offsets to count toward these public obligations, noting that private capital often bypasses the poorest communities and adaptation projects. While acknowledging the role of private finance in tripling renewable energy, the document criticizes the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) for its failure to restrict fossil fuel financing and the methodological flaws in Net-Zero Banking Alliance targets. It further highlights the failure of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam due to a lack of concessional funding and private sector risk aversion.

The report finds that the 20 largest European banks provided US$200.3 billion to companies expanding upstream and midstream oil and gas between 2021 and 2023, with Barclays and HSBC as the largest supporters. Despite net zero pledges, most banks lack robust policies to end corporate financing for fossil fuel expansion, and financing to diversified oil and gas companies remains overwhelmingly directed toward fossil fuel activities rather than sustainable transitions.

Japan is the only G7 country without a clear coal phaseout deadline, with coal accounting for nearly one-third of its electricity generation as of 2023. The Japanese government is promoting 'next-generation' technologies, specifically carbon capture and storage (CCS) and ammonia co-firing, which the report characterizes as 'false solutions' due to their high cost and limited effectiveness. These policies are supported by market mechanisms like the Capacity Market and the Long-Term Decarbonization Power Source Auction, which incentivize the continued operation of coal plants. Furthermore, Japan's three megabanks—Mizuho, MUFG, and SMBC—provided US$23.5 billion in coal financing between 2021 and 2023, often utilizing loopholes that exclude only new clients. The report also highlights the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) initiative, noting that 35% of its 158 agreements involve fossil fuels, potentially locking Southeast Asian nations into outdated energy systems.

The document highlights a contradiction between the desire of French and European citizens to support the ecological transition and the reality that their savings are invested by financial institutions into fossil fuels. It identifies a lack of transparency and poor accessibility as the primary obstacles to sustainable saving.

The document asserts that despite early commitments in 2019, French financial actors continue to support coal companies, undermining France's international climate leadership. It highlights that between 2021 and 2023, the four largest French banks financed 26 problematic coal companies. The author argues that voluntary policies are insufficient and calls for a mandatory regulatory framework with clear definitions of excluded companies and deterrent sanctions to ensure a complete exit from both thermal and metallurgical coal.