Search Climate Insights Directory

The briefing reports a significant industry shift toward offshore oil and gas extraction in 2024, with the vast majority of new discoveries, project approvals, and startups occurring in the oceans. It highlights that 85% of new discoveries by volume were concentrated in ten offshore fields, including major finds in Kuwait and Namibia. The document warns that these developments are incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5°C and pose severe risks to marine ecosystems through noise pollution, habitat loss, and potential oil spills throughout the project lifecycle.

In 2024, global prospective utility-scale solar and wind capacity grew by over 20% to 4.4 TW, though this remains only half of the 9 TW required to meet COP28's tripling renewables goal. While at least 240 GW of capacity became operational in 2024, project completion rates vary significantly: 76% in G7 countries, 55% in China, and 52% in other non-G7 countries. China leads in both operating capacity (at least 891 GW) and prospective projects, planning over two-thirds of all future utility-scale solar and wind projects. Conversely, G7 countries hold 45% of global GDP but are building only 10% of planned projects.

In 2024, China approved 66.7 GW of new coal power and saw 94.5 GW begin construction, the highest level since 2015, despite adding a record 356 GW of wind and solar capacity. This 'energy addition' strategy is driven by long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) that guarantee coal generation and the influence of coal mining companies, who financed over 75% of new approvals. These factors lead to the curtailment of renewables and a shift away from using coal plants as flexible regulating capacity. The report concludes that China's coal expansion contrasts sharply with global trends, as China accounted for 93% of global coal construction starts in 2024.

The United States has the world's second-largest pipeline of gas-fired power plants in development, totaling over 85 GW, largely fueled by speculation regarding AI energy needs. However, most of these projects are in early stages, and there is a significant risk that they could become stranded assets if AI power demand does not materialize. The report highlights that renewables and storage are currently cheaper and faster to deploy than new gas power, while specific regions like Texas and the PJM Interconnection area are seeing the highest concentration of these developments.

India achieved a record 34.7 GW of power capacity additions in 2024, driven largely by solar PV. However, the report finds that replicating this record annual deployment would leave India short of its 500 GW non-fossil capacity target by 2030. To close this gap, annual wind and solar additions must grow by approximately 15% year-on-year, effectively doubling current record levels by the end of the decade. While renewables are on track to overtake operating coal capacity in total volume within two years, fossil fuels still contributed over two-thirds of the increase in power generation in 2024.

The Europe Gas Tracker 2025 identifies a sprawling planned hydrogen network in Europe consisting of 12 import projects for hydrogen derivatives, 50,165 km of pipelines, and 44.6 GW of hydrogen-burning power capacity. The report argues this scale is unrealistic for decarbonization due to energy inefficiencies and a massive gap between projected green hydrogen production and the network's requirements. Most projects remain in early stages, with no hydrogen derivative import projects having reached final investment decisions. Meanwhile, the report notes that the rapid growth of LNG import capacity, which increased by 31% since February 2022, is slowing as structural gas demand falls and overcapacity emerges.

India is pursuing a "build now, decarbonize later" strategy in its steel industry, focusing on expanding capacity through emissions-intensive blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) routes. This approach risks creating stranded assets valued between US$124187 billion and locking in high emissions due to a young fleet of blast furnaces. While the government has introduced roadmaps for green steel and energy efficiency, the document argues that deep decarbonization requires a fundamental shift away from coal toward green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI) and increased scrap-based secondary production.

Global Energy Monitor (GEM) identified 23 methane 'super-emitter' events linked to eight coal mines across Australia, Colombia, Mexico, and China between January 1, 2023, and April 1, 2024. Using NASA EMIT sensor data and the Global Coal Mine Tracker, GEM connected these plumes to specific operators, highlighting a lack of global incentives for mine operators to mitigate methane emissions, particularly from ventilation shafts.

Global Energy Monitor (GEM) identifies that five major oil and gas plant owners failed to disclose 10.7 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2022, resulting in an annual social cost of $2 billion. The report highlights how companies use the 'operational control' and 'financial control' approaches of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol to exclude assets from their reporting boundaries. Specifically, the Saudi Electricity Company failed to disclose over 7 million tonnes of CO2 from three plants, representing $1.3 billion in annual climate costs. Other analyzed entities, including Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, Calpine Corporation, Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc., and Entergy Corporation, also exhibited gaps between their reported emissions and their actual asset ownership.

The report finds a significant gap between renewable energy targets and actual projects in development across the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region. While six CCA countries have targets totaling 43 GW of renewable additions by 2030–2040, only 30 GW are in development, leaving a 13 GW deficit. Fossil fuel expansion remains dominant, with more than three times as much fossil capacity under construction (11.8 GW of oil and gas plus coal) as wind and utility-scale solar (3.5 GW). Azerbaijan, the COP29 host, is highlighted for limited ambition, with no wind or solar projects in development beyond 2027, calling into question its commitment to a 30% renewable share by 2030.

The report finds that Indonesia's captive coal capacity tripled between 2019 and 2024, reaching 15.2 GW, with projections to hit 26.2 GW by 2026. This growth is primarily driven by the nickel, aluminium, and iron and steel industries. The authors argue that this trend contradicts Indonesia's climate goals and will cause significant public health burdens, including an estimated 27,000 additional deaths if captive plants are excluded from a 2040 coal phase-out. While some companies are adopting solar and hydro, the report emphasizes that renewable energy solutions are now cost-competitive with coal.

The report finds that in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region, fossil fuel capacity under construction is more than three times that of wind and utility-scale solar. While non-fossil projects (including hydropower and nuclear) have a larger total pipeline, they suffer from long lead times and lower construction rates. Most CCA countries are failing to meet their renewable energy targets, with a 13 GW deficit in development across six countries. COP29 host Azerbaijan is highlighted for having a limited pipeline of renewables beyond 2027, calling into question its climate leadership.

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region is planning an estimated US$123.6 billion in new LNG infrastructure, primarily concentrated in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. Mexico has the world's third-largest planned LNG export buildout at 73.6 mtpa, largely intended to export U.S. gas from the Permian Basin. Argentina is proposing the 30 mtpa Argentina GNL Terminal to export gas from the Vaca Muerta shale basin, a project described as a "carbon bomb." Brazil is pursuing the world's fourth-largest LNG import expansion at 36.5 mtpa to reduce reliance on Bolivian gas and mitigate hydropower instability during droughts. These developments risk creating stranded assets and locking the region into gas dependence, contradicting IEA recommendations that the LNG trade peak this decade to limit warming to 1.5“. The report argues that the region's abundant renewable resources offer a more sustainable alternative to fossil fuel volatility.

The BRICS bloc is reaching a milestone where non-fossil power capacity is set to exceed fossil-fueled capacity for the first time in 2024. While the group hosts a significant portion of the world's coal fleet and continues to develop new fossil plants, there is a massive pipeline of wind and solar projects. The report finds that the BRICS countries have enough renewables in development to nearly triple their capacity by 2030, though the actual construction rate varies significantly by member, with China leading the transition.

The briefing finds that while net zero commitments among the top 50 steel producers have slightly increased, half of these companies still lack a 2050 target, and 23 lack concrete intermediate milestones. Transparency remains low, with only 15 companies defining their emission scopes. The report highlights the 2023 launch of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) steel sector guidance as a key tool for improving target transparency and ambition, citing SSAB and Thyssenkrupp as early adopters.

The BRICS group is approaching a critical transition point where non-fossil power capacity is expected to eclipse fossil fuels by the end of 2024. While the bloc possesses a vast pipeline of wind and solar projects—enough to potentially triple renewable capacity by 2030—nearly all members continue to develop new coal, oil, or gas plants. China dominates the group's transition, leading in both renewable additions and the construction of new coal capacity. Other members show divergent paths: Brazil and Ethiopia are heavily hydropower-reliant, while the UAE, Iran, and Russia remain deeply dependent on oil and gas, though the UAE is rapidly diversifying via nuclear and solar power.

The briefing examines the expansion of LNG infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, highlighting significant planned investments in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. It argues that these projects risk becoming stranded assets and conflict with global climate goals to limit warming to 1.5°C, suggesting that the region should instead prioritize its abundant renewable energy resources.

Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

China is the world's largest coal producer and importer, with a significant shift toward large-scale and mega-scale mining operations. Despite climate goals, China is developing approximately 1,280 Mtpa of new coal capacity, nearly half of the global proposed pipeline. This expansion, concentrated in provinces like Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, drives massive methane emissions, with China's operating mines alone accounting for roughly 70% of global coal mine methane emissions from similar-sized operations. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the sector, controlling 40% of production capacity and contributing nearly 40% of the nation's coal mine methane emissions.

The report calculates that the planned expansion of the Afşin Elbistan A Thermal Power Plant will cause significant public health damage and economic losses. In the first year of operation (2028), the project is estimated to cause 42 deaths and cost the economy 58.1 million USD. Over a 35-year operational period (2028-2063), the cumulative impact is projected to be 2,268 deaths and an economic cost of 2.6 billion USD, which the authors equate to the cost of building 29 hospitals with 500 beds each.