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The document examines the trade-offs between universal and targeted Basic Income Guarantees (BIG) for South Africans aged 18-59. It argues that targeting creates administrative burdens, high exclusion errors, and social stigma, whereas a Universal Basic Income Guarantee (UBIG) ensures broader coverage and social cohesion. The brief contends that a UBIG is fiscally feasible through progressive taxation, such as a Social Security Tax, and provides superior poverty reduction by allowing households to pool resources. It specifically critiques the use of employment status or household-level targeting, noting that the latter can exacerbate gender inequalities. The brief recommends a universal BIG as the most efficient path to economic recovery and social stability.

The document examines the role of foreign interventions in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, highlighting the use of private military companies like the Wagner Group and Dyck Advisory Group, as well as the deployment of Rwandan and SADC (SAMIM) troops. It argues that while foreign forces have achieved rapid tactical successes, such as recapturing Mocímboa da Praia and consolidating control in Palma, these interventions often lack transparency and parliamentary oversight. The author emphasizes that military action alone cannot end the insurgency, recommending a comprehensive approach including deradicalization, inter-religious dialogue, and socio-economic development in the north.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of nuclear governance across the Southern African Development Community (SADC), categorising member states by their nuclear capacity and identifying gaps in regulatory synchronisation. It highlights the critical need for harmonised policies to manage the transport of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) and radioactive sources across borders. The author proposes leveraging the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the African Association of Competent Authorities (AACA) to create a more integrated regional safety and security architecture.

The document argues that Zimbabwe exhibits the form but not the substance of constitutionalism, characterized by an overweening Executive that subordinates the Judiciary and Legislature. It details a 'party-military-business coalition' that maintains power through the militarisation of politics, organised violence, and the shrinking of civic space. Economically, the report describes chronic fragility, hyperinflation, and a failing parastatal sector plagued by corporate governance breaches. While the government has introduced anti-corruption strategies and joined the APRM, civil society contends these are often symbolic, noting a persistent 'catch and release' syndrome for high-profile offenders and a lack of genuine political will to align laws with the 2013 Constitution.

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) found that the SAP Pilot Scheme has not significantly accelerated project approvals or simplified requirements for proponents. While the SAP has increased access for African States and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), it has failed to attract Small Island Developing States (SIDS) or the private sector. The median time from concept note submission to Board approval for SAP projects is 365 days, only 8% shorter than comparable regular projects. The IEU recommends developing a formal SAP strategy, simplifying review criteria, and delegating approval authority to the Executive Director.

As of May 24, 2022, 43 companies have committed USD 458 million across 48 countries to support the Zero Hunger Private Sector Pledge. The largest individual commitments come from Bayer (USD 160 million) and PepsiCo (USD 100 million), with significant regional focus on Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Green Aggregation Tech Enterprise (GATE) is a risk-pooling mechanism that guarantees a baseline level of revenue for rural mini grid developers, addressing the lack of credit histories among rural customers. By diversifying risks across different geographies and customers, GATE aims to enable developers to meet debt obligations and crowd in commercial debt. The instrument requires strong implementing partners, support from Development Finance Institutions for initial capital, and a robust regional electricity market, specifically leveraging the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The initiative is currently preparing for launch in southern Africa, starting with Zambia, and aligns with the Zambian National Energy Policy 2019.

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) operates as a mutual insurance company and agency to help African Union members manage climate shocks through weather-index insurance. Since 2014, ARC Ltd has provided USD 720 million in coverage and paid USD 65 million in claims, primarily targeting the agriculture sector. Participation requires the use of Africa RiskView (ARV) software to define payout thresholds based on rainfall deviation. The program's viability depends on robust subnational climate data, government technical expertise in sovereign insurance, and high-level political awareness.

The Seychelles implemented a debt for climate (DFC) swap in 2017, where The Nature Conservancy acquired external debt at a discount and raised USD 5 million in donor funding to establish the Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust (SeyCCAT). This trust manages the conservation of 13 Marine Protected Areas covering over 85% of the country's coral reefs and shallow waters. Since 2017, SeyCCAT has provided over USD 1.5 million in grants for 33 projects, with significant funding directed toward women, youth, and small-scale artisanal fisheries. The document further details the structural requirements for DFC swaps, emphasizing the need for autonomous funds, high-level political leadership, and the suitability of Middle Income Countries (MICs) that are not part of the Debt Suspension Servicing Initiative (DSSI).

The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, launched in 2011 by the World Food Program and Oxfam America, employs a four-pronged strategy—risk reduction, risk transfer, prudent risk-taking, and risk reserves—to help farmers adapt to climate risks. By 2020, the program provided index insurance and complementary services to nearly 180,000 farmers across ten countries, leveraging existing government safety nets and community partnerships to scale its impact.

The Lesotho APRM Popular Sensitisation (LAPS) Project workshop, held on 25 August 2021, focused on re-engaging non-state actors to resuscitate Lesotho's participation in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The event highlighted that Lesotho's national APRM structures have been non-existent since 2015/2016 due to a lack of political will, frequent government changes, and financial constraints. To assist Lesotho, civil society representatives from Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe shared their experiences in developing CSO submissions. Key recommendations for Lesotho included forming a robust Working Group to identify 12 key governance issues, ensuring the National Governing Council (NGC) includes marginalized groups and non-state actor leadership, and adopting a non-partisan, evidence-based approach to advocacy. The project aims to complete its submission by June 2022 to inform Lesotho's Second Generation Country Review.

The document proposes a 'Just Recovery Renewable Energy Plan for Africa' aiming for 100% renewable energy by 2050. Based on modelling by Dr. Sven Teske, it argues that this transition is technically and financially feasible, requiring an annual investment of approximately US$130 billion. The plan emphasizes energy sovereignty, decentralization, and a just transition for workers, projecting the creation of 7 million jobs by 2050. It identifies key funding sources including the cancellation of African debt, the elimination of illicit financial flows, and the fulfillment of climate finance obligations by developed nations.

The report advocates for a systemic shift in Africa's energy landscape, moving away from fossil fuels toward a decentralized, community-owned 100% renewable energy system by 2050. Based on modeling by Dr. Sven Teske, the plan suggests that achieving this goal requires an annual investment of approximately $130 billion. The document emphasizes that this transition would not only mitigate climate impacts and address severe energy poverty—where approximately half of sub-Saharan Africans lack electricity—but also create up to 7 million jobs by 2050. It calls for a 'just and feminist transition' that prioritizes gender equity and workers' rights. To fund the plan, the authors propose ending illicit financial flows, canceling African debt, and demanding that developed nations fulfill their climate finance obligations.

The report argues for a systemic shift in Africa's energy landscape, moving away from fossil fuels toward a decentralized, community-owned system of 100% renewable energy by 2050. Based on modeling by Dr. Sven Teske, the plan estimates a need for 360 GW of capacity by 2030 and 2,280 GW by 2050, requiring an average annual investment of $130 billion. This transition is projected to create 7 million jobs by 2050. The document emphasizes 'energy sovereignty' and 'energy as a common good,' calling for the cancellation of African debt, the end of illicit financial flows, and the fulfillment of climate finance promises by developed nations to fund the transition.

The Sustainable Luangwa project aims to secure water resources and biodiversity in the Luangwa Upper Sub-catchment, specifically targeting the Mafinga Hills National Forest Reserve (NFR) and surrounding areas. Classified as a Category B (Medium-risk) project, it implements a safeguards framework to mitigate risks such as elite capture, conflict over land tenure, and restrictions on natural resource access. Key project components include the establishment of a Water Resource Protection Area (WRPA), improved management of the Mafinga Hills NFR, and the promotion of climate-resilient conservation agriculture. The framework mandates participatory processes, including Livelihood Restoration Plans (LRP) for affected persons and a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) administered by a Project Management Unit (PMU).

The Zimbabwe APRM Popular Sensitisation (ZAPS) project validation workshop, held on 8 July 2021, served as a platform for civil society organisations (CSOs) to present and refine a submission to the APRM. The workshop identified critical governance failures in Zimbabwe, including a "constitutional amendment crisis" that has expanded presidential powers, the "militarisation of politics" through the installation of military leaders in political roles, and systemic corruption where legislative frameworks are applied only to "small fish" while elite corruption persists. Other key areas of concern included the shrinking of civic space—marked by 932 reported cases of organised violence and torture between March and November 2020—and the decline of state enterprises and parastatals, which now contribute less than 2% of the GDP. The project aims to use these findings to catalyze reform and enhance accountability and transparency in Zimbabwe's governance.

The paper examines how the APRM's Expanded Mandate has revitalized the agency by introducing targeted reviews and monitoring roles for Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, while cautioning that these additions may distract from its core mission of comprehensive country reviews. It highlights the role of the 'Kagame Reforms' and the leadership of CEO Prof. Eddy Maloka in restoring institutional stability and financial predictability. The author argues that the APRM must now consolidate these gains, rationalizing its activities to ensure that new instruments, such as National Governance Reports, do not become weak substitutes for rigorous peer reviews.

The document examines the intersection of power-sharing institutions and gender equality, noting that while power-sharing is a common tool for peacebuilding, it is often 'gender blind'. It argues that consociational models focusing on ethno-national identity can risk embedding patriarchal attitudes or sacrificing women's claims for equality to maintain communal unity. However, the authors suggest that because power-sharing already utilizes group proportions and quotas, it provides a 'natural environment' for securing gender-based quotas. The briefing highlights that power-sharing agreements are seven times more likely to have gender quotas than those without such provisions.

The report characterizes "net zero" agendas as a "Great Cheat," asserting that they allow major polluters to continue emissions while relying on unproven technologies and flawed offsetting schemes. It details how these entities use lobbying, financial influence over academia, and corporate capture of international forums like the UNFCCC to displace real emission reductions. The document highlights specific failures in the plans of companies such as Shell, Total SA, and JBS, and calls for a transition to "Real Zero" by 2030 through systemic change and climate justice.

The report claims that "net zero" agendas are a form of greenwashing used by "Big Polluters" to avoid reducing emissions. It identifies these entities as industries responsible for the majority of historical emissions, including fossil fuels, agribusiness, and aviation. The document details how these actors use risky technologies like BECCS and carbon offsets as "dangerous distractions" and employ lobbying, financial contributions, and academic partnerships to shape climate policy in their favor. Case studies on JBS, Shell, and Total SA are used to illustrate how these plans often mask continued pollution and lead to land grabbing in the Global South.