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In 2023, IDFC members committed $199 billion in green finance, a 31% decrease from 2022, largely due to currency depreciation in East Asia and the Pacific and the adoption of more conservative tracking methodologies. Climate finance dominated at 98% of total green finance, with mitigation accounting for 89% of that amount. Adaptation finance fell significantly to $10.5 billion, while biodiversity finance reached its lowest level since 2020 at $8.2 billion. The report emphasizes the role of public development banks (PDBs) in providing transformative finance and calls for the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) to integrate 'transformational criteria' to better catalyze private investment.

The report proposes a two-step assessment approach to link financial institutions' net zero strategies to real-world impacts. It emphasizes tracking investments in new assets rather than existing portfolios to avoid the 'divestment' loophole where assets are transferred without reducing emissions. The methodology uses a multi-level ownership tree (up to Level 2) to attribute finance to indirect investors based on equity and debt weightings, utilizing data from sources like Bloomberg Terminal and CPI's Global Landscape of Climate Finance.

The report finds that international concessional climate finance grew by 50% from 2019 to reach USD 81 billion in 2022, though it remains small compared to fossil fuel subsidies. Sub-Saharan Africa is the primary recipient of these flows. The analysis highlights a gap in adaptation finance and a lack of standardized impact metrics. Domestic concessional finance is heavily concentrated in high-income economies, particularly Western Europe, and focuses primarily on mitigation. The report recommends redirecting fossil fuel subsidies, targeting fragile and conflict-affected states, and streamlining project approval processes to enhance efficiency.

The report finds that Australia, Canada, and the UK (the "Big Three") have historically and currently dominated fossil fuel extraction emissions within the Commonwealth. While these wealthy nations have the highest emissions, they are the least economically dependent on fossil fuel rents. In contrast, lower- and middle-income countries like Nigeria and Papua New Guinea are more exposed to financial risks from carbon liabilities. The report concludes that Commonwealth production plans are inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal, with the Big Three's share of the gap between Business as Usual and Net Zero scenarios exceeding 50%.

The document critiques biodiversity offsets and credits, asserting they are based on a flawed 'mitigation hierarchy' and fail to maintain ecosystem integrity. It argues that these schemes, often modelled on dysfunctional carbon markets, lead to greenwashing, land grabbing, and human rights violations, particularly against Indigenous Peoples. The authors call for a shift away from market-based financial flows toward non-market approaches, debt and tax justice, and the protection of land tenure rights.

The document critiques biodiversity offsets and certificates, asserting they are conceptually and methodologically flawed tools that facilitate nature destruction. It argues that these mechanisms, often modeled after failed carbon markets, ignore ecosystem integrity, lead to land grabbing, and violate the human rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. The authors call for a systemic shift away from market-based financialization toward community-led, rights-based conservation and the reduction of harmful financial flows.

The document argues that the well-being of forests and biodiversity depends on the recognition and enforcement of the collective rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs). It focuses on the role of Indigenous and Community-Conserved Territories and Areas (ICCAs) and Community Forest Management (CFM) as essential tools for stopping deforestation and protecting biodiversity. The brief outlines key rights—including self-determination, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), land tenure, and gender justice—and provides specific policy recommendations to prevent the displacement of IPLCs by extractive industries or state-led conservation schemes.

The document explores Debt-for-Climate Swaps (DFCS) as a tool to break the 'Climate Crisis-Sovereign Debt Doom Loop' in Emerging Markets and Low-Income Developing Countries. It details bilateral and multipartite DFCS structures, analyzing their advantages, costs, and the role of credit enhancements. The report proposes a quantitative model to identify suitable countries across Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific, and outlines how the GCF can intervene through financial support, technical assistance, and stakeholder coordination.

The briefing examines the expansion of LNG infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, highlighting significant planned investments in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. It argues that these projects risk becoming stranded assets and conflict with global climate goals to limit warming to 1.5°C, suggesting that the region should instead prioritize its abundant renewable energy resources.

Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

The report identifies a dual-track narrative strategy: 'Type A' narratives that exploit societal vulnerabilities to sow discord (such as anti-immigrant and gendered disinformation), and 'Type B' narratives that erode trust in democratic institutions (including electoral fraud and anti-West rhetoric). It details the use of advanced Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) based on the DISARM framework, highlighting the role of AI-generated deepfakes, website cloning, and coordinated inauthentic behavior. The findings suggest that despite EU guidelines under the Digital Services Act, voluntary recommendations are insufficient to protect democratic processes from these evolving, often state-sponsored, threats.

The Institute for Economic Justice proposes a universal basic income guarantee (UBIG) as a foundational safety net for South Africa's transition from fossil fuels to clean energy. The document asserts that while targeted support for displaced workers is necessary, a UBIG is essential to cover those indirectly affected, such as informal workers and carers, and to prevent people from falling through gaps in social protection. It highlights international evidence from countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, and Ethiopia to demonstrate how cash transfers mitigate climate-induced crises and reduce negative coping strategies. Furthermore, the text argues that a UBIG facilitates environmental adaptation by providing the financial stability needed for reskilling and sustainable consumption, while promoting a more equitable distribution of climate risks between the Global North and Global South.

The article examines why many developing countries oppose the WTO moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, highlighting the digital divide, loss of public revenue, and restrictions on industrial policy. It argues that the moratorium primarily benefits developed nations that dominate digital exports and calls for a clear definition of 'electronic transmissions' to resolve disputes.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, first established in 1998, is likely to end by March 2026. This expiration could lead to a fragmented global regulatory landscape, increased costs for consumers and businesses, and a shift toward regional trade agreements. While developing nations argue that the moratorium limits their policy space and public revenue, the authors suggest that the lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions' complicates the transition and that a multilateral agreement remains the most stable path for digital trade.

The document examines the ecological footprint of e-commerce, highlighting carbon emissions from logistics, packaging waste, and the impact of high product return rates. It argues that sustainability requires a coordinated effort: governments must implement green regulations and urban planning; the private sector should optimize supply chains and adopt renewable energy; and consumers must shift away from impulsive, high-frequency purchasing. The author emphasizes the need for better data collection and international cooperation, particularly to support developing nations in building sustainable digital infrastructures.

The author analyzes the friction between national data regulations and international trade agreements, proposing four key lessons for future rule-making: developing a balanced narrative beyond the 'free flow vs. data sovereignty' dichotomy, understanding the limits of trade law in solving complex policy issues, integrating the perspectives of developing countries to combat 'data colonialism', and adopting a multi-layered governance framework that combines binding treaties with soft law and multi-stakeholder cooperation.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, in place since 1998, is likely to end by March 2026 due to opposition from developing countries seeking to recover lost tax revenues and maintain policy space for national industrialization. The authors argue that the end of this global rule would lead to a fragmented 'mosaic' of regional and bilateral trade agreements with inconsistent definitions of 'electronic transmissions,' potentially increasing costs for consumers and creating barriers for digital service providers. While some members argue that the moratorium hinders their ability to support domestic digital industries, the authors suggest that alternative taxes, such as VAT, could generate revenue without the trade-distorting effects of customs duties. The document highlights a critical lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions,' which has led to divergent revenue loss estimates—ranging from 280 million USD globally (OECD) to nearly 10 billion USD annually for developing countries (UNCTAD).

The document analyzes the environmental footprint of e-commerce, highlighting issues such as carbon emissions from logistics, packaging waste, and high return rates. It proposes a multi-stakeholder action agenda involving government regulation, private sector supply chain optimization, consumer behavioral shifts, and international cooperation to foster a sustainable digital economy.

The author analyzes the tensions between the free flow of digital data and national regulatory interests, such as privacy and cybersecurity. The paper argues that current international trade frameworks are insufficient for addressing the 'global data divide' and the dominance of big tech. It proposes a multi-layered governance model combining binding agreements with non-binding standards and regulatory interoperability to foster an inclusive digital economy.

The document analyzes why many developing countries oppose the WTO moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, highlighting the global digital divide, the lack of a clear definition for 'electronic transmissions', and the resulting loss of public revenue and industrial policy flexibility.