FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings I: Elections October 2024

The report identifies a dual-track narrative strategy: 'Type A' narratives that exploit societal vulnerabilities to sow discord (such as anti-immigrant and gendered disinformation), and 'Type B' narratives that erode trust in democratic institutions (including electoral fraud and anti-West rhetoric). It details the use of advanced Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) based on the DISARM framework, highlighting the role of AI-generated deepfakes, website cloning, and coordinated inauthentic behavior. The findings suggest that despite EU guidelines under the Digital Services Act, voluntary recommendations are insufficient to protect democratic processes from these evolving, often state-sponsored, threats.

• FIMI actors employ a two-tiered narrative strategy: 'Type A' narratives target societal vulnerabilities to amplify xenophobia and racism, while 'Type B' narratives systematically undermine trust in electoral processes, government institutions, and public health systems.
• Anti-immigrant narratives are used globally to frame immigrants as threats to national security and cultural identity, with specific examples in Portugal involving fake videos of attacks and in Spain using manipulated content to link migrants to health risks.
• Gendered disinformation and hate speech were prominent during the 2024 EU elections, targeting female candidates and leaders, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to undermine their credibility and discourage female political participation.
• Electoral fraud narratives have been deployed in Italy, Spain, and France to delegitimize outcomes; this includes promoting null votes in Spain and the use of AI-generated deepfake phone calls in Lithuania to simulate unethical negotiations between political figures.
• Threat actors are increasingly using AI and sophisticated manipulation techniques, such as the 'Operation CopyCop' in France which used Large Language Models (LLMs) to rewrite reputable news articles into negative content against Macron's party.
• The 'Doppelganger' operation and 'APT WeRedirect' utilize the cloning of legitimate government and media websites to spread pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian content, effectively hijacking trusted information sources.
• The report concludes that voluntary risk mitigation guidelines issued by the European Commission under the Digital Services Act (DSA) are insufficient to safeguard democratic processes given the proliferation of disinformation.

APA

Global Disinformation Index (2024). FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings I: Elections October 2024. https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/fimi-isac-collective-findings-i-elections.pdf

Chicago

Global Disinformation Index. FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings I: Elections October 2024. 2024. https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/fimi-isac-collective-findings-i-elections.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Global Disinformation Index |title=FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings I: Elections October 2024 |date=October 2024 |url=https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/fimi-isac-collective-findings-i-elections.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{globaldisinformationindex2024fimiisac, author = {{Global Disinformation Index}}, title = {{FIMI-ISAC Collective Findings I: Elections October 2024}}, institution = {Global Disinformation Index}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://www.disinformationindex.org/files/fimi-isac-collective-findings-i-elections.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }