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The document challenges six common arguments used to justify financial support for gas expansion, asserting that new gas projects are incompatible with a 1.5°C warming limit and that global gas demand will peak by 2030.

The document argues that carbon markets can fill a critical funding gap for African smallholder farmers, who received only 0.8% of climate finance in 2023. It highlights that soil carbon interventions provide dual benefits of climate mitigation and adaptation by improving soil health, water retention, and crop yields. However, the briefing notes that African agriculture remains underrepresented in carbon markets, with only 12 identified projects across the continent. Barriers include high soil sampling costs, strict evidence requirements for baselines, and a lack of localised research. The author recommends that policymakers avoid 'one-size-fits-all' regulations and instead prioritise projects that deliver non-carbon co-benefits like food security and nutrition.

The document outlines the key priorities for COP29, emphasizing the establishment of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance and the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund. It highlights the need for intensified Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) before the 2025 deadline and the advancement of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). Additionally, it identifies the importance of nature-based solutions, the operationalization of Article 6 regarding carbon markets, and the need to address transboundary climate risks and socioeconomic disparities in adaptation, all within a complex geopolitical landscape influenced by Azerbaijan's fossil fuel economy.

The Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter, launched at COP28 by 50 companies, is criticized for focusing on upstream operational emissions while ignoring the larger impact of burning produced fuels. Analysis shows that between January and September 2024, Charter members approved 68 new oil and gas fields containing 14 billion barrels of oil equivalent, which could release nearly 5 billion metric tonnes of CO2. Ten companies, including ADNOC, Saudi Aramco, Petrobras, TotalEnergies, and Shell, are responsible for over 90 percent of these new reserves. These projects represent a commitment of nearly USD 250 billion in expenditure. While the IEA's 1.5ºC pathway requires global production to decline by nearly 20 percent by 2030, Charter companies are projected to increase their production by 17 percent by 2030.

The report finds that 10 major international oil companies (IOCs) are responsible for 7% of global gas flaring on an equity-weighted basis, with a significant portion occurring at non-operated assets. In 2023, total global upstream flaring was 145 billion cubic meters (bcm), with an average intensity of 5.0 m³/bbl. The analysis highlights a gap between corporate commitments to the World Bank's Zero Routine Flaring (ZRF) initiative and actual performance, noting that non-routine flaring remains largely unabated and that no analyzed company meets the IEA's Net Zero Emissions scenario target of 0.3 m³/bbl by 2030. The report argues that IOCs have a broader influence on up to 40% of global flaring through their partnerships with national oil companies (NOCs) and recommends extending emissions targets to non-operated assets and implementing stricter regulatory and financial levers.

National renewable energy targets for 2030 currently aim for a collective doubling of capacity rather than the tripling agreed upon at COP28, despite market forecasts suggesting such a goal is achievable, particularly for solar and battery storage.

The document examines the governance gaps surrounding solar radiation modification (SRM), warning that the current dominance of Global North institutions and private entities creates a risk of unilateral deployment. It advocates for the UNFCCC to formally engage with SRM to democratize decision-making and prevent the exacerbation of global inequalities.

The document analyzes the global distribution of agricultural methane emissions, highlighting that while low- and middle-income countries produce the most, high-income countries have higher per capita emissions due to consumption patterns. It proposes a transition toward climate-smart agriculture through technology, policy reform, and targeted finance, particularly for smallholder farmers in Africa, to meet global reduction targets by 2030.

The paper explores the intersection of gender inequality and climate change, particularly in Africa, highlighting how women are disproportionately affected by climate-related displacement, food insecurity, and energy poverty. It details structural barriers in employment, land ownership, and political representation that limit women's adaptive capacity. The document reviews international frameworks like the Paris Agreement and the Lima Work Programme on Gender, and calls for COP29 to prioritize honoring financial pledges, increasing women's access to clean energy, and investing in gender-disaggregated data to ensure a just social order.

The document is an open letter from a broad coalition of individuals and organizations calling for COP30 to move beyond the mere recognition of climate disinformation and instead implement binding, verifiable measures to protect information integrity. It argues that coordinated disinformation, primarily funded by the fossil fuel industry, sabotages the energy transition, threatens public health and human rights, and undermines the goals of the Paris Agreement. The signatories call on governments to regulate tech platforms that profit from manipulative content and demand an end to greenwashing and the monetization of disinformation.

Non-CO2 emissions account for approximately 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet they are frequently overlooked in NDCs, which often lack gas-specific quantitative targets. While some countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Japan provide good practice examples of quantitative targets, major emitters including China, Russia, India, and Brazil generally only include non-CO2 gases as part of overall GHG targets. China, whose current NDC covers only CO2 despite non-CO2 gases making up 18% of its national emissions, has indicated it will include these gases in its updated NDC. The brief argues that the 2025 NDC update cycle is a critical opportunity for major emitters, particularly China, to adopt sector-specific targets and align with international initiatives like the Global Methane Pledge and the Kigali Amendment to maintain the 1.5°C warming limit.

A global network of women leaders from business, politics, and civil society urges world leaders to accelerate carbon pollution reduction. They demand that by 2025, governments increase NDC ambition to align with the 1.5°C limit, phase out fossil fuels, triple renewables, double energy efficiency, halt deforestation, and mobilize public and private finance, particularly for the Global South.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The briefing highlights a significant funding gap in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where current climate finance flows represent only 0.5% of regional GDP, far below the 3.7% to 4.9% estimated by ECLAC to meet Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While developed nations eventually met the USD 100 billion annual pledge in 2022, the LAC region's share of international finance (17% between 2016-2020) consists largely of loans (81%), exacerbating regional debt. Financing is heavily concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia, with a strong preference for mitigation over adaptation projects.

The document argues that while there is growing political and private sector momentum to expand nuclear energy, a massive financing gap persists. It highlights that only 2.5% of annual clean energy investment currently goes to new nuclear capacity, driven by a 'nuclear risk premium' and long development timelines. The authors call for innovative financing mechanisms and government-led risk reduction to unlock the trillions of dollars required to meet the Net-Zero Nuclear Initiative goals.

The document highlights a significant gap in clean energy investment for emerging and developing economies (EMDEs), noting that only 15% of global investment reaches these regions (excluding China). It identifies the primary barrier as an elevated cost of capital—often two to three times higher than in OECD countries—driven by risks such as currency exchange, regulatory uncertainty, and asset expropriation. In Africa, the weighted average cost of capital for power sector projects is 15.6%, making decarbonization prohibitively expensive. The authors argue that COP29 must move beyond pledges toward granular, data-driven plans and bottom-up actions that improve local infrastructure and market performance to make EMDEs more attractive to risk-averse private capital.

The report evaluates how countries incorporate nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based adaptation into their national adaptation plans, analyzing 57 documents to identify references to natural infrastructure, biodiversity risk assessments, and alignment with National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans.

The Sherco coal plant in Minnesota transitioned to a clean energy hub by replacing retired capacity with 710 MW of solar and a 10 MW/1,000 MWh iron-air battery system. This transition was enabled by Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) incentives, the use of a 'generator replacement' process to bypass interconnection queues, and early community and labor engagement. The project serves as a model for 'clean repowering,' which RMI estimates could deploy 250 GW of clean energy and save ratepayers $12 billion nationwide.

The document outlines the structure of climate negotiations at COP29, listing various negotiating blocs such as the G77+China, EU, and AOSIS, while providing a glossary of terms and a calendar of thematic focus areas.

The guide outlines the critical themes of COP29, emphasizing its role as a "finance COP" focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) and the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund. It highlights the tension between rich and poor nations regarding climate aid, the influence of the United States, and the controversies surrounding Azerbaijan's role as host. Additionally, it provides logistical details for media personnel attending the event from November 11 to 22, 2024.