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The report argues that public development banks (PDBs)—including national, regional, and multilateral institutions—are uniquely positioned to overcome structural and market barriers to climate risk insurance in EMDEs. It identifies key barriers such as data gaps, underdeveloped local capital bases, and fragmented regulatory frameworks. The document proposes a tiered approach where National Development Banks (NDBs) focus on local market development and project pipelines, Regional Development Banks (RDBs) coordinate risk pooling and shared data infrastructure, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide catalytic capital and credit enhancement. Key recommendations include the use of targeted premium subsidies with sunset clauses, the bundling of insurance with loans, and the creation of regulatory sandboxes to foster innovation in parametric insurance.

The report argues that the Article 6.4 Sustainable Development (SD) Tool is primarily procedural and fails to protect Indigenous Peoples and local communities due to an overreliance on national laws, narrow definitions of Indigenous status, and a restrictive approach to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Geospatial analysis reveals that hundreds of projects in the Article 6 pipeline—including both new notifications and transitioning Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects—overlap with or are in close proximity to Indigenous and community lands, particularly in Asia. Documented cases in India, Kenya, Colombia, and Brazil demonstrate that these gaps have already led to involuntary resettlement, inadequate compensation, and long-term land conflicts.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The global iron and steel industry faces a 'coal lock-in crisis' as blast furnace (BF) capacity continues to expand despite decarbonization targets. While electric arc furnace (EAF) and direct reduced iron (DRI) capacities are growing, the transition is slowed by massive legacy assets in China and aggressive new coal-based developments in India. Green hydrogen remains a critical but underutilized bottleneck, with only 2% of operating DRI capacity using it as a primary reductant. The report highlights a significant gap between announced net-zero goals and actual industrial investment, particularly regarding the relining of existing blast furnaces.

The document analyzes a structural contraction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and a persistent under-allocation of climate finance toward adaptation. It argues that while the sector possesses the foresight to predict these trends, institutional barriers prevent this knowledge from translating into action. The paper highlights the failure of blended finance to scale in high-exposure contexts, the inability of alternative donors like China and Gulf states to replace Western ODA, and emerging risks such as the centralization of risk analytics and sovereign debt traps.

The report warns that the surge in demand for critical minerals—such as lithium, cobalt, and copper—to support the energy transition and digital economy may exacerbate gender inequalities and human rights challenges. It identifies three key risk drivers: specific environmental impacts of critical mineral processing, the location of projects on Indigenous or agricultural lands, and the use of accelerated permitting. To mitigate these, the report recommends implementing intersectional gender analyses, ensuring inclusive consultation and consent, and establishing gender-responsive benefit-sharing mechanisms.

The document details the global cobalt market, highlighting the extreme concentration of mine production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and refining in China. It examines the shift toward battery-enabled end-uses, the role of Chinese investment in global supply, and the social risks associated with artisanal mining in the DRC.

The report argues that the surge in demand for critical minerals essential for the energy transition and digital economy risks amplifying existing gender inequalities. It identifies three compounding risk factors: specific environmental impacts (such as water scarcity and pollution), the high concentration of mineral reserves on Indigenous and agricultural lands, and the trend toward accelerated permitting processes. To mitigate these, the report recommends that stakeholders apply intersectional gender analysis in impact assessments, ensure inclusive consultation and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), and establish gender-equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms, including fair land compensation and inclusive employment practices.

The report examines the African Union's (AU) efforts to create a coherent foreign policy framework to navigate a fragmented international order, while highlighting the need for deeper economic integration similar to the EU. It details the evolving threat of Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin and the emerging extremist hub in the Borgu-Kainji axis. Additionally, it argues for a youth-focused approach to combat transnational organized crime, citing the rise of cybercrime and drug trafficking in West Africa. Finally, it outlines Burundi's priorities as AU chair, emphasizing water security, youth empowerment, and the urgent need for internal financial autonomy to ensure political sovereignty.

The document outlines how education ministries can engage across the four phases of the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process: impact, vulnerability, and risk assessment (IVRA); planning; implementation; and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL). It emphasizes the heightened vulnerability of children to climate-related learning disruptions and argues that the NAP process is a critical mechanism to elevate education priorities, secure climate finance, and align sectoral plans with national commitments. The guide provides specific strategies for data collection via Education Management Information Systems (EMIS), the use of innovative financial instruments, and the mainstreaming of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI). A case study of Saint Lucia illustrates the successful development of a Sector Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan (SASAP) through participatory, multi-stakeholder engagement.

The report outlines a comprehensive approach to building climate-resilient education systems by integrating them into the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process. It emphasizes three core components: resilient infrastructure, school safety and educational continuity, and climate-responsive teaching and learning. The document provides a step-by-step guide for NAP teams, covering enabling factors, impact, vulnerability, and risk assessments (IVRA), adaptation planning, implementation, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) systems, while advocating for a child-centered and inclusive lens to protect the rights of the most vulnerable students.

The document outlines a strategic process for tenants to uncover the identities of landlords who use shell companies, specifically Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs), to obscure ownership. It details a step-by-step workflow involving county property records, business entity registries like OpenCorporates and Secretary of State databases, and web searches to trace ownership from a specific property up to parent companies or hedge funds.