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The fact sheet describes Biocultural Community Protocols (BCPs) as endogenous, inclusive tools used by indigenous and local communities to define their rights and responsibilities under customary, state, and international law. It details how BCPs facilitate proactive responses to threats like illegal mining and infrastructure projects, and how they support the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. The document provides several case studies from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and promotes a toolkit and website for community facilitators to develop and implement these protocols.

The document introduces 'biocultural community protocols' as tools for Indigenous and local communities to articulate their customary laws, values, and decision-making processes to external actors. It provides a structured four-part framework for facilitators to guide communities through the process of documentation, implementation, and reflection. The toolkit emphasizes endogenous development, legal empowerment, and participatory methods—such as community mapping, participatory video, and 'Legislative Theatre'—to reduce power asymmetries and safeguard collective biocultural heritage against external threats like land grabbing and industrial resource extraction.

The document outlines a three-part process for managing biocultural community protocols: intrinsic analysis of community changes, extrinsic analysis of interactions with external actors, and the subsequent evaluation and revision of the protocol itself. It emphasizes participatory methods, such as the 'Most Significant Change' technique, to capture qualitative impacts on community wellbeing and gender roles. The guide also stresses the importance of keeping both internal community members and external stakeholders informed through diverse communication tools to maintain transparency and trust.

The document defines biocultural community protocols as participatory instruments used by Indigenous and local communities to document their customary laws, values, and decision-making processes. These protocols aim to bridge the gap between community worldviews and external actors—such as governments and companies—to prevent resource exploitation and ensure the respect of customary stewardship. The toolkit outlines a four-part process: understanding the community, documenting the protocol, using it for engagement, and reflecting on outcomes. It provides a wide array of participatory tools, including community sketch maps, trend line analysis, and participatory theatre, to empower communities through legal awareness and social mobilization.

The document outlines a framework for the ongoing management of biocultural community protocols, focusing on 'Looking Inwards' to assess community changes, 'Looking Outwards' to evaluate external partnerships, and 'Revisiting and Revising' the protocol as a living instrument. It emphasizes qualitative tools like 'Most Significant Change' stories and participatory methods to measure wellbeing and impact.

The document describes Biocultural Community Protocols (BCPs) as community-determined frameworks that define values, procedures, and priorities to guide engagement with governments, companies, and NGOs. It outlines how BCPs help communities secure customary rights and respond to threats like illegal mining or infrastructure projects. The briefing provides case studies from Ghana, Malaysia, Kenya, India, and South Africa, illustrating the use of BCPs for resource mapping, legal empowerment, and the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. It also promotes a four-part Toolkit for Community Facilitators to support the endogenous development of these protocols.

The authors argue that fragmentation should be understood through three dimensions: the number of organizations, the degree of institutionalization, and the distribution of power. They hypothesize that extreme fragmentation across all three dimensions increases the likelihood of widespread, indecisive infighting, while cohesion—achieved through fewer organizations, stronger institutions, or concentrated power—reduces the probability of such violence. The paper illustrates these dynamics using cases from Darfur, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka.

The author argues that while globalisation drives unprecedented economic growth through comparative advantage and market efficiency, it creates a 'race to the bottom' where nations compete for volatile capital by slashing corporate taxes and deregulation. This process potentially erodes public funding for welfare, labour protections, and environmental standards. While the author finds evidence of a downward trend in global corporate tax rates, they note that reputational risks and NGO watchdogs may moderate the degradation of labour and environmental standards. The document concludes that managing these negative effects requires stronger, more democratic global governance, including the potential creation of a World Tax Authority and an International Financial Stability and Harmonisation Authority.

The study finds that climate-related natural disasters in India have a conditional and generally weak relationship with violent conflict. While disasters can increase the risk of politically motivated violence in areas with low literacy (low development), they are associated with an increased risk of riots in areas with higher literacy. However, the author concludes that these statistical relations are not substantively large enough to suggest that post-disaster violence is a major problem in India, as the direct damages from disasters likely dwarf the damages from ensuing unrest.

The research examines the determinants of external state support for rebel groups using a new dataset of 403 organizations. It argues that support is not merely a function of the civil war's general characteristics but depends on the specific attributes of the rebel group and the international relations of the target state. The findings indicate that moderately strong groups with transnational constituencies are most likely to receive aid, particularly when the target state is involved in an international rivalry or receives its own external support. Conversely, very strong or very weak groups, and those in democratic states, are less likely to be supported.

The research demonstrates that states experiencing civil wars are significantly more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Using data from 1946 to 2001, the authors find that this 'civil peace' effect is comparable in magnitude to the 'democratic peace' effect. Analysis of over 400 MIDs reveals that the increased risk is driven by states attempting to influence the outcome of civil wars through direct intervention, externalization (such as cross-border counter-insurgency), and unintended spillovers, rather than by opportunistic attacks on weakened states or diversionary wars to consolidate domestic power.

The research analyzes the relationship between state repression of 'empowerment rights' (social, political, and economic liberties) and ethnic fractionalization in predicting civil war onset. Using data from 143 states, the study finds that state repression does not have a direct effect on war onset. However, it discovers a significant conditional effect: in ethnically fractionalized societies, higher levels of state repression actually reduce the probability of civil war, whereas in homogeneous societies, repression increases the risk. These findings challenge 'grievance-based' theories of ethnic conflict, suggesting instead that the opportunity to mobilize—which is constrained by repression—is the primary driver of rebellion in diverse societies.

The author examines the 'quantitative-qualitative mismatch' in conflict studies, where large-N statistical analyses often find no link between income inequality and violence, while case studies suggest a strong connection. The paper posits that political violence is a group phenomenon and therefore driven by horizontal inequalities (HIs)—systematic disparities between ethnic, religious, or regional groups—rather than vertical inequalities (VI) between individuals. The author proposes a theoretical framework where HIs create both motives (grievances) and opportunities (resources and cohesion) for mobilization. The review concludes that while measuring HIs is challenging, evidence from survey-based data and disaggregated studies supports the link between HIs and various forms of political violence, including civil war and urban disorder.

The authors present the During-Conflict Justice (DCJ) dataset, which catalogues 2,205 justice processes across 204 internal armed conflicts in 108 countries between 1946 and 2011. The research identifies that DCJ is a common tool, appearing in over 60% of conflicts since WWII, with governments being the primary adopters (70.4%). The study finds that democratic governments are more likely to use DCJ, particularly trials, truth commissions, and reparations, compared to autocracies. Rebel groups tend to use DCJ more frequently when fighting democracies and as their own relative military strength increases. Analysis suggests that government-initiated DCJ is correlated with a reduction in battle deaths in the following year and a higher likelihood of the conflict ending in a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory.

The paper maps the disparate research and practice of 'business-peace' interactions into five core assertions: economic engagement creating a peace dividend, local development building peace capacities, importing international norms for accountability, constraining conflict drivers, and direct corporate diplomacy. While proponents argue these activities foster stability and development, critics warn of neo-colonial exploitation, 'peacewashing', and the risk of exacerbating local inequalities. The author concludes that business contributions are often limited by the willingness of local regimes and the priority of profit over courageous ethical choices in fragile contexts.

The authors present the Non-State Actors (NSA) in Civil Wars dataset, covering internal armed conflicts from 1945 to 2011. The dataset shifts the unit of analysis from country-years to state-rebel group dyad spells, allowing researchers to examine the specific characteristics of opposition forces rather than just macro-level state variables. Key indicators include rebel strength relative to the government, territorial control, organizational structure (such as the presence of political wings), and external support from states or non-state actors. Descriptive statistics from the dataset show that while over 85% of rebel groups are weaker than their governments, nearly half are at least equal in their specific capacities to mobilize support, procure arms, and fight. The dataset is designed to be compatible with the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset to facilitate data aggregation across different research projects.

The document argues that treating nonstate actors as unitary entities in civil conflict analysis creates a gap between conceptual frames and empirical reality. It proposes a 'disaggregation' approach to examine how internal divisions, factionalism, and shifting coalitions influence the initiation, escalation, and termination of violence. The authors highlight that fragmentation can either increase violence through in-group competition or facilitate peace through state co-optation of specific factions. The text calls for more disaggregated data to better understand the dynamics of nonstate actors, including the role of external state intervention in precipitating or exacerbating internal splits.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of global conflict trends from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 54 state-based conflicts in 2019. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving recent conflict increases and the prevalence of internationalized civil conflicts. While battle-related deaths have generally decreased over the last 20 years, specific hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia remain deadly. The paper also analyzes the decline in peace agreements since 2015 and the persistence of non-state conflicts, particularly violent drug cartel activity in Latin America and communal violence in Africa.

The document examines the contested nature of 'power sharing,' noting that it is often implemented as a tool for conflict resolution but yields contradictory results in research. It identifies four primary types of power sharing: political, military, territorial, and economic. The author argues that findings vary based on whether researchers view power sharing as a means to achieve stable democracy (consociationalism) or as a tool for postconflict conflict management. While some studies suggest inclusive institutions prolong peace by addressing rebel security concerns, others argue they reward violence, strengthen ethnic divisions, and hinder democratic accountability by marginalizing opposition.

The research examines the intersection of Norway's national identity as a gender-equal and peace-promoting nation with its diplomatic practices. Through interviews with ten diplomats, the authors analyze how 'state feminism' has transitioned from domestic policy to foreign policy, specifically within the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The findings highlight a strategic tension: while Norway promotes gender equality to enhance its international branding and credibility as a neutral facilitator, it avoids the explicit label of 'feminist foreign policy' to prevent being perceived as too value-driven or Western, which could jeopardize its role as a benign peace facilitator. The document notes a shift from early, male-dominated peace efforts to more professionalized, gender-balanced teams in recent processes like those in Colombia and the Philippines.