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The October 2023 Polish parliamentary elections represent a critical juncture for the country's democratic governance and its relationship with the European Union. The contest pits the ruling nationalist coalition, led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, against a fragmented but numerically stronger 'democratic opposition' including the Civic Coalition, Poland 2050, the Left, and the Polish People's Party. While PiS and its partner United Poland oppose EU decarbonisation and the Green Deal, the opposition generally supports the green transition and Eurozone accession. A victory for the opposition would necessitate extensive reforms to restore the rule of law and depoliticise state institutions, while a PiS victory would likely continue the undermining of European constitutional values.

The text examines the intersection of the cost-of-living crisis, energy insecurity, and climate change in Europe, arguing that these shocks reveal the failure of the current socioeconomic model. It suggests that Green parties must move beyond austerity or simple redistribution to advocate for public investments in the green transition, decentralized renewable energy cooperatives, and a Green New Deal to ensure social protections and ecological resilience.

The report examines the fragmented state of Green Public Procurement (GPP) within the EU and proposes recommendations to leverage public purchasing power for decarbonization. Focusing on the construction and road transport sectors—which each account for approximately 12% of government procurement GHG emissions globally—the study analyzes case studies from eight EU Member States to identify best practices for meeting the EU's goal of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030.

The document examines the gap between EU Green Public Procurement (GPP) targets and actual implementation in eight Member States. It identifies systemic barriers—including fragmented governance, lack of standardized data, and limited procurement officer capacity—while highlighting successful local and national initiatives in Sweden, France, Germany, and others. The brief argues that the EU must harmonize reporting, institute mandatory requirements for high-emitting sectors, and provide better technical support to leverage public spending for climate goals.

The report finds that Green Public Procurement (GPP) in the EU is characterized by a fragmented approach with few binding requirements and significant gaps between national climate targets and actual procurement practices. While some regions like Catalonia and cities like Berlin show high ambition, most Member States rely on voluntary guidelines. The construction and road transport sectors are highlighted as high-impact areas where GPP could drive decarbonization, yet implementation is hindered by a lack of standardized data, insufficient capacity and time for procurement officers, and a lack of mandatory EU-level criteria. The report recommends harmonizing GPP definitions, introducing mandatory carbon criteria, and expanding the scope of EU Directives to include embedded emissions.

The document argues that the Open Government Partnership (OGP) is an underutilized platform for conservationists to drive transparency, participation, and accountability in natural resource governance. It provides three specific templates for creating OGP commitments: beneficial ownership transparency to combat deforestation, openness and integrity in wildlife law enforcement, and participatory governance for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The guide emphasizes that these reforms help prevent 'open washing' by using multi-stakeholder forums and independent reporting to track government progress.

In 2022, the EU electricity mix was led by nuclear (22%), gas (20%), coal (16%), and wind (15%), with solar accounting for 7.3%. While solar and wind continued their long-term growth trends, nuclear and hydro experienced significant declines due to plant closures and drought. Coal saw a temporary increase to offset these losses, while gas remained the only fossil fuel to show growth over the last two decades.

In 2022, wind and solar generated a record 22% of EU electricity, overtaking fossil gas (20%). Despite this, EU power sector emissions rose by 3.9% due to a 185 TWh generation gap caused by a severe drought affecting hydro power and unexpected French nuclear outages. This gap was partially filled by a 7% increase in coal generation. However, electricity demand fell by 7.9% in Q4 2022, and coal generation declined in the final four months of the year. Ember projects a 20% plummet in EU fossil generation in 2023 as hydro and nuclear capacity recover and renewable deployment accelerates.

In 2022, EU electricity demand fell by 2.7% to 2809 TWh, driven by mild weather and demand reduction measures. Despite this, power sector CO2 emissions rose by 3.9% due to shortfalls in nuclear and hydro generation, which necessitated increased fossil fuel use. Wind and solar generation continued to grow, reaching a 22% market share, while nuclear generation fell to its lowest share in 40 years at 22%.

In 2022, the EU experienced a temporary 7% rise in coal generation driven by shortfalls in nuclear and hydro power, rather than a structural 'return to coal'. This was offset by a record surge in solar capacity and a significant 7.9% drop in electricity demand in Q4 2022. Solar power generated 7.3% of EU electricity, avoiding approximately 249 billion in gas import costs. Looking ahead to 2023, the report forecasts a potential 20% plummet in fossil fuel generation as French nuclear capacity returns and renewable capacity continues to grow.

The report finds that 40 financial institutions fund a combined methane footprint that could exceed 503 Mt CO2e. It highlights a significant gap between the climate commitments of the countries where these institutions are domiciled and the institutions' own internal policies, which are described as weak or non-existent regarding agri-methane.

The report finds that GFANZ members, including major banks and asset managers, have provided hundreds of billions of dollars to companies expanding fossil fuel production. It argues that the alliance's sectoral guidelines and individual member policies are insufficient to prevent this expansion, often relying on flawed decarbonization targets that do not explicitly prohibit new fossil fuel supply. The document calls for the adoption of robust 'no-expansion' policies, alignment with UN Race to Zero criteria, and the implementation of meaningful accountability mechanisms to ensure financial flows are redirected toward clean energy.

The report finds that while 92% of surveyed business leaders view reducing carbon emissions as an urgent priority, many struggle with the 'how' of decarbonization due to budget and technological constraints. Businesses increasingly view the voluntary carbon market (VCM) as a critical tool for immediate action, though concerns over greenwashing and market transparency persist. While science-based targets are widely supported, there is a significant demand for clearer, more realistic guidance to help organizations meet their 2030 and 2050 goals.

The report outlines a two-tiered approach to an EU methane import standard: an initial prescriptive standard focusing on practices and technologies, followed by a more ambitious emission intensity standard. It argues that there are no insuperable legal obstacles to such a standard under WTO or UNFCCC rules, provided the EU applies equivalent burdens to domestic production. Key recommendations include using an equivalence principle for exporting countries and companies, implementing financial penalties for non-compliance, and establishing an EU methane fund to support mitigation in developing countries. The document also highlights the need for robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) and warns of 'methane leakage' where high-emitting gas is redirected to less regulated markets.

The CESCR frequently addressed climate change in its 2022 State reviews, focusing on mitigation policies, adaptation plans, and the phase-out of fossil fuels. The Committee emphasized the need for States to meet Paris Agreement commitments and highlighted extraterritorial obligations to ensure that domestic policies and international agreements do not adversely affect human rights in other countries. Additionally, the 2022 General Comment No. 26 on land rights stressed that climate mitigation measures, such as large-scale renewable energy projects, must include robust safeguards to protect human rights and the environment.

The report analyzes how different audiences perceive the intersection of climate change and health and evaluates the effectiveness of various communication frames. It finds that framing climate change as a public health issue, particularly by emphasizing the health benefits of solutions (gain framing) and the harms of air pollution, can increase public engagement and reduce political polarization. The document highlights health professionals as highly trusted messengers who are generally willing to engage in advocacy but face barriers such as lack of time and specialized knowledge. It also notes that public officials exhibit varying levels of awareness and face institutional barriers to prioritizing climate-health issues. The report concludes with a research agenda calling for more diverse geographic data, better integration of equity in messaging, and the expansion of climate-health curricula in medical education.

The report finds that low-cost, repeated behaviors like reducing food waste are significantly more common than high-cost, one-time installations like heat pumps or solar panels. While many who adopted these behaviors faced minimal difficulty, non-adopters cited lack of awareness and lack of interest for low-cost actions, and high cost and home ownership issues for high-cost technologies.

The analysis reveals that only 24% of the 67 sampled countries demonstrated a climate risk responsive recovery. A significant paradox was identified: a country's income level was a stronger determinant of whether it used COVID-19 funds for adaptation than its actual climate vulnerability. High-income countries were more likely to integrate physical climate risks into their recovery plans, while the most vulnerable countries were the least likely to do so, with only Kenya and Vanuatu among the 20 most vulnerable countries approving explicit adaptation actions. Most responsive measures focused on water resources management, disaster prevention, infrastructure, and nature-based solutions, primarily targeting drought and flooding.

The document explores the 'anti-green backlash' and the practical dilemmas of the energy transition, focusing on social inequality, territorial disputes over renewables and mining, and the geopolitical implications of critical raw material sourcing. It argues that a just transition requires rebuilding the welfare state, increasing democratic participation, and addressing historical ecological debts to avoid 'eco-apartheid' and political polarisation.

The document analyzes the Mediterranean's electricity grid infrastructure, identifying four main interconnection zones and various proposed projects like the EuroAsia and EuroAfrica Interconnectors. It highlights how geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, hinder integration while suggesting that the energy transition and EU demand for renewables could drive cooperation. The author proposes guidelines for enhancing interconnectivity, emphasizing the need for political alignment and regulatory cooperation.