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In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While the number of countries pursuing new coal projects dropped to 32, China and India continue massive expansions. In Indonesia, the growth of captive coal plants for nickel and aluminium processing contradicts national climate commitments, with the RUPTL 2025-2034 continuing to plan for on-grid coal investment despite a formal moratorium.

The document argues that Indonesia's legal framework fails to align with OECD Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct, specifically regarding the recognition of Indigenous Peoples' land rights and the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). It highlights how 'national strategic projects' and the 'Omnibus Law' facilitate investment at the expense of human rights, often supported by military deployment. The coalition recommends that the OECD demand a timeline for the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Bill, accelerated land recognition, and the cessation of military involvement in development projects.

Satellite observations of methane plumes from coal mines increased by approximately 1,400% between 2019 and 2024, yet a significant gap remains between theoretical detectability and actual monitoring. While 71% of global coal production is located in regions with favourable conditions for detection, only 10% of hard coal production has been observed via satellite. This discrepancy is attributed to factors such as satellite overpass frequency and instrument tasking priorities. High detection rates in Canada and Poland are linked to regional prioritisation by Carbon Mapper and regulatory scrutiny under the EU Methane Regulation, whereas major producers like India, South Africa, and Australia show substantial monitoring gaps despite favourable geography.

Global coal mine methane (CMM) emissions remained broadly steady at 34.7 million tonnes in 2023, despite an 8% increase in global coal production since 2021. This trend undermines the Global Methane Pledge's goal to cut anthropogenic methane emissions by 30% by 2030. Analysis reveals significant data gaps, as six of the nine largest emitters failed to submit official 2023 CMM data to the UNFCCC. Independent estimates from the IEA, GEM, and satellite data often diverge sharply from official figures, particularly in South Africa, Indonesia, and Russia, suggesting widespread underreporting and a reliance on outdated emission factors rather than mine-level measurements.

Coal mine methane (CMM) emissions remained steady at approximately 34.7 million tonnes in 2023 despite rising coal production, indicating a failure to align with the Global Methane Pledge. The report highlights a critical data gap, estimating that 89% of emissions were unreported to the UNFCCC in 2023 and that 87% of global production relies on generic emission factors rather than direct measurement. While satellite monitoring is increasing, it currently captures only 10% of hard coal production. Technically, 54-63% of CMM emissions could be mitigated by 2030 using proven technologies, with drainage station capture offering significant potential at negative net cost and ventilation air methane (VAM) oxidation capable of cutting nearly a quarter of emissions.

The report highlights significant gaps and uncertainties in global coal mine methane (CMM) emissions reporting, noting that 89% of emissions were left unreported in 2023. It criticizes the reliance on generic emission factors (Tiers 1 and 2) used for 87% of global coal production and advocates for the transition to direct, facility-level measurements (Tier 3) to increase data confidence and support mitigation policies.

The briefing argues that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) uses financial intermediaries (FIs) like Clifford Capital to bypass restrictions on fossil gas investments. While the ADB committed to Paris Agreement goals in 2017 and stopped financing coal, it provided approximately $4.48bn for oil and gas infrastructure in Asia Pacific between 2017 and 2025. The document highlights Clifford Capital, which received a $95m equity investment from the ADB in 2020, as a channel for funding fossil gas projects, including the Tangguh LNG project in Indonesia and Bhola-2 in Bangladesh. The authors call for greater transparency in FI lending, a prohibition on new fossil gas infrastructure funding, and a time-bound fossil fuels exit plan.

In 2024, global public financial support for fossil fuels reached USD 1.2 trillion, nearly five times the USD 254 billion provided to clean energy. The analysis highlights a cycle where energy price shocks lead to regressive blanket subsidies that entrench fossil fuel dependency. While international public finance is trending toward clean energy, G20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain heavily invested in fossil fuels, with 81% of their 2024 capital expenditure funding fossil infrastructure. The authors advocate for replacing blanket subsidies with targeted social protection and aligning SOE investments with transition goals to build resilient, low-carbon energy systems.

The report argues that electricity planning in Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and the Philippines, is overly focused on GDP and industrial growth, which masks a "well-being gap" in essential services. Using the Decent Living Standards framework, it estimates a sufficiency floor of 620–1,270 kWh per capita per year, finding that while aggregate generation often meets this threshold, poor allocation and affordability prevent basic needs from being met.

The report asserts that metallurgical coal demand is plateauing as the steel industry shifts toward low-carbon technologies like electric arc furnaces (EAFs) and green hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI). While some governments and financial institutions remain bullish on long-term growth, particularly in Asia, the document predicts a 4.8% drop in met coal consumption between 2025 and 2030. It highlights the risk of stranded assets, noting that 145 companies are planning expansions that could increase global capacity by 580 million tonnes per year. The report recommends scrapping subsidies for traditional steel, lowering industrial electricity prices, and using public procurement to prioritise green steel to accelerate the transition.

In 2025, clean power met all global electricity demand growth for the first time since the pandemic, as China's fossil generation plateaued. Solar power is the primary driver of this shift, and the deployment of battery storage is increasingly enabling solar to displace fossil fuels during non-daylight hours. India is expected to follow a less coal-reliant path than China due to lower energy intensity and the maturity of low-cost clean technologies.

The document describes El Niño as a natural climate phenomenon characterized by warmer-than-average sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific. It argues that climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of extreme El Niño events, particularly Central-Pacific (CP) events, and complicating their prediction. For 2026, there is a 61% chance of an El Niño emerging between May and July, with some models suggesting it could be the strongest in 140 years. The briefing details global teleconnections, noting that El Niño typically causes droughts in southern Africa, Australia, and India, while increasing flood risks in East Africa and the Americas. These shifts significantly impact global agriculture, reducing yields for maize, rice, and wheat while often increasing soybean yields. Regional analysis highlights specific risks, such as increased cholera in East Africa, hydropower reductions at Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Amazon becoming a net carbon source during Eastern-Pacific (EP) events.

The document analyzes the strategic interests of the EU and Indonesia in Africa's critical raw materials sector, arguing that their differing strengths—the EU's financial and regulatory capacity and Indonesia's downstream industrialisation experience—could be combined through triangular cooperation to support African development and reduce mutual dependence on China.

The briefing examines the impact of energy supply disruptions stemming from the US-Iran war, noting that the current crisis is larger than the 1970s oil embargo. It argues that while governments are using short-term fixes like strategic reserves and subsidies, the long-term solution lies in electrification, demand-side efficiency, and the scaling of 'green molecules' like hydrogen and ammonia. The text highlights specific vulnerabilities in Southeast Asia and the US, and suggests that mitigating methane leakage and flaring could recover energy volumes equivalent to approximately half of worldwide LNG trade.

The report analyzes the 'twin fossil shocks' of the 2020s—the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2026 shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz—comparing them to the 1970s oil crises. It contends that unlike the 1970s, today's energy transition is driven by 'electrotech' (solar, wind, batteries, and EVs) that is cheaper, faster to deploy, and more secure than fossil fuels. The authors suggest these shocks will accelerate the absolute peak of fossil fuel demand, particularly by pushing LNG out of power generation and oil out of road transport, especially in Asia. The document concludes with policy recommendations to prioritize electrification and remove fossil fuel subsidies to end fuel dependency.

The document examines the impact of geothermal energy expansion in Indonesia, specifically projects funded by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. It details environmental degradation, including water depletion and pollution, and social harms such as health crises, economic losses for farmers, and the criminalization of dissent. The author advocates for a 'Feminist Just Transition' framework to ensure community consent and equity in the energy transition.

The 2026 Middle East crisis, triggered by conflict in Iran, caused a spike in oil and gas prices and led some Southeast Asian nations to switch from gas to coal for electricity. However, the report argues that coal is not insulated from geopolitical shocks and carries high hidden health and climate costs. Analysis shows that replacing planned gas expansion with solar and storage would save ASEAN USD 4 billion by 2030, whereas replacing it with coal would increase costs. Despite this, ASEAN coal demand is projected to rise by 25% by 2030, driven largely by Indonesia and Vietnam, though Indonesia has committed to phasing out fossil fuels within 10 to 15 years.

The Industrial Transformation Technology and Investment Model (ITTIM) is an Excel-based tool that estimates energy use, CO2 emissions, and capital investment needs for industrial decarbonization. It employs a six-tier cumulative technology framework—ranging from energy efficiency to clean chemical feedstocks—to mitigate 97% to 99% of industrial emissions. The model currently supports datasets for China, India, Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, and the United States, allowing users to simulate various scenarios including carbon pricing and different hydrogen cost projections.

The document details Indonesia's strategic position in the global minerals market, particularly nickel, driven by aggressive downstream processing policies and export bans. It highlights the economic significance of mining (11% of GDP) and the associated environmental costs, including rising energy-sector emissions and deforestation. Socially, it notes significant gender disparities in the mining workforce and the prevalence of artisanal mining risks.

The report analyzes the integration of voluntary sustainability standards (VSSs) into trade policies to enhance market access for developing countries. It identifies two primary forms of integration: direct mandatory compliance and voluntary influence on national policies. Through case studies in Mozambique (cotton), Namibia (horticulture), Suriname (fisheries), and Vietnam (forestry), the report highlights that while VSSs can improve product quality and reputation, implementation is often hindered by high certification costs, limited institutional capacity, and market volatility.