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The report indicates that while global coal power is trending toward an end, the pace of phase-out is insufficient to meet Paris Agreement targets. China is a major outlier, with a surge in new plant approvals and construction that contrasts with a general decline in new projects outside its borders. In Japan, while new project scales are shrinking, operational capacity increased in 2022, and very few plants have confirmed closure dates.

The report finds that while global coal phase-out remains possible, the current pace of closures is insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals. China is a major outlier, accounting for 68% of proposed global coal capacity in 2022, while other regions show a decline in new projects. In South Korea, the report argues that current plans are inconsistent with national climate goals and that the financial risks of coal dependence are evident in the deficits of the Korea Electric Power Corporation.

The report indicates that while the global coal fleet grew by 19.5 GW in 2022, this was primarily driven by China, which now accounts for 68% of global developing coal capacity. Outside China, new coal proposals have collapsed by 84% since 2015. However, the current pace of decommissioning is insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals, with a required average of 117 GW of annual retirements to achieve a 2040 phase-out. In Latin America, development has slowed significantly, though Argentina recently commissioned the Río Turbio plant and Brazil maintains plans for 1.4 GW of new capacity by 2031, despite current project stalls.

The 2023 report by Global Energy Monitor and partners highlights a divergence in global coal trends: while most of the world is reducing coal capacity, China is significantly increasing its domestic pipeline. In 2022, China's under-construction coal capacity grew by 38%, while the rest of the world saw a 20% decrease. The report notes that 70% of OECD coal capacity is moving toward phase-out, but only 6% of non-OECD capacity is scheduled for retirement before 2040. In Pakistan, coal capacity grew from 150 MW in 2016 to 7.6 GW in 2023, with the government signaling a shift toward increasing local coal-based electricity capacity to 10 GW despite environmental and social concerns in the Thar region.

The report indicates that while the global coal sector is generally declining, China is significantly increasing its coal capacity, contrasting with a sharp drop in new projects elsewhere. Most of the world's operational coal capacity is now within the scope of national neutrality targets, though the current pace of retirement remains insufficient to meet Paris Agreement objectives. In Latin America and the Caribbean, coal development has slowed significantly, with notable retirements in Chile and Peru, though Argentina and Brazil maintain some capacity in development.

The report finds that while the world outside China is nearing a 'no new coal' milestone, a massive surge in coal permitting and construction in China is offsetting global progress. In 2022, the global coal fleet grew by 19.5 GW, driven by China, which now accounts for 68% of global capacity under development. While the U.S. and EU continue to retire capacity, the pace of global retirements remains far below the levels required to meet a 1.5C pathway, which would necessitate an average of 117 GW of retirements per year. The report also highlights the role of private finance, noting that most financial institutions' coal policies remain insufficient to align with climate science.

The document establishes a standardized framework for reporting aluminum emissions at the product level, utilizing fixed system boundaries to ensure comparability regardless of a company's vertical integration. It defines two primary reporting boundaries: a 'benchmarking boundary' (mining to final cast-house) and a 'full boundary' (mining to semi-fabrication). Key requirements include the use of primary data, the disclosure of scrap-based content (distinguishing between pre- and post-consumer scrap), and the reporting of mine-to-smelter cast-house emissions intensity for primary aluminum. The guidance also details specific calculation methods for energy impacts, including a hierarchy for sourcing renewable energy and a dual-reporting approach for pre-consumer scrap using both cut-off and co-product allocation methods.

The document analyzes the economic relationship between South Africa and the BRICS nations, noting that while trade has grown, it remains unbalanced and dominated by raw material exports to China. It identifies three primary 'enablers' for deepening these ties: the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the shift in global manufacturing due to US-China rivalry (including 'friend-shoring' and 'Chexit'), and the potential expansion of BRICS membership. The author recommends that South Africa use its 2023 BRICS chairship to promote Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and business-to-business engagements to attract diversified investment into Africa.

The document argues that BRICS failed to harness the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity for collective health diplomacy, instead relying on bilateral arrangements and national interests. Despite declarations of cooperation, there were no 'all-BRICS' partnerships for vaccine development, and the bloc experienced significant discord over the transparency and approval of vaccines like Russia's Sputnik V and India's Covaxin. The author highlights a lack of a dedicated BRICS health institution and recommends the creation of a collaborative think tank, a joint research centre, and a formal pandemic intervention protocol to move from 'vaccine nationalism' toward effective science diplomacy and technology transfer.

The briefing finds that low to middle income groups in Sweden were most affected by the 2022 energy price crisis, with an average welfare impact of -3.8%. It highlights that sparsely populated areas suffered greater impacts than densely populated ones. The analysis suggests that direct compensation targeting income deciles 1 to 5, specifically deciles 3 to 5, would be more effective than fuel tax reductions, which primarily benefited high-income groups and risked undermining long-term climate goals.

The report explores the integration of systems thinking into asset management to better assess sustainability impacts. It identifies six key dimensions of systems thinking—considering multiple sustainability dimensions, both positive and negative impacts, indirect effects, co-benefits and trade-offs, long-term perspectives, and the scale of impacts. The study finds that while there is interest among 'front runner' practitioners, the finance sector's reliance on quantitative, aggregated data and short-term horizons creates a significant barrier to operationalizing a systems approach. The authors argue that improved, standardized, and audited company reporting, particularly through EU regulations like the CSRD and EU Taxonomy, is essential to provide the data necessary for effective systems-level analysis.

The submission by Ecojustice and the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment (CAPE) proposes comprehensive amendments to the Competition Act to align it with Canada's net-zero and environmental commitments. The authors argue that current laws fail to address 'greenwashing'—deceptive environmental claims—which distorts the market, penalizes genuinely sustainable businesses, and misleads consumers. Key recommendations include amending the Act's purpose clause to recognize sustainability, legislating specific prohibitions against common forms of greenwashing (such as misleading carbon offset claims and generic 'eco-friendly' labels), and expanding the public's ability to challenge deceptive marketing through the Tribunal without needing to prove specific damages. Additionally, the document suggests establishing a sustainability taskforce within the Competition Bureau, allowing for 'public benefit' considerations in merger assessments, and creating exemptions for competitor collaborations that advance environmental protection.

Damilola Ogunbiyi's keynote speech at the 9th Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue emphasizes the critical need for equitable financing and industrialization in the Global South. She highlights the severe disparity in renewable energy investment, noting that Sub-Saharan Africa received less than 1.5% of global investment between 2000 and 2020. To address this, she promotes the Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI) to generate carbon credits and revenue, and the Renewable Energy Manufacturing Initiative (REMI) to foster green industry in Africa and Asia. Ogunbiyi advocates for whole-economy energy transition plans (ETPs), citing Nigeria's plan which estimates a cost of USD 1.9 trillion to reach net-zero by 2060.

The Europe Gas Tracker 2023 reports that the EU is pursuing a costly and uncoordinated expansion of gas infrastructure, including a potential 136% increase in LNG import capacity. This build-out, estimated to cost €53.5 billion, risks locking the bloc into fossil fuel dependency and contradicts the European Climate Law's goals of a 55% emissions reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050.

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) views Canada's 2023 federal budget as a significant step toward a net-zero economy, noting billions for clean energy and CAD 800 million for freshwater protection. However, the IISD warns that the budget maintains loopholes for fossil fuels, specifically through carbon capture and storage (CCS) funding and the inclusion of abated natural gas in clean electricity tax credits, which may undermine commitments to end inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

A coalition of environmental organisations opposes the Swedish EU Presidency's effort to delete Article 16 from the proposed Nature Restoration Law, which would have granted citizens and NGOs the right to challenge the legality of national restoration plans. The signatories argue that relying on recitals or the Aarhus Convention is insufficient due to inconsistent compliance across EU Member States and the risk of irreparable environmental damage, as seen in Poland and Romania.

The author contends that 'carbon farming' activities are unsuitable for carbon removal certification because they provide temporary, volatile storage that risks enabling greenwashing and delaying actual emission reductions. Instead of market-based carbon credits, the document proposes 'activity-based finance' to support farmers and foresters in adopting nature-based practices, funded by public resources or polluter-pays instruments.

The Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) proposal introduces a target of 50 million tonnes of annual CO2 injection capacity by 2030 to address storage bottlenecks in Europe. It mandates Member States to map suitable storage areas and requires oil and gas producers to share geological data and contribute to the storage target based on their production shares from 2020-2023. To accelerate deployment, the NZIA allows CO2 storage projects to seek 'Net-Zero Strategic Project' status, potentially reducing permitting times to 18 months. However, the document notes that success depends on overcoming coordination failures between Member States, establishing consistent transport network regulations, and implementing bankable funding mechanisms.

The steel sector accounts for 11% of global CO2 emissions, primarily due to the blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) route which relies on metallurgical coal. While secondary steelmaking via electric arc furnaces (EAF) and green hydrogen-based Direct Reduction of Iron (DRI) offer cleaner alternatives, coal-based capacity continues to grow, with 80 million tons of annual capacity planned for relining. The document highlights that ArcelorMittal has weakened its 2030 emissions intensity reduction target from 25% to 10% and prioritizes shareholder returns over decarbonization. It calls on financial institutions to adopt corporate-level exclusion policies for metallurgical coal and stop financing the relining of blast furnaces.

Carbon Market Watch (CMW) urges the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to avoid shortcuts in developing recommendations for removal activities, emphasizing that temporary carbon storage should not be equated with permanent emission reductions. CMW argues that current forestry and land-use credits lack permanence, and that buffer pools are insufficient to manage reversal risks. The organization specifically opposes the inclusion of tonne-year accounting, claiming it creates a false equivalence between temporary storage and permanent removals, and criticizes the proposed definition of removals for including 'products' and 'processes' rather than focusing solely on outcomes.