Search Climate Insights Directory

The document examines the progress of carbon pricing in three Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia has an advanced regulatory framework and a functioning carbon exchange (IDXCarbon) but struggles with low trading volumes and high emission allowances. The Philippines is in the early stages of designing an emissions trading system (ETS) and exploring voluntary markets. Viet Nam is piloting an ETS for power, steel, and cement sectors, driven by its 2050 net-zero commitment and the impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

The document argues that the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion transforms the legal landscape for investment disputes by establishing that climate action is a binding legal obligation rather than a discretionary policy choice. This shift undermines investor claims based on 'legitimate expectations' for fossil fuel activities and provides states with stronger defenses against claims of unfair and inequitable treatment (FET) or indirect expropriation. The author recommends that states reform investment treaties to exclude climate measures from compensation claims, limit prospective damages based on future fossil fuel revenues, and negotiate agreements to neutralize survival clauses in treaties like the Energy Charter Treaty.

The IISD recommends that the EU uphold its Arctic fossil fuel extraction moratorium to ensure energy security, protect fragile ecosystems, and maintain policy coherence with the European Green Deal. The document argues that Arctic fossil fuels are too expensive, high-risk, and slow to develop to be viable, noting that new fields would only become operational after the EU should have advanced its net-zero pathway. It further suggests phasing out imports from the Barents and northern Norwegian seas to reduce security risks and align with partners like Canada and Greenland, who have implemented similar bans.

The report assesses the alignment of ARSO's regional agriculture and forestry standards with the EUDR. While ARSO demonstrates strong institutional governance and a solid baseline for legal compliance, it lacks critical technical requirements for EUDR readiness, specifically regarding the December 31, 2020 cut-off date, plot-level geolocation, and structured ex ante risk assessments. The author recommends that ARSO adopt EUDR-aligned definitions of deforestation, mandate polygon-level mapping for plots over 4 hectares, and increase transparency regarding audit outcomes to help African producers maintain market access to the EU.

The ICJ's 2025 Advisory Opinion establishes that states have binding legal obligations to protect the climate system, which includes phasing out fossil fuel production and subsidies. This finding challenges the legal basis for many investor-state claims, as it undermines the 'legitimate expectations' of investors in carbon-intensive industries and provides states with stronger defenses against claims of fair and equitable treatment (FET) violations. The brief argues that the prospect of ISDS can cause 'regulatory chill,' deterring necessary climate action. It recommends that states reform investment treaties through sector-based carve-outs, restrict forward-looking damages based on projected fossil fuel revenues, and coordinate withdrawals from outdated agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty.

The report examines a diverse array of transition mechanisms, including Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), national sectoral processes in countries like Germany and Chile, and first-mover alliances such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance. It highlights the necessity of national ownership, structured social dialogue, and blended finance to overcome political gridlock and ensure a just transition. The analysis reveals significant gaps in international support, particularly a shortfall in grants and concessional finance for Global South countries and a lack of coordinated global guidance for designing transition roadmaps.

The document outlines a structured approach to the global transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF), emphasizing that current production and consumption plans are misaligned with 1.5°C pathways. It proposes that effective TAFF roadmaps must be anchored in science, justice, and national ownership, while integrating elements such as subsidy reform, economic diversification, and decommissioning. The guide highlights the necessity of international coordination between producer and consumer countries to manage systemic risks, reform global finance, and ensure a just and orderly transition.

Between September 1 and December 18, 2025, 22,158 lobbyist entries were recorded at the European Parliament, with private interests accounting for 59% of visits. The report highlights a pervasive presence of American lobbyists (95% presence rate) and fossil fuel representatives (87.5% presence rate), who utilized direct access and professional consultancies to influence the Omnibus I law. A case study on ExxonMobil reveals the company spent between €1.3 million and €1.7 million on consultancies alone in 2025 to target climate legislation. The analysis concludes that this lobbying effort, supported by a right-wing/far-right parliamentary majority, successfully secured the removal of climate transition plans from the legislation.

Between September 1 and December 18, 2025, the European Parliament recorded 22,158 lobbyist entries, with private interests accounting for 59% of these visits. The report highlights a disproportionate presence of US-based lobbyists and fossil fuel interests, who were present 87.5% of the time during the studied period. This influence was particularly concentrated around the negotiation of the Omnibus I law, which modified the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). The analysis reveals that fossil fuel lobbyists often entered the Parliament without declared appointments to engage in informal interactions. A case study of ExxonMobil demonstrates a complex lobbying chain involving direct visits, professional consultancies, and trade associations, totaling over 650 entries in four months to push for the removal of climate transition plans.

The European Central Bank (ECB) will introduce a 'climate factor' on 15 June 2026 to adjust the valuation of marketable assets issued by non-financial corporations used as collateral. The factor penalizes assets tied to high-emission activities based on sector-specific stressors, issuer-specific climate scores, and asset maturity. Reclaim Finance argues the measure is a positive step but suffers from transparency gaps and a flawed annual calculation cycle that may misrepresent risks for short-term assets. The briefing recommends making climate factors public, automating calculations, and extending the framework to credit claims and other asset classes to ensure comprehensive integration of climate risks into monetary policy.

The briefing critiques Sweden's Social Climate Plan for its limited focus on a single electric vehicle premium, arguing that it ignores 120,000 heating-poor households and fails to address the root causes of transport poverty. Using the Transitional Assistance Framework, the authors categorize the plan as 'adaptive' but 'narrow' because it provides financial aid without addressing structural barriers like charging infrastructure or public transport. The document contrasts Sweden's approach with more comprehensive proposals from Greece, Latvia, and Poland, and recommends that EU member states prioritize structural investments over short-term technology subsidies to ensure a truly just transition.

The document examines energy storage as a structural resource for flexibility in Latin American electrical systems facing high penetration of variable renewable energy. It highlights that while Chile leads in battery deployment to manage curtailment, other countries like Colombia, Peru, and Brazil are at earlier stages, often focusing on reliability or specific industrial uses. The report argues that the primary barriers to deployment are institutional and regulatory rather than technological, and recommends shifting from a capacity-focused approach to a functional one that prioritizes specific flexibility needs.

Methane is a potent greenhouse gas that contributes approximately 0.5°C to global temperature increases. Human-made sources—including the fossil fuel industry, landfills, livestock, and agriculture—account for about 55% of methane pollution, while natural sources like wetlands and permafrost account for 45%. Mitigation strategies focus on stopping leaks in the oil and gas supply chain, improving landfill waste management, and altering livestock diets. International efforts include the Global Methane Pledge, aiming for a 30% reduction from 2020 levels by 2030, and EU regulations banning venting and flaring. RMI supports these goals through data tools like the Oil Climate Index plus Gas (OCI+), WasteMAP, and the MiQ certification standard.

The document proposes tripartite contracts to address high electricity prices and market volatility in Europe, which currently hinder industrial decarbonisation. By placing a public contracting entity between clean energy generators and industrial consumers, these agreements aim to provide long-term revenue certainty for developers and fixed price certainty for industries. The brief highlights that while technologies for low- to medium-heat processes are ready, market gaps and electricity taxation remain barriers. It notes that the European Commission is developing such agreements for offshore wind, grids, and storage, drawing on practices from Spain, France, and Italy.

The research paper examines the transition of trade-related climate measures from abstract policy debates to concrete implementation between 2025 and early 2026. It highlights the role of the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation as primary drivers of international tension. The authors analyze discussions within the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD), as well as new initiatives established at COP 30 in Brazil, including the 'Mutirão' technical dialogues and the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT). The paper argues that MC14 serves as a critical moment for consolidating these debates around transparency, interoperability, and development support.

The document analyzes the tension between existing WTO trade rules and the needs of countries to secure critical minerals for the energy transition. It argues that current 'critical minerals diplomacy'—characterized by non-binding sectoral partnerships among developed nations—creates power asymmetries and 'selective delegalization' that disadvantage producer economies. The author suggests that the WTO could serve as a more neutral platform for a plurilateral critical minerals initiative or a code of best practices to balance supply-side industrialization goals with demand-side security needs.

The document argues that the multilateral system, particularly the UN Security Council, is experiencing a 'rupture' characterized by paralysis and legitimacy deficits. While the AU seeks immediate structural changes—including permanent seats and veto power—the EU generally favors gradual procedural reforms. Despite these differences, the briefing identifies key areas of convergence: improving UNSC working methods, strengthening EU-AU-UN cooperation, and implementing UN Resolution 2719 to provide predictable financing for AU-led peace operations. It suggests that both continents must move beyond rhetorical alignment toward tangible delivery to maintain influence in a fragmented geopolitical order, especially given the US's increasing disengagement from international organizations.

The document examines the trend of ASEAN countries increasing LNG import infrastructure, with planned investments of USD 20.4 billion. It argues that LNG fails to provide true energy security due to its sensitivity to geopolitical shocks, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and tensions in the Middle East, and competition for supply with Europe. The author suggests that Southeast Asian nations should instead prioritize domestic renewable energy, leverage their own solar manufacturing capacity, and accelerate the ASEAN Power Grid to enhance resilience and reduce import dependency.

The briefing discusses the systemic nature of climate disinformation, driven by the public relations industry and Big Tech algorithms for profit. It highlights Spain's initiative to hold digital platforms and executives legally accountable for the algorithmic amplification of illegal content and disinformation. The text also notes the European Union's endorsement of the UN Declaration on Information Integrity on Climate Change and the implementation of fossil fuel advertising bans in cities like The Hague, Amsterdam, and Florence as models for protecting the public from corporate-driven deception.

A coalition of 133 organisations, including Reclaim Finance and WWF, argues that the European Commission's November proposal for the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) is insufficient because it limits fossil fuel exclusions to only two of the three sustainable product categories. The signatories contend that allowing any ESG-labelled funds to support fossil fuel expansion would mislead investors, contradict EU climate objectives, and undermine the credibility of the SFDR framework.