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The document argues that large-scale deployment of CCS is essential for Europe to reach climate neutrality by 2050, yet current draft NECPs show significant gaps in targets and planning. It provides a framework for Member States to assess storage capacity, map projects, engage stakeholders, and establish financing and regional cooperation for CO2 transport and storage networks.

The document argues that clean hydrogen should be treated as a 'precious molecule' and prioritised for 'no regrets' hard-to-abate industrial sectors rather than being deployed indiscriminately. It recommends that EU Member States move beyond a sole focus on renewable ('green') hydrogen to include other low-carbon pathways, such as nuclear ('pink') and natural gas with carbon capture ('blue'), to avoid resource constraints. The guide emphasises locating production close to end-users to minimise transport inefficiencies and suggests that hydrogen in transport be limited to heavy-duty trucking, aviation, and shipping, while light-duty vehicles should prioritise electrification. Finally, it advises leveraging EU and national support mechanisms to fund 'champion' projects across the entire value chain.

The document argues that superhot rock (SHR) energy—a subset of Engineered Geothermal Systems that accesses rock temperatures exceeding 400°C—could provide a zero-carbon, firm, and energy-dense power source available globally. It notes a significant gap in current EU planning, where only one country (Italy) mentions SHR in its draft NECP, despite 20 countries planning for geothermal energy. The guide recommends that Member States fund pilot demonstrations, map national SHR resources, contribute to a centralised EU geothermal data repository, develop national geothermal strategies, and create stakeholder collaboration platforms. It highlights that SHR systems can potentially produce up to ten times the energy of conventional geothermal wells and could support the production of clean hydrogen.

The report examines hydropower in northern Sweden, specifically the Norrbotten region, amidst rising energy demands from 'fossil-free steel' and battery production. It highlights the shift of hydropower from baseload capacity to a flexibility and storage role to support intermittent wind and solar power. This transition, alongside industrial growth, increases the risk of 'hydropeaking'—rapid fluctuations in river flow—which threatens freshwater biodiversity and fish species like salmon and brown trout. The document analyzes the Swedish National Plan for Hydropower Permit Reviews (NAP), noting the trade-off between environmental restoration and a national production loss limit of 1.5 TWh/year. It concludes that while climate change may increase water run-off and production potential, sustainable management requires integrated economic and ecological frameworks and broader stakeholder inclusion.

The GCF Board's 37th meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, resulted in the approval of 15 funding proposals totaling USD 736.4 million and the adoption of the 2024 administrative budget of USD 112.4 million. Key strategic outcomes include the endorsement of the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, which allocates USD 501.5 million to enhance country ownership and direct access, and the confirmation of USD 9.3 billion in pledges for the second formal replenishment (GCF-2). The Board also established an ad hoc Committee on Human Resources Matters to address systemic compensation and policy issues. Significant discussions occurred regarding the potential for a regional presence to reduce operational bottlenecks and the ongoing debate over the financing of results-based payments for REDD+, which was deferred to the next meeting.

A study of municipality officials in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden reveals that while fewer than half actively measure consumption-based emissions, there is broad interest in doing so to identify sustainable measures toward climate neutrality. Respondents believe municipalities can influence emissions by cooperating with residents and businesses, but they require standardized methods and reliable data because many lack the resources to create independent inventories.

The report argues that CCS is essential for the EU to reach climate neutrality by 2050, noting that current deployment rates are far below required levels and that no operational CO2 storage sites currently exist within the EU. It recommends setting clear deployment targets for CCS, DACCS, and BECCS, and establishing a strategic plan to distribute storage basins across the region by 2035 to avoid over-reliance on the North Sea. To address financial barriers, the author suggests coordinating funding, using carbon contracts for difference (CfDs), and creating a dedicated tender for capture capacity. The report also emphasizes the need for a common regulatory framework for cross-border CO2 transport, the creation of an aggregation platform to match CO2 sources with sinks, and the development of market demand for near-zero carbon products. Finally, it advocates for the prioritization of permanent industrial carbon removals (DACCS and BECCS) and their gradual integration into compliance markets like the EU ETS, provided robust standards and monitoring are in place.

The report identifies a shift in clean energy deployment challenges from technical and economic issues to social and institutional barriers, specifically community resistance to wind and solar projects. Based on workshops with 25 practitioners and researchers, it proposes four paradigm-shifting solutions: a 'fair share' policy to distribute infrastructure burdens across a state, 'off-the-shelf' visioning modules to help communities self-determine their desires before projects are proposed, the creation of local task forces supported by trusted facilitators to build capacity, and the development of co-ownership or co-management models to increase local benefits and acceptance. The document also highlights unresolved tensions, such as the conflict between the urgent need for rapid decarbonization and the time required to build meaningful community trust.

The document argues that international investment agreements (IIAs) and the ISDS mechanism act as legal barriers to climate action by allowing fossil fuel companies to sue governments for compensation when regulations impact their returns. It outlines a three-part framework for States: removing risk through treaty termination, carveouts, or removal of ISDS clauses; reducing risk via the adoption of 'right to regulate' provisions, interpretative statements, and the careful design of climate measures; and responding to active claims using jurisdictional challenges, the 'necessity defense', and arguments against the 'legitimate expectations' of investors. The toolkit emphasizes that the urgent need to limit warming to 1.5°C may justify the termination of treaties like the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) based on a fundamental change of circumstances.

The guide identifies key barriers to Just Transitions—including institutional capacity gaps, structural labour market vulnerabilities, and limited financing—and offers a strategic roadmap for policymakers. It argues that Just Transitions must move beyond a narrow focus on the energy sector to become a holistic, cross-ministerial strategy integrated into national development plans. Key recommendations include adopting needs-based capacity building, establishing robust social protection systems, and shifting international climate finance toward a more participatory, social-justice-oriented model.

The document analyzes the ascent of the far right, highlighting its use of 'metapolitics' to shift cultural norms and its ability to capitalize on economic and social insecurities. It examines specific national contexts, such as Italy's media capture under Giorgia Meloni and the rise of Vlaams Belang in Flanders, while warning against 'conservative socialism' where left-wing parties adopt far-right rhetoric. The report concludes that defeating the far right requires a positive, inclusive vision of the future rather than mere imitation or moral condemnation.

The report outlines the activities of the Climate Story Lab Nordic 2023/2024, which supported nine climate films to develop impact strategies and narratives. It argues that storytelling is a critical infrastructure for the energy transition, capable of moving beyond scientific facts to address the emotional and existential dimensions of the climate crisis. The document provides a handbook of essays from scientists, filmmakers, and practitioners, emphasizing the need to reach the 'moveable middle' of the population and the importance of centering climate justice and local contexts in narratives. It concludes by calling for a more robust 'storytelling ecosystem' that supports independent filmmakers and challenges the influence of fossil fuel industry narratives.

The document examines the M4 framework for marine multi-use projects, identifying a global trend toward combining offshore wind with other technologies, most notably hydrogen production. A technoeconomic analysis of a potential floating wind farm off Scotland indicates that centralized offshore hydrogen production is the most cost-effective strategy. The report highlights that while technical barriers are low, commercialization is hindered by regulatory gaps and a lack of multi-use integration in Marine Spatial Plans.

The report finds a significant gap between net zero targets and actual fossil fuel phase-out commitments. While some progress is visible in corporate coal phase-outs and among European entities, the majority of analyzed countries and companies have not committed to ending fossil fuel activities on a timescale consistent with the Paris Agreement. National net zero targets cover 88% of global GHG emissions, but only 7% of those emissions are covered by at least one phase-out commitment.

The report finds that while CETP signatories have made progress in restricting fossil fuel finance, they have not yet fully prioritized clean energy support. In the first year of implementation, signatories moved USD 6.5 billion out of fossil fuels and USD 5.2 billion into clean energy, which is significantly lower than the estimated annual potential of USD 28 billion. The analysis reveals that most high-income signatories lack CETP-aligned policies that fully prioritize clean energy, and there is a widespread lack of provisions for fair and transformative financing, such as grant-based instruments for the countries most in need.

The report finds that while current national targets collectively aim for a doubling of renewable capacity by 2030, they often underestimate the actual pace of deployment. A global tripling to 11,000 GW is considered achievable if governments update targets to reflect recent growth and maintain a 17% annual increase in additions. The analysis identifies specific countries with high potential to increase ambition, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UAE, while noting that others like India and Saudi Arabia already have targets that aim for a tripling of their 2022 capacity.

The report evaluates solid oxide electrolyzer cell (SOEC) technology, highlighting its superior electrical efficiency when integrated with external heat sources, such as those found in steel, chemical, and nuclear plants. While the technology is more mature than often perceived—leveraging experience from the gigawatt-scale solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) industry—it faces challenges regarding stack durability due to high-temperature thermal stress and the need to scale from small modules to hundred-megawatt systems. The report finds that raw material supply chains are not a bottleneck and that gigawatt-scale manufacturing is feasible within 18 to 36 months.

The EU chemicals sector faces a critical investment window until 2030, requiring over EUR1tn by 2050 to achieve net zero. The document argues that decarbonisation must address scope 3 emissions—which account for 60% to 80% of total emissions—through demand reduction, circularity, and alternative feedstocks. Key policy recommendations include expanding the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to include polymers and organic chemicals, implementing Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) for low-carbon hydrogen, and strengthening the EU Taxonomy to better incentivise low-carbon basic chemicals production.

Half of the world's economies are at least five years past a peak in fossil power generation, with 107 economies representing 38% of global electricity demand having seen emissions fall by nearly 20% over the last decade. While the EU, Oceania, and North America are in a period of decline, Asia and the Middle East are the only regions yet to reach a peak, though individual countries like Viet Nam and Japan show progress. The report emphasizes that the expansion of wind and solar is the primary driver of fossil fuel displacement, noting that without these technologies, power sector emissions would be 20% higher.

The authors argue that the Norwegian Arts Council's 2023-2030 strategy exhibits 'klimablindhet' (climate blindness) by failing to use the word 'climate' once, despite the urgent global climate crisis. They contrast this with the proactive approaches of the Danish Arts Foundation (Statens Kunstfond) and Arts Council England, which provide CO2 calculations, training, and strategic environmental programs. The authors claim that Norwegian cultural actors fear losing public support if they engage in climate critique, particularly regarding Norway's oil policy, and call for the Arts Council to acknowledge the climate crisis and support the sector's role in a just transition.