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The document examines the application of human rights due diligence in the mineral supply chains of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), specifically focusing on 'conflict minerals' like tantalite, tin, tungsten, and gold. It reviews six major initiatives—including the OECD Guidance, the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism, and the iTSCi—concluding that their heavy reliance on traceability is insufficient to stop the financing of armed groups. The author argues that these frameworks are based on a reductionist 'resource curse' theory and fail to account for the informal nature of artisanal mining, weak state governance, and complex land ownership disputes. The paper highlights that such initiatives can lead to a de facto embargo on minerals, harming the livelihoods of artisanal miners. It concludes that sustainable management requires the meaningful inclusion of local stakeholders and a deeper understanding of the political and socio-economic drivers of conflict beyond mere economic profit.

The report finds that AFOLU mitigation potentials for eight major emitters—the United States, Indonesia, China, India, Brazil, the European Union, Mexico, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—could reduce the 2020 emissions gap by approximately three-fourths and the 2030 gap by nearly half. The United States has the highest individual potential at 23 Gt CO2eq, while Indonesia, China, and India also show substantial potentials between 0.75 and 1.75 Gt. These potentials are derived from three primary activities: reducing emissions from deforestation and peatland clearing, decreasing agricultural emissions (such as methane and nitrous oxide), and increasing carbon sequestration through reforestation and ecosystem restoration.

The IISD guide outlines a framework for negotiating agricultural investment contracts, emphasizing the primacy of national legislation over contracts and international treaties. It provides a comprehensive model contract covering land rights, financial obligations, social and environmental commitments, and dispute resolution, while advocating for transparency and community engagement to ensure sustainable rural development.

The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland and Water is a comprehensive tool designed for governments and communities to manage foreign investments in agricultural land. It emphasizes the primacy of domestic law over investment contracts and international treaties, while providing a model contract to fill gaps where domestic laws are weak. The guide outlines a preparatory phase involving investor screening, community engagement, and impact assessments, and proposes specific contractual provisions covering tenure, financial obligations, social development, and environmental protections. It strongly advocates for transparency, the avoidance of stabilization clauses, and the use of domestic courts for dispute resolution to protect the national interest and ensure long-term project viability.

The document analyzes the roles of Zimbabwe as SADC chair and South Africa as chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) for 20142015. It argues that while these roles provide opportunities for leadership, the impact is constrained by SADC's consensus-based decision-making and institutional weaknesses. Key challenges include high dependency on donor funding, political instability in Lesotho, and the influence of domestic political struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The document examines the systemic marginalisation of police components within the African Union's (AU) security architecture, which is dominated by military perspectives. It identifies critical gaps in police-specific doctrine, training, and resourcing, while highlighting the operational difficulties of managing diverse police contingents in high-risk environments. The paper argues that for African-led PSOs to be effective, the AU must develop a distinct police identity, harmonise ranking systems, and reduce reliance on external donor funding.

The report argues that conservation initiatives frequently violate the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, despite an increasing international legal consensus on their protections. It asserts that responsibility for upholding these rights extends beyond states to include international organisations, businesses, and NGOs. The authors analyse a vast array of international instruments and find that while normative trends are moving toward greater recognition of rights, enforcement and redress remain significant challenges. The document concludes by suggesting the creation of core standards, stakeholder guidance, and potentially a dedicated global grievance mechanism or 'Roundtable on Ethical Conservation' to ensure just conservation practices.

The paper advocates for the use of strategic foresight and integrated policy analysis to help African governments navigate complex development trade-offs and set realistic targets. It highlights the International Futures (IFs) model as a tool for scenario analysis and evidence-based planning, using it to critique the feasibility of certain Agenda 2063 goals, such as the eradication of extreme poverty by 2030 and the 'silencing the guns' initiative by 2020. The author emphasizes that such foresight is dependent on improving the quality and availability of reliable data across the continent.

The document argues that while engaging the private sector in post-conflict settings carries reputational and political risks, it is essential for sustainable economic recovery. It suggests that SADPA should move beyond a purely militaristic or diplomatic approach to PCRD by coordinating with businesses to create jobs and stimulate growth. The author proposes six specific modalities for engagement, including risk guarantees, governance reform, and the creation of public-private dialogue platforms, while cautioning against a purely mercantilist approach that could damage South Africa's image in Africa.

The analysis finds that armed conflict in Africa generally follows a global pattern of decline when measured relative to population growth, though this was disrupted by the Cold War and has seen a recent uptick since 2010. Africa is uniquely characterized by high levels of 'non-state conflict'—violence between armed groups not involving the government—which the author attributes to weak governance. While terrorism is rising globally, the Middle East is currently experiencing faster growth than Africa. The paper also highlights that internal conflicts now dominate globally over interstate wars, and warns that climate change may increase local conflicts over resources in northern and southern Africa.

The document analyzes the African Group's engagement at the UN Human Rights Council, noting a tension between a desire for regional leadership and a tendency to grant accused governments veto power over resolutions. While some 'human rights-friendly' states consistently support country-specific resolutions, others systematically abstain or oppose them, leading to an uneven response to crises across the continent and globally.

The policy brief argues that peace agreements in the DRC, specifically the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (AAFA), reflect shifts in economic power between the eastern Kivus and the southern Katanga province. While early conflicts and the ICGLR were driven by the exploitation of coltan and other minerals in the east by Rwanda and Uganda, the subsequent rise of copper and cobalt investments in Katanga shifted geopolitical influence toward SADC states.

The document evaluates South Africa's reintegration into global affairs and its role as a leader for the African agenda. While acknowledging South Africa's success in joining platforms like the G-20 and BRICS and its significant economic investments in Africa, the author identifies a 'twin deficit': a lack of consistency between diplomatic actions and constitutional values (democracy and human rights), and a 'lone-wolf' approach that alienates regional partners. The brief recommends that Pretoria move away from a pragmatic 'do no harm' approach toward issue-based partnerships and institutional reforms within the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) to regain credibility as a trusted interlocutor in African conflicts.

The New York Declaration on Forests Action Agenda provides a framework for governments, companies, indigenous peoples, and multilateral institutions to combat deforestation. It highlights significant progress, such as Brazil's 71% reduction in deforestation by 2013 and the adoption of zero-deforestation policies by major palm oil traders covering 60% of global trade. The agenda details specific roles for stakeholders, including the implementation of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and the commitment of indigenous peoples to protect 400 million hectares of forests. It also notes financial commitments from developed nations like Germany, Norway, and the UK to provide predictable REDD+ financing.

The document assesses South Africa's strategic position in global development, arguing that the country can strengthen its peacebuilding and PCRD efforts in Africa by leveraging the IBSA Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). It highlights the role of the newly established SADPA in coordinating these efforts while cautioning that South Africa must align its PCRD vision with the African Union and manage domestic perceptions of its outgoing aid.

The document assesses South Africa's role as an emerging global actor in peace and security, specifically its interactions with the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBC, PBSO, and PBF). It highlights South Africa's experience in mediation and peacekeeping in countries like the DRC and Burundi, while noting a lack of systematic staffing of South Africans in the UN system. The paper emphasizes the potential of South-South cooperation, exemplified by the IBSA Fund, and recommends that South Africa leverage the 2015 UN peacebuilding review to promote African perspectives and national ownership of peace processes.

The paper examines the impact of Chinese resources-for-infrastructure (R4I) swaps on the 'resource curse' in Africa, specifically analyzing mechanisms like price volatility, Dutch disease, rent-seeking, and political conflict. Through case studies of countries such as Angola, the DRC, and Ghana, the author finds that R4I swaps are neither inherently harmful nor a panacea; their developmental impact depends on the capacity of host government institutions to manage risks and opportunities.

The research finds that most African countries are unlikely to meet the World Bank's target of reducing extreme poverty to below 3% by 2030. Using the International Futures (IFs) model, the authors argue for a more achievable continental goal of reducing extreme poverty to below 20% by 2030 and below 3% by 2063. The paper emphasizes that poverty reduction requires a combination of pro-poor economic growth, social assistance, human development, and progressive social change, noting that policies must be tailored to individual country contexts due to varying initial conditions and poverty gaps.

The paper argues that elections in Africa often trigger instability because they are primarily viewed as a means of accessing state resources. It suggests that stability requires 'inclusive political settlements' and a move away from 'electoral autocracy' where elections are used to consolidate power. The author emphasizes the need for credible Election Management Bodies (EMBs), legitimate domestic observation, and inclusive mediation mechanisms involving civil society and traditional leaders to prevent violence.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a US-Africa trade agreement established in 2001 that provides duty-free access to the US market for qualifying sub-Saharan African states. While exports from AGOA countries to the US grew by 78% between 2001 and 2014, the trade is heavily dominated by energy and commodities, with mineral fuels and oils accounting for 68% of imports. South Africa is a primary beneficiary, contributing an estimated 62,395 jobs and exporting high-end manufactured goods such as vehicles, unlike many other AGOA partners who rely on raw materials.