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In 2025, solar and wind power expanded fast enough to outpace global electricity demand growth for the first time over a sustained period. Solar growth accelerated in Africa and Central Europe, while BRICS nations now generate over half of global solar power. The rise of 'electrotech'—led by China—and falling battery costs are enabling fossil-free baseload power and supporting the energy demands of AI and data centres.

The paper argues that while West Africa possesses over 300 Tcf of proven gas reserves, regional prosperity is hindered by regulatory fragmentation, bilateral financing that bypasses regional coordination, and global decarbonization risks. It recommends the adoption of a binding regional gas code, the creation of a 5 billion USD Gas Infrastructure Development Fund, and the establishment of a West African Gas Task Force to align national and external investments with a 10-year regional roadmap.

The study finds a substantial disconnect between African climate commitments (NDCs) and national development blueprints (NDPs), with NDCs focusing on climate-centric sectors like energy and forestry while NDPs prioritize economic growth, finance, and the private sector. This 'parallel policy framework' is driven by institutional fragmentation, where NDCs are often externally funded and led by environment ministries, whereas NDPs are domestically anchored and led by economic planning ministries. The authors recommend a 'whole-of-government' approach to embed climate goals into national budgets and development strategies to maximize socio-economic co-benefits.

The handbook traces G20 engagements with Africa from 2008 to 2025, noting a transition from ad hoc initiatives to structured partnerships, culminating in the African Union's permanent membership in 2023. While identifying successes in rural youth employment and financial inclusion, it highlights persistent implementation gaps in infrastructure and climate finance. The document maps G20 outcomes against AU Agenda 2063, finding strong alignment with economic integration but gaps in peace and institutional capacity. It also details South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency priorities, focusing on solidarity, equality, and sustainability through specific task forces on inclusive growth, food security, and AI.

Nigeria holds 33 percent of Africa's gas reserves and is implementing the 'Decade of Gas' (2021-2030) to transition toward a gas-powered economy. While the country is a top global LNG exporter, it faces significant internal challenges, including high gas flaring (188 Bcf in 2022), inadequate pipeline infrastructure, and poor payment discipline in the power sector. The document argues that natural gas can serve as a bridge fuel toward Nigeria's net-zero 2060 goal and a catalyst for African industrialization in sectors like fertilizers and petrochemicals. However, the global energy transition is leading International Oil Companies (IOCs) to divest from onshore assets, and geopolitical instability—specifically Niger's 2023 coup—threatens major cross-border projects like the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline.

The document evaluates the ECOWAS free movement framework, noting its success in facilitating intra-regional mobility while highlighting significant barriers such as insecurity, protectionist national policies, and the recent withdrawal of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The document examines how the lack of a harmonised digital identification system in West Africa hindered the free movement of people and goods during the Ebola epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic. It proposes that the ECOWAS Commission create a framework for digital ID interoperability and a 'health passport' linked to digital IDs to prevent future border closures and economic disruptions. The author suggests leveraging existing initiatives like the ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card (ENBIC) and the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion (WURI), while drawing on successful regional models from the EU's Digital COVID Certificate and ASEAN's Universal Verification Mechanism. The paper specifically recommends that the West African Health Organization (WAHO) lead the digital health trust initiative and that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) be included in the network to ensure regional health security.

The document examines how the lack of harmonised digital identification and health information exchange systems in West Africa hindered the ECOWAS free movement regime during the Ebola epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic. It proposes integrating vaccine certification with foundational digital IDs—such as the ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card (ENBIC) and the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion (WURI) initiative—to create a 'health passport'. Drawing on examples from the EU's Digital COVID Certificate and ASEAN's Universal Verification Mechanism, the author recommends that the ECOWAS Commission and the West African Health Organization (WAHO) develop a regional digital health certification framework that includes members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to ensure comprehensive regional health security.

The document examines the critical infrastructure gaps in West Africa, highlighting how deficiencies in energy, transport, digital connectivity, and water management hinder economic growth and the goals of ECOWAS's Vision 2050. It details specific initiatives like the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway and the West African Power Pool (WAPP), while identifying barriers such as corruption, regulatory fragmentation, and a regional infrastructure funding gap estimated between USD 20 billion and USD 36 billion per year. The paper advocates for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), innovative financing like green bonds, and the inclusion of youth and SMEs to drive sustainable development.

The document analyzes Nigeria's climate policy through four 'policy moments', highlighting a persistent struggle with institutional overlap and fragmented governance. It examines how internal competition between bodies like the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC) and the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (OSPEC) dilutes Nigeria's international bargaining power. The paper also discusses the impact of global energy market shifts, the divestment of onshore assets by International Oil Companies (IOCs), and the challenges of removing fuel subsidies. It concludes that Nigeria must move away from transplanting foreign institutional models and instead develop a domestically driven, streamlined framework that integrates the petroleum sector into its climate goals.

Nigeria's climate agenda is hampered by overlapping institutions and a lack of elite consensus, which diminishes its bargaining power internationally. While the Tinubu administration has attempted to centralize governance through the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (OSPEC) and the Presidential Climate Action Committee (PCAC), these moves risk further fragmentation by sidelining statutory bodies like the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC). Externally, Nigeria faces declining oil exports to China and India and increased competition from the US in European markets, intensifying the need for a successful energy transition. The report highlights a trend of International Oil Companies (IOCs) divesting from onshore assets due to regulatory instability, while noting that agile local firms are better positioned to navigate domestic complexities.

As of 31 August 2025, the GCF has a total pledged amount of USD 30 billion and has committed USD 18 billion to 314 projects across 133 countries. The portfolio is split between adaptation (58% in grant-equivalent terms) and mitigation (42%). The Fund's accredited entity network consists of 153 entities, 66% of which are direct access entities. The Readiness Programme portfolio has grown to USD 749.1 million. The current pipeline includes 142 concept notes and 66 funding proposals requesting a combined USD 12.3 billion in GCF financing, which exceeds the projected commitment authority for 2026–2027. The Secretariat is implementing pipeline optimization measures to retire inactive proposals and align with the 2024–2027 Strategic Plan.

The report argues that tropical forests should be central to climate strategies, moving from being viewed as a risk to a solution. It analyzes 91 countries, categorizing them by forest cover and deforestation rates, and concludes that forest protection and restoration are compatible with economic growth. To address the funding gap for restoration, the authors propose the Reversing Deforestation Mechanism (RDM), a jurisdictional, results-based payment system for net carbon removals. RDM is designed to complement existing tools like JREDD+ and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). Simulations suggest that at a carbon price of US$ 50 per ton, RDM could generate significant annual revenues and remove up to 2 GtCO2 per year globally in its early stages.

IREN Agri is a blended debt fund designed to support climate-smart agriculture in West Africa, starting with a cocoa-focused pilot in Côte d’Ivoire. The vehicle combines medium-term loans, multi-year offtake agreements, and digital technical assistance via the SUTTI platform to reduce investor risk and improve smallholder resilience. The fund aims to scale from a EUR 12.5 million pilot to a EUR 100 million fund by 2028, targeting a serviceable obtainable market of over EUR 500 million across six West African countries.

The report examines the role of securitisation in developing African capital markets, noting that while South Africa has a mature market, other sub-Saharan regions remain nascent. It identifies significant barriers, including fragmented legal and tax frameworks, a lack of a 'ratings culture', and limited understanding among financial institutions. Despite these challenges, the study finds a substantial supply of securitisable assets in banking, microfinance, and fintech sectors. It recommends a holistic regulatory approach, the use of anchor investors from DFIs and MDBs, and the adoption of scalable structures like warehouse facilities to mobilise private capital and bridge the private credit gap.

The report examines eight innovative financial instruments—including the Adaptation Benefit Mechanism, biodiversity credits, carbon taxes, carbon trading, credit guarantees, debt-for-nature/climate resilience swaps, pooled investment funds, and sovereign green/sustainability-linked bonds—to bridge the climate finance gap in developing countries. It identifies common barriers such as limited institutional capacity, lack of robust project pipelines, and underdeveloped local capital markets. The document emphasizes that while these instruments can signal a government's commitment to climate action, their success depends on a supportive enabling environment characterized by effective leadership, clear taxonomies, and robust climate data. For least developed countries (LDCs), the report suggests a phased approach, first strengthening basic financial and legal prerequisites before focusing on 'climate investability'. It concludes with specific recommendations for donors and development partners to provide technical assistance, anchor investments, and pilot projects to scale up private sector mobilization.

This report examines a toolkit of regulatory and economic policy instruments used to curb deforestation and promote forest restoration in tropical regions. It analyzes the effectiveness of command-and-control measures, financial incentives, and the critical role of land tenure security, while highlighting how political cycles and electoral incentives create risks for long-term conservation success.

The document analyzes the operational resurgence of IS-WAP, highlighting its use of surveillance and combat drones, its 'Burning of the camps' campaign targeting military bases, and its logistical ties with IS-SP. It argues that a deteriorating regional security architecture, exacerbated by political instability in Niger and the withdrawal of foreign troops, is facilitating the expansion of militant Islamist groups across the Sahel and towards coastal West African states.

The report identifies a significant 'take-off' in solar panel imports to Africa, with imports from China rising 60% to 15,032 MW in the 12 months to June 2025. This growth is widespread, with 20 countries setting new import records and 25 countries importing at least 100 MW. The report suggests this surge may be driven by distributed solar, potentially replacing expensive diesel generation and significantly increasing electricity supply in several countries, such as Sierra Leone and Chad.

The study finds that unreliable power supply in Benin forces businesses to invest in defensive measures, with extra costs accounting for 44% of total electricity expenditures. These costs, primarily driven by power generator operations, push an additional 5% of businesses into a state of 'electricity burden' (spending >10% of revenue on power). The burden is most prevalent among informal businesses, home-based enterprises, and those in the production sector.