Search Climate Insights Directory

The report argues that tax incentives for critical mineral value addition are secondary to primary non-tax enablers such as infrastructure, regulatory stability, and clear national strategies. It analyzes the value chains of copper, lithium, and nickel, noting that while production-based, cost-based, and profit-based tax incentives can attract investment, they risk revenue loss if projects are not commercially viable. The document highlights varied national approaches, such as Indonesia's nickel export bans and Australia's production tax credits, and recommends rigorous financial modelling to ensure that downstream incentives do not result in a net loss of government revenue compared to raw ore exports.

The report argues that fiscal incentives are secondary to 'primary' non-fiscal conditions—such as stable regulatory frameworks, reliable energy and transport infrastructure, and clear national strategies—which are essential for the commercial viability of mineral processing. Using case studies from countries like Indonesia, Australia, and Zambia, it examines tools such as variable royalty rates, investment tax credits, and export restrictions. It warns that without rigorous economic modelling, policies like export bans or tax holidays can lead to significant revenue losses, deterred investment, or the support of commercially unviable projects.

The document identifies a significant funding and deployment gap for carbon removal, estimating a need for at least 100 megatons per annum (Mtpa) and $20 billion per year by 2035. It proposes a government-led Advance Market Commitment (AMC) as a mechanism to guarantee future markets, reduce costs through economies of scale, and harmonize global standards. The paper provides a design framework for such an AMC, covering product eligibility, procurement processes, and cross-border funding, while outlining the complementary roles of corporations, philanthropy, NGOs, and academia.

The policy brief addresses the lack of a shared vision for implementing Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, which calls for making financial flows consistent with climate goals. It argues that current efforts are fragmented and risks of greenwashing are high. The authors propose a Theory of Change (ToC) to link high-level goals to specific activities across regulators, financial entities, the real economy, and civil society. The document emphasizes that while Article 9 focuses on the provision of public climate finance from developed to developing nations, Article 2.1(c) requires systemic reforms—such as climate-related financial disclosures, taxonomies, and fiscal policy changes—to redirect the broader global financial system. It concludes with recommendations for the COP30 (CMA7) to adopt a structured work program based on this ToC to avoid circular discussions and ensure a just transition.

The document details Project Catalyst, a partnership launched in 2009 by WWF-Australia and The Coca-Cola Foundation to implement sustainable sugarcane farming practices in Queensland. The project focuses on reducing nitrogen run-off, which contributes to Crown of Thorns starfish outbreaks and coral deterioration. Since 2019, the initiative has prevented 36.2 metric tons of dissolved inorganic nitrogen from entering the Great Barrier Reef across the Wet Tropics, Burdekin, and Mackay Whitsunday regions.

The report identifies a significant global health and economic toll from red and processed meat consumption, which is linked to type II diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer. It highlights a 'treatment-over-prevention' trend in wealthy nations, particularly in Europe, where robust healthcare systems mitigate disease outcomes at a high financial cost. The authors argue that implementing fiscal policies and dietary interventions to reduce meat intake could save billions in healthcare spending and significantly reduce premature mortality and disability.

The report finds that while CETP members reduced international fossil fuel finance by up to 78% to USD 4.7 billion in 2024, the scale-up of clean energy finance remains slow, with only USD 3.2 billion in increases compared to 2019–2021. It highlights that less than one-fifth of funds shifted from fossil fuels were redirected to clean energy and calls for a collective target of at least USD 42 billion for clean energy finance in emerging markets and developing economies.

The report examines Nigeria's potential to leverage its critical mineral deposits—including lithium, cobalt, and copper—to drive economic diversification and meet climate goals. It identifies significant gaps in exploration funding, processing infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks, while highlighting the risk of over-dependence on foreign investors like China. The document recommends a comprehensive national strategy, increased investment in geological mapping, and the development of domestic value-addition capabilities to move beyond the export of raw materials.

Chile faces significant renewable energy curtailment due to limited transmission and storage capacity, with 5,642 GWh of solar and wind energy curtailed in 2024. The report recommends a National Curtailment Reduction Plan, the mass installation of Dynamic Line Rating (DLR) systems, minimum storage requirements for new projects in congested areas, and the creation of a formal demand response market. It also suggests strengthening electricity exchange markets with Argentina and Peru to improve system flexibility.

Chile faces significant energy curtailments due to transmission bottlenecks and a lack of system flexibility, with 2024 curtailments reaching 19% of solar and wind generation. The document argues that while large infrastructure projects like the Kimal-Lo Aguirre line are planned for 2029, immediate action is needed through a 'Clean Flexibility Kit' including battery storage, Dynamic Line Rating (DLR), and demand response markets. It compares Chile's situation with other high-renewable systems like China, Ireland, and California to provide a roadmap of short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations to improve grid efficiency and reduce economic losses for investors.

The Hail Creek coal mine in Australia's Bowen Basin has consistently underreported methane emissions since 2021, with independent airborne studies estimating emissions to be four to six times higher than official figures in 2022 and 2023. Major steel companies ArcelorMittal, Nippon Steel, and POSCO imported at least 4.3 Mt of coal from the mine in 2023 and 2024, potentially importing more than three times the methane emissions reported by the operator. This underreporting creates regulatory risks under the EU Methane Regulation, as actual methane intensity in 2023 (exceeding 9.5 tonnes CH4/kt) likely surpasses proposed EU limits, whereas reported data (4.8 tonnes CH4/kt) suggests compliance.

The report argues that major steel companies, including ArcelorMittal, Nippon Steel, and POSCO, overlook methane emissions from coal mining in their Scope 3 disclosures. It highlights that these emissions, particularly from 'gassiest' Australian mines, significantly increase the climate impact of blast furnace-based steelmaking and are not mitigated by downstream technologies like hydrogen injection or CCUS.

The report finds that methane from Australian coking coal adds an average of 10-17% to the short-term climate impact of blast furnace-based steelmaking, with some 'super-emitting' mines potentially doubling this impact. It highlights significant underreporting of methane emissions in Australia, specifically citing the Hail Creek mine, and notes that leading steelmakers like ArcelorMittal, Nippon Steel, and POSCO fail to disclose the methane footprint of their coal supplies. The document argues that cutting coal mine methane is a cost-effective near-term decarbonisation step, as over half of these emissions are avoidable using existing technology.

The report argues that methane emissions from coking coal mining are a significant but under-accounted 'blind spot' in the steel industry's climate impact. It highlights that coking coal is more methane-intensive than thermal coal and that Australian mines, which supply over half of the global seaborne coking coal market, consistently underreport these emissions. Using IEA data and GWP20 metrics, the report estimates that mining emissions can add 10% to 17% to the emission intensity of blast furnace steel, with some 'gassiest' mines potentially doubling the climate footprint. It concludes that nearly half of these emissions could be abated using existing technologies at a cost lower than the market price of Australian Carbon Credit Units.

ClientEarth advocates for the UK government to mandate the development, disclosure, and implementation of transition plans aligned with the Paris Agreement. The organization argues that a 'comply or explain' framework is insufficient and that mandatory requirements are necessary to prevent 'greenwashing' and 'say-do gaps'. It specifically highlights the need for pension schemes to manage systemic climate risk through Paris-aligned anchors and robust stewardship. ClientEarth further asserts that legal risks for directors are often overstated due to the 'dishonesty standard' in English law, and that alignment with the 1.5°C goal is essential for the UK to fulfill its international obligations following the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion.

The briefing argues that nuclear power is an impractical solution for near-term climate targets in Europe and Australia due to systemic delays, high costs, and a high rate of project cancellations. In Europe, utility-scale wind and solar capacity under construction or in pre-construction outweighs nuclear by fourteen to one, and solar generation surpassed nuclear in the EU for the first time in mid-2025. In Australia, the document concludes that nuclear is unlikely to replace coal by 2038 because construction timelines—estimated by CSIRO to be at least five years longer than the global average—would require groundbreaking by the end of 2025. Globally, the Global Nuclear Power Tracker indicates that 38% of all proposed nuclear capacity (566 GW) has been cancelled.

The Production Gap Report 2025 finds that governments are collectively planning more fossil fuel production than in 2023, with 2030 projected levels exceeding 1.5°C-consistent pathways by over 120%. While some countries are developing net-zero aligned scenarios, most continue to expand production and provide substantial financial support for fossil fuels, undermining Paris Agreement commitments.

The report finds that while CETP signatories have significantly reduced international public finance for fossil fuels, this has not been matched by a corresponding increase in clean energy support. It highlights ongoing policy violations by several high-income countries and the risk of backsliding due to political shifts, particularly the United States' exit from the partnership in February 2025. The authors recommend a joint quantitative target of at least USD 42 billion per year for clean energy in emerging markets and developing economies by 2026.

The document analyzes the shift in international trade from a focus on liberalization toward 'multipurpose' approaches driven by geopolitics and national security. It argues that this complexity provides opportunities to embed nature and climate goals into trade agendas. The author proposes a new paradigm that reframes trade as a strategic tool for sustainability, emphasizing a 'nature-positive' narrative and the integration of climate mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Key recommendations include reorienting trade rules to reward sustainable production, scaling the diffusion of green technologies, and ensuring that developing countries are not unfairly burdened by environmental requirements. The paper identifies multiple entry points for action, including WTO reform, regional agreements like AfCFTA, and the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.

The report advocates for Australia to set a 2035 emissions reduction target of at least 75% below 2005 levels, aligning with a 1.5°C pathway. It argues that such a target provides the predictability businesses need for capital allocation and infrastructure investment, while mitigating risks associated with fossil fuel dependence. The authors propose a comprehensive implementation framework including sectoral pathways, a National Climate Investment and Accountability Council, and blended finance platforms to drive the transition.