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The European Union's projected hydrogen demand is expected to rise from 8.3 Mtpy to over 60 Mtpy by 2050, with the World Energy Council estimating that 50% of this demand must be met through imports from regions such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the U.S. To ensure these imports are climate-beneficial, the Clean Air Task Force (CATF) advocates for a certification system that measures greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the entire value chain—including production, storage, transport, and conversion—rather than focusing solely on production facilities. The document highlights a regulatory gap, noting that the Gas Package's delegated act for GHG emissions methodology is not planned until 31 December 2024, which lags behind current market activities and Memoranda of Understanding. CATF recommends that the EU adopt a technology-inclusive approach covering renewable and low-carbon hydrogen (including blue hydrogen), incorporate stringent methane leakage criteria, and align its methodology with the Methane Regulation's monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements by 2027.

The European Union faces a significant hydrogen supply gap, with demand projected to rise from 8.3 million tonnes per year to over 60 million tonnes by 2050, necessitating imports from regions such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the USA. The Clean Air Task Force argues that current certification efforts are often voluntary or too narrow, focusing only on production plants rather than the full value chain. To avoid market uncertainty and investment risks, the document recommends that the EU's 'Gas Package' and subsequent delegated acts establish a technology-neutral certification methodology. This methodology must employ a full life-cycle analysis (LCA) that includes upstream methane leaks, transport, storage, and distribution to ensure genuine greenhouse gas reductions.

The statement urges national governments to align their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with the IPCC 1.5°C report, specifically calling for peaking emissions by 2020 and reaching net zero by 2050. It highlights the existing commitments of non-state actors—including over 900 companies, 9,000 cities, and hundreds of investors—as evidence that a zero-carbon transition is possible. The signatories demand specific policy interventions, including carbon pricing between US$40-100/tCO2-e by 2030, the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies, and the implementation of TCFD financial reporting recommendations by 2020.

The report outlines a variety of passive and active cooling strategies for urban environments, ranging from nature-based solutions like tree planting and green roofs to technical interventions such as cool pavements and district cooling systems. It emphasizes the importance of integrated urban planning, the implementation of Heat Action Plans to protect vulnerable populations, and the use of diverse policy incentives and business models to scale these solutions.

The report argues that Eskom is facing a liquidity and financial crisis driven by stagnant electricity demand and the high costs of its coal-fired power construction programme. Through system-level modelling and station-specific analysis, the study finds that the levelised costs of operating older coal stations (Arnot, Camden, Grootvlei, Hendrina, and Komati) exceed their system alternative value, meaning they can be replaced by cheaper alternatives without compromising security of supply. Specifically, decommissioning Grootvlei, Hendrina, and Komati early could save Eskom R12.5bn in present value terms. Additionally, the report finds that cancelling Kusile units 5 and 6 is economically viable if capital cost savings exceed a threshold of approximately R4.7bn. The authors conclude that South Africa no longer requires new nuclear, coal, or gas procurement, as solar PV and wind have become the most competitive new-build options.

The report identifies a portfolio of low-carbon opportunities for the European steel sector, ranging from energy efficiency and fuel shifting to breakthrough technologies like Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) and increased recycling. It argues that current EU ETS mechanisms, particularly free allocation based on historic volumes, fail to provide sufficient incentives for deep decarbonisation and high-value product innovation. The authors recommend a structural reform of leakage protection, specifically proposing a combination of output-based allocation and the inclusion of consumption in the EU ETS to create a credible business case for breakthrough technologies and material efficiency. The report also emphasizes the need for sustained public funding for process innovation to overcome the 'valley of death' in technology scaling and suggests strengthening links between steel producers and downstream consumers, particularly in the automotive and construction sectors, to drive demand for lightweight, high-strength steels.

The report identifies seven primary and secondary barriers to institutional impact investing, including a shortage of attractive deals, lack of track records, and limited exit options. It suggests that governments can mitigate these by strengthening the investment pipeline through technical assistance and seed funding, and by promoting blended capital arrangements. The authors propose the National Impact Investment Readiness Assessment (NIIRA) tool to help investors and policy-makers evaluate the quality and scalability of a country's impact investment pipeline. A case study of India illustrates the role of pioneering firms like Aavishkaar and IntelleGrow in building a supportive entrepreneurial ecosystem.

The document asserts that limiting global warming to 2° Celsius requires significant innovation in technologies and processes to reduce costs and improve performance. It highlights the role of public climate finance in attracting private investment and suggests that the UAE can lead an expanded international innovation system through cooperation in areas such as joint research, capacity building, and the support of innovation hubs like IRENA and Masdar.

The authors argue that current community-scale emissions targets, such as 80% reductions by 2050, do not account for the UNFCCC principle of "common but differentiated responsibility." By applying the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) framework to Seattle, the study finds that an equitable global obligation would require the city to become carbon "negative" before 2020. This does not imply physical sequestration but rather a role where wealthy cities dramatically reduce their own emissions while financing low-carbon transitions in developing regions. The paper suggests that communities can use offsets or direct technology and financial transfers to meet these obligations and recommends that local governments integrate global equity into their official climate action plans.

The EU steel sector, which contributes 5% of the region's annual CO2 emissions, faces significant technical and economic hurdles in its transition to net zero. While hydrogen-based DRI is a prominent pathway, its scalability is limited by the massive requirements for renewable electricity and low-carbon hydrogen. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is presented as a complementary, potentially lower-cost near-term solution for both blast furnace and DRI plants. The report concludes that a portfolio of technologies is necessary to mitigate risks and ensure the industry's survival, supported by carbon pricing, border adjustments, and demand-side policies.

The document outlines the structure of COP28, including its constituent meetings (COP28, CMA5, CMP18, SBI 59, and SBSTA 59) and the three main goals of the Paris Agreement: limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, adapting to climate change, and aligning finance flows. It details the thematic program from November 30 to December 12, 2023, the role of the Youth Climate Champion, and the significance of the first-ever Global Stocktake, which found the world is far from achieving Paris Agreement goals. The text also describes the distinction between the Blue Zone for negotiations and the Green Zone for public engagement.

The author argues that while the 2022 WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies ('Fish 1') was a historic first step in banning the most harmful subsidies, it is insufficient to address structural causes of overfishing. The upcoming MC14 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, is presented as a vital opportunity to commit to 'Fish 2'—additional disciplines targeting general overcapacity. This is urgent because a 'termination clause' threatens to void the entire 2022 agreement by September 2029 if comprehensive disciplines are not adopted. The document highlights that global fisheries subsidies exceeded USD 35 billion in 2018, with over 80% benefiting industrial fleets, thereby undermining ocean sustainability and the livelihoods of coastal and island developing states.

The document analyzes the tension between the WTO's multilateral and plurilateral paths for regulating digital trade. It focuses on the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (WPEC), the ongoing moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, and the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on E-commerce. The author highlights the divide between developed nations seeking permanent rules and developing nations concerned about the digital divide and loss of tariff revenue, noting that decisions at MC14 in March 2026 will shape global digital governance.

The IISD-Europe program on sustainable procurement provides policy advisory and research services to scale up green industrial growth through "whole life value" procurement. The institute advises governments on Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), and leads the International Initiative on Procurement and Green Growth. IISD argues that because public procurement accounts for 12–15 per cent of GDP in the EU and US, governments can use their purchasing power to trigger markets for sustainable goods and services and incentivize private sector investment in green technology.