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CDM Watch argues that despite mandates from decision 2/CMP.5 to improve transparency and stakeholder communication, existing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) procedures create significant obstacles that prevent effective public participation in a manner consistent with international law and the Kyoto Protocol.

The document argues that transparency and high-quality data are essential for governments to prioritize and monitor the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies, which otherwise undermine climate and energy security goals. It proposes a two-track strategy involving both domestic improvements in accounting and the creation of an international data-management regime.

The report argues that fossil-fuel subsidies lock economies into carbon reliance, exacerbate greenhouse gas emissions, and divert funds from social services. It concludes that while reform is politically difficult due to interest group influence and administrative path dependence, it would lead to aggregate GDP increases and significant CO2 reductions. The document emphasizes that transparency—both through improved national accounting and a new international reporting regime—is essential for successful de-subsidization. It provides a framework for reform based on research, clear objectives, coherent policy design, and the prevention of backsliding through independent pricing bodies.

The document reports on a February 2010 roundtable discussing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It highlights the mechanism's success in attracting 30 member states and producing 12 comprehensive Country Review Reports (CRRs) that diagnose governance failures. However, it identifies critical weaknesses, including a 'crisis of leadership', insufficient funding, and a lack of systematic implementation of National Programmes of Action (NPoAs). The discussion emphasizes the need for greater transparency in the Panel of Eminent Persons and more robust civil society engagement to ensure the APRM's long-term credibility and impact.

The document examines the risks and opportunities associated with Ghana's transition to an oil-producing nation. While Ghana has a strong record of democratic transitions and a vocal civil society, it faces challenges including a lack of absorptive capacity for sudden revenue increases, delays in passing oil revenue management legislation, and a history of local communities receiving few benefits from the mining and timber sectors. The author argues that oil alone will not drive structural economic change and recommends the establishment of stabilisation and heritage funds, the use of associated gas to fuel industrial policy and agriculture, and increased transparency in contract negotiations to prevent elite capture and social unrest.

The document identifies the need to translate political calls for the phasing out of fossil-fuel subsidies, such as those from the G-20, into coherent action through a multilateral program. It references research from the GSI and support from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) regarding the role of transparency in accelerating these reforms.

The paper examines the 'resource curse'—the tendency for resource-rich countries to experience low economic growth—through centralised and decentralised political economy models. It argues that the curse is not inevitable but depends on the presence of 'impartiality-enhancing institutions' that curb favouritism and rent-seeking. The authors critique current donor initiatives, such as the EITI and Norway's Oil for Development programme, for focusing too narrowly on revenue transparency and technical capacity rather than the broader institutional reforms and societal accountability required to address the root causes of the curse.

The paper examines the failure of structural adjustment programs and subsequent 'good governance' initiatives in Africa. It posits that the tension between formal institutional norms and informal neo-patrimonial practices—where leaders prioritize clients over the general public—has led to state decay. The author argues that for governance to be effective, it must be conceptualized locally, integrating informal realities into development plans rather than merely replicating Western models of transparency and accountability.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) failed to spark a national conversation in South Africa due to the government's determination to dominate the process and a systemic failure to engage the media. The author argues that the review process was centralised within the office of Public Service and Administration Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, which marginalised civil society and led to a Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) that reflected government views rather than a broad public consensus. While the Sunday Times provided consistent coverage, it faced hostility from the government when reporting on the findings of the Eminent Persons Panel, which contradicted official narratives on issues like crime and child safety. The paper concludes that for the APRM to be an effective vehicle for policy development, it requires greater transparency, a separation of the Focal Point and National Governing Council (NGC) chair roles, and a responsive media strategy from the APRM Secretariat.

The author argues that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in South Africa missed a critical opportunity for public engagement because the government, specifically through the office of Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, centralized and dominated the process. This centralization marginalized civil society and the media, leading to a lack of transparency and public interest. The paper highlights the tension between the Sunday Times, which attempted critical coverage of the process, and the government, which reacted defensively to reports on national failures such as crime and child safety. It concludes that for the APRM to be an effective policy tool, governments must adopt a less defensive posture, ensure genuine transparency, and actively engage the media to translate complex reports into public-interest news.

The paper examines the requirements for effective anti-corruption systems, particularly in new democracies and developing countries. It argues against relying solely on a single anti-corruption agency, suggesting instead a matrix of legal and oversight institutions. The author emphasizes that political will and ethical leadership are the most difficult but essential components for success. The text highlights the role of data in targeting resources and the importance of a partnership approach, citing South Africa's National Anti-Corruption Forum as an example, while cautioning that such partnerships must not undermine the ability of civil society to hold the government accountable.

The paper examines the requirements for sustainable anti-corruption reforms, emphasizing that single-agency approaches are often insufficient. It advocates for a matrix of legal and supervisory institutions, the use of objective institutional audits like the Global Integrity Index, and the necessity of political will to prevent the weaponization of anti-corruption efforts against political opponents. The author highlights the role of civil society and independent media in maintaining accountability and provides examples of both successful and failed initiatives in South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria.

The document outlines how civil society organizations (CSOs) can move beyond the perception of parliaments as rubber-stamp bodies to actively influence policy. It emphasizes the importance of understanding electoral systems—noting that single-member districts often produce more independent legislators—and the necessity of providing non-partisan, evidence-based information to resource-constrained parliamentarians. The author advocates for building long-term relationships with 'champions' within the ruling party, maintaining organizational transparency to ensure credibility, and using media and public pressure to support legislative goals.

The report details the struggle of the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) to integrate transparency and anti-corruption safeguards into South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process. Despite facing government attempts to control the process and exclude specialized NGOs, ODAC successfully lobbied for the inclusion of access to information and whistleblower protection in the final Plan of Action (PA). The document highlights systemic issues in the South African process, including the over-representation of government officials in the National Governance Council and the opaque nature of final document revisions.

The briefing argues that Global Environmental Governance (GEG) suffers from financial inefficiency and a lack of transparency, as there is no centralized system to track how environmental funds are allocated. To resolve this, the authors propose the Global Environmental Financing Tracking (GEFT) Register, a voluntary, web-based information system modeled after the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Financial Tracking Service. The GEFT Register would allow donors and recipients to report financial flows, which would then be tagged by issue, source, and recipient. The authors suggest that the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) host the register and produce an annual report to identify funding trends and gaps. The goal is to better match funding supply with demand, improve donor visibility, and rationalize investment portfolios to ensure resources are used more effectively to address global environmental challenges.

The document analyzes how international investment agreements (IIAs) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms interact with human rights obligations. It finds that most IIAs are silent on human rights, and the current ad hoc nature of investor-state arbitration creates legal uncertainty for states attempting to enact new human rights or environmental regulations. The author argues that the lack of transparency in these proceedings undermines democratic accountability and recommends the development of model clauses to protect the 'right to regulate' and ensure human rights values are embedded in investment law.

The report finds that while many governments have established legal frameworks for freedom of information, actual practice lags behind, particularly regarding proactive information release and meaningful public participation. It argues that environmental access rights are human rights and that their implementation improves the legitimacy and quality of environmental decisions. The document identifies hurdles such as vested interests and lack of capacity, and provides recommendations for governments and advocates to foster a culture of openness and accountability in environmental governance.

The document outlines proposed revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to ensure that investor-State arbitrations—defined as those brought by an investor against a State under a treaty—are subject to greater public oversight without affecting other types of arbitrations. The proposals focus on four key areas: public notification of the initiation of arbitration, public disclosure of pleadings and open hearings, public access to final decisions, and the right for non-disputing parties to file amicus curiae briefs.

The document examines the 'resource curse' in Africa, focusing on how corruption in the mining and oil sectors undermines human development. It contrasts 'state-centred' theories of corruption with 'corporate corruption' and 'state capture,' where companies illicitly influence policy. The author argues that transparency initiatives like the EITI are only partial solutions and that litigation is often hindered by political will and complex international contracts. The paper concludes that combating corruption must be balanced with broader goals of social justice and environmental protection to truly benefit African citizens.

The policy brief by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) proposes specific amendments to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to distinguish 'State arbitrations' from private commercial ones. The authors argue that because State arbitrations often involve public funds, governmental misconduct, and critical public policy issues—such as drinking water systems or hazardous waste bans—they require higher standards of transparency. The brief proposes revisions to four articles to ensure public notice of proceedings, open hearings, public access to awards and documents, and the explicit ability for tribunals to accept amicus curiae briefs.