Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa

The document examines the 'resource curse' in Africa, focusing on how corruption in the mining and oil sectors undermines human development. It contrasts 'state-centred' theories of corruption with 'corporate corruption' and 'state capture,' where companies illicitly influence policy. The author argues that transparency initiatives like the EITI are only partial solutions and that litigation is often hindered by political will and complex international contracts. The paper concludes that combating corruption must be balanced with broader goals of social justice and environmental protection to truly benefit African citizens.

• The 'resource curse' or 'paradox of plenty' describes how natural resource dependence in developing countries is often linked to poor economic growth, inequality, and civil conflict, with corruption identified as a primary driver.
• The 'rentier state' model suggests that when rulers rely on undisclosed resource rents rather than taxation, they become detached from citizens, weaken democratic institutions, and use resource wealth to maintain political hegemony through patronage.
• Corruption in the extractive industries is categorized into 'administrative corruption' (bribes to break existing rules) and 'state capture' (where companies illicitly change laws and regulations to their own benefit).
• In Angola, the rentier effect is evidenced by extreme poverty and inequality despite massive oil revenues; between 1997 and 2002, 'unaccounted for funds' from the oil industry reached US$4.22 billion.
• Mining activities pose significant ecological threats, with the World Resource Institute reporting in 2003 that over 25% of the world's mines are located in or within 10 km of strictly protected areas.
• Mining companies may engage in 'localised state capture' by bribing community leaders or creating non-representative committees to secure land and consent, as seen in cases in Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria.
• Legal efforts to prosecute corruption are often ineffective due to a lack of political will in 'home' countries and the use of 'Foreign Investment Contracts' that protect companies from criminal or civil charges in host countries.
• Transparency initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) are limited because they focus on revenue flows but ignore the political economy of corruption, such as conflicts of interest and state capture.
• There is a tension between an 'orthodox' view of anti-corruption, which aims to facilitate free-market dynamics and investment, and a view that sees corruption as a threat to democratic governance and social justice.

APA

Standing, A. (2007). Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper153.pdf

Chicago

Standing, André. Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2007. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper153.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Standing |first1=André |title=Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2007 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper153.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{standing2007corruption, author = {Standing, André}, title = {{Corruption and the extractive industries in Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2007}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper153.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }