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The document highlights the potential negative economic consequences of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on Africa, particularly for least developed countries (LDCs). It warns of significant GDP and export losses, administrative barriers to market access, and a lack of concrete EU financial commitments to help African manufacturing industries decarbonize.

The document argues that current climate finance flows are insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals, with a significant gap in EMDEs and LDCs due to high capital costs and strained public finances. It proposes that G7 countries accelerate finance through blended finance, debt-for-climate swaps, and MDB reforms. Specific recommendations include establishing a global risk mitigation facility, coordinating green industrial policies to avoid protectionism, and implementing universal disaster index insurance to reduce vulnerability in emerging economies.

The document proposes a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty based on three pillars: non-proliferation (ending new exploration), fair phase-out of existing production, and a Global Just Transition. The Global Just Transition pillar focuses on enabling countries, workers, and communities to move away from fossil fuel dependence through economic diversification, the rapid deployment of renewable energy, and robust social protection. It emphasizes that wealthy nations must transition fastest and provide financial, technological, and capacity-building support to the Global South to ensure a sustainable and equitable transformation.

The document argues that BRICS failed to harness the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity for collective health diplomacy, instead relying on bilateral arrangements and national interests. Despite declarations of cooperation, there were no 'all-BRICS' partnerships for vaccine development, and the bloc experienced significant discord over the transparency and approval of vaccines like Russia's Sputnik V and India's Covaxin. The author highlights a lack of a dedicated BRICS health institution and recommends the creation of a collaborative think tank, a joint research centre, and a formal pandemic intervention protocol to move from 'vaccine nationalism' toward effective science diplomacy and technology transfer.

The European Green Deal (EGD) offers the African private sector significant opportunities in green hydrogen production and the supply of critical raw materials, driven by the EU's need for energy security and supply chain diversification. While various funding instruments like InvestEU and the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package exist, the report warns of a potential 'unequal partnership' where Africa remains a mere resource supplier. It emphasizes the need for African stakeholders to proactively engage in technology transfer and co-creation to avoid lock-in effects and ensure inclusive growth.

The document explores how the European Green Deal (EGD) creates opportunities for the African private sector, particularly in green hydrogen and critical minerals, while warning against a return to a resource-supplier relationship. It details various EU funding mechanisms, technology transfer possibilities, and capacity-building programs, providing recommendations for African governments and companies to proactively engage with the EU to ensure an equal partnership.

The document analyzes the relationship between trade and climate change in Latin America, highlighting the region's relatively low greenhouse gas emissions intensity but high vulnerability to climate hazards. It examines domestic climate commitments in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)—such as electromobility, sustainable agriculture, and circular economy initiatives—and their trade implications. The paper also assesses external pressures from trading partners, specifically the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and deforestation regulations. It concludes by recommending strengthened international cooperation, technology transfer, and the expansion of 'Aid for Trade' to support a just transition to a low-carbon economy.

The document analyzes the extreme vulnerability of CARICOM states to climate change, noting that while the region contributes only 0.33% of global greenhouse gas emissions, its key trade sectors—tourism, agriculture, and the blue economy—face existential threats. It identifies a gap in the region's trade policy, which currently lacks a clear articulation of how to serve climate resilience. The paper suggests that CARICOM can leverage its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to identify WTO negotiating priorities, such as technology transfer, climate finance, and the removal of trade barriers for environmental goods. It specifically recommends that the WTO recognize the unique vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and move beyond a developed-country agenda to support SIDS' offensive interests in carbon markets and the blue economy.

The guidelines detail the requirements for SAP funding proposals, which are designed for projects with minimal environmental and social risks and a maximum GCF funding request of USD 25 million. The document outlines a five-section proposal structure covering project summaries, detailed design, financing, investment criteria performance, and mandatory annexes. It emphasizes the need for a clear theory of change, a strong climate rationale, and evidence of country ownership and paradigm shift potential. The manual also specifies the roles of accredited entities (AEs) and executing entities (EEs), the necessity of no-objection letters from national designated authorities, and the requirement for detailed budget plans and risk assessments.

The WTO Dialogue on Plastics Pollution, launched in November 2020 and co-sponsored by 75 members, seeks to align international trade policies with global efforts to reduce plastic pollution. The Dialogue operates through three workstreams: crosscutting issues (transparency and capacity building), promoting trade in sustainable technologies and substitutes, and fostering circularity and reduction. Key priorities include improving the Harmonized System (HS) for better trade data, integrating plastic pollution into the Aid for Trade initiative, and coordinating with other international frameworks like the Basel Convention and the UNEA's legally binding instrument on plastic pollution.

The Institute for Economic Justice argues that South Africa's JETP is a flawed climate finance model that relies heavily on loans rather than grants, benefiting private Independent Power Producers (IPPs) while leaving the state with the financial risk. The author contends that the deal lacks transparency, fails to adequately fund the localization of the renewable energy value chain, and provides insufficient social security for workers in the coal belt.

The document argues that climate finance for Africa is grossly insufficient, with an estimated annual shortfall of $112 billion for the 2020-2030 period. It calls for a total commitment of $1.3 trillion from rich countries to cover adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage, while advocating for the use of natural gas as a transition fuel and the reform of the global financial architecture.

The report analyzes the African medical manufacturing landscape, highlighting a heavy reliance on imports (over 70% for health technology) and a concentration of capabilities in North Africa, South Africa, and Nigeria. It identifies critical gaps in Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) production and medical device manufacturing, while noting that vaccine production is limited to four countries. The study argues that localization is a political project requiring a shift from generic-drug business models to more complex technologies, supported by patient capital, innovative public procurement, and the establishment of specialized pharmaceutical parks. It emphasizes the need for regulatory harmonization and the development of local 'notifying bodies' for medical devices to reduce compliance costs.

The document examines how anti-fossil fuel norms—specifically the phase-out of coal, oil, and gas, the end of public financing for fossil fuels, and subsidy reform—can overlook the needs of marginalized communities and the Global South. It argues that while these norms create political momentum, they risk causing unintended inequitable consequences, such as asset stranding in developing nations, unless paired with financial support and a focus on energy access.

The document examines the intersection of global trade flows and climate change, highlighting how trade can both exacerbate emissions through 'embodied' carbon and facilitate the diffusion of green technologies. It details a variety of policy levers—including border carbon adjustments, the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the liberalization of environmental goods—that can align trade with climate goals. The brief analyzes the role of the WTO, noting that while existing rules generally allow for good-faith environmental policies, tensions arise over local content requirements and discriminatory measures. It highlights member-led initiatives like the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform group as critical paths for future cooperation, emphasizing the need for a 'just transition' for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs).

The document examines the intersection of trade, climate change, and development in Africa, advocating for a shift from a narrow 'just energy transition' to a broader 'climate-resilient development' (CRD) approach. It highlights Africa's vulnerability to climate crises and proposes strategies for green industrialization, climate-smart agriculture, and the strengthening of development finance institutions. The author critiques the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as 'green trade protectionism' and calls for a 'Global Green New Deal' based on multilateral cooperation, technology transfer, and the fulfillment of climate finance promises by developed nations.

In 2019/2020, Nigeria received an average of USD 1.9 billion annually in climate finance, representing only 11% of the USD 17.7 billion needed annually for its conditional NDC. Public finance dominated at 77% of total flows, primarily delivered as concessional debt. Mitigation finance (USD 1.1 billion) outweighed adaptation finance (USD 663 million), despite high vulnerability to climate shocks. Energy systems received the most investment, particularly solar, while sectors like waste and industrial processes remained severely underfunded. The report highlights a significant contradiction between climate finance flows and continued heavy investment in fossil fuels, noting one LNG project alone received USD 2.77 billion. Key barriers include limited private sector mobilization, capacity constraints in GHG reporting, and a lack of national climate budget tagging.

In 2019/2020, Nigeria received an average of USD 1.9 billion annually in climate finance, representing only 11% of the USD 17.7 billion needed to meet its conditional NDC target. Public finance dominated the landscape, accounting for 77% of flows, primarily through concessional debt. Mitigation finance (USD 1.1 billion) outweighed adaptation finance (USD 663 million), despite the country's high vulnerability to climate risks. Energy systems received the largest share of investment (41%), with a strong focus on solar technologies, while sectors like waste and industrial processes remained severely underfunded. The report highlights a significant contradiction between climate finance goals and continued heavy investment in fossil fuels, noting that a single LNG project received USD 2.77 billion—more than the total tracked climate finance for the period.

The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) critiques the SAREM draft for lacking definitions of 'decent work', failing to provide a robust framework for monitoring local content compliance, and ignoring the potential for a local recycling industry. The document argues that the current market-led approach risks a 'race to the bottom' on price, which undermines local manufacturing. To counter this, the IEJ recommends aggressive local content requirements (LCRs) of 50% for future public procurement, the use of import tariffs to protect nascent industry, and the provision of low-cost public debt to offset the higher costs of locally produced components. It further advocates for a Technology Transfer System (TTS) to build local technical capacity and the establishment of municipal-level recycling depots for solar PV modules to prevent environmental damage and create jobs.

The paper analyzes how regional trade agreements (RTAs) act as 'incubators' for promoting trade in environmental goods and services (EGS) in the absence of significant multilateral progress at the WTO. It examines various RTA approaches to defining EGS, implementing market access commitments, coordinating regulations, and providing support measures for developing countries. The authors highlight that RTAs often go beyond WTO rules, utilizing tools like specific EGS lists, 'ex-outs' for precise product classification, and sectoral chapters to address non-tariff barriers. These regional experiences are presented as potential models for the WTO's Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussion (TESSD) and the Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (IDP).