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The document assesses the feasibility of using domestic fiscal tools—explicit fossil fuel subsidies (EFFS) and environmental taxes—to close Africa's climate finance gap, which is estimated at 5–10% of GDP. While these tools could contribute 1.7% and 1.1% of GDP respectively, the author argues they are insufficient to fully close the gap. The paper recommends establishing independent fuel reserve authorities to manage price volatility and suggests a gradual, long-term withdrawal of subsidies to avoid social unrest and inflation. It highlights that Africa's climate finance is heavily dependent on foreign sources and public funding compared to global averages.

The West Contra Costa Unified School District (WCCUSD) has significantly increased its spending on outside contractors, with $14 million paid to three private equity-owned firms in 2024-2025, which the report argues undermines the stability and quality of support for students with disabilities.

A briefing on a workshop regarding the creation of a shared superhot rock geothermal testbed to bridge the gap between theory and deployment for high-capex geothermal innovation.

The document examines the critical infrastructure gaps in West Africa, highlighting how deficiencies in energy, transport, digital connectivity, and water management hinder economic growth and the goals of ECOWAS's Vision 2050. It details specific initiatives like the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway and the West African Power Pool (WAPP), while identifying barriers such as corruption, regulatory fragmentation, and a regional infrastructure funding gap estimated between USD 20 billion and USD 36 billion per year. The paper advocates for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), innovative financing like green bonds, and the inclusion of youth and SMEs to drive sustainable development.

The document argues that South Africa's National Treasury is incorrectly relying on austerity and claims of high statutory tax rates to justify limited public spending. It suggests that the government can increase revenue by implementing wealth taxes, recouping illicit financial flows, and reducing tax expenditures for high-income individuals and corporations. It specifically highlights the gap between statutory and effective tax rates for companies and the potential for the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) to lower borrowing costs.

The document argues that Europe must shift from a research-centric approach to a comprehensive industrial strategy for fusion energy to avoid falling behind global competitors like the US, UK, China, and Japan. It recommends that the EU's first Fusion Strategy prioritise private sector-led net energy fusion demonstration plants by the 2030s and adopt a Key Enabling Technology (KET)-based roadmap to align public funding with commercially relevant R&D. The authors propose streamlining governance by expanding the role of the Fusion for Energy (F4E) Joint Undertaking as the singular public governance body and establishing a cohesive Public-Private Partnership (PPP) programme to remove financing barriers for start-ups. Additionally, the letter calls for the explicit recognition of fusion as a strategic clean technology in EU legislation, including the Green Taxonomy and the Net Zero Industry Act, and the creation of a regulatory framework that distinguishes fusion from fission.

The briefing emphasizes that the US nuclear posture relies on a foundation of science, technology, and engineering (S&T) managed by the NNSA National Laboratories and the Department of Energy. It advocates for increased long-term investment in early-stage R&D, the modernization of aging manufacturing infrastructure through robotics and CNC, and the rebuilding of a specialized workforce. The authors suggest that the S&T base should be viewed as a tool of deterrence in itself, requiring stable funding cycles that transcend short-term political terms and expanded public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation.

The document examines the failure of uniform utility reform models in Africa, emphasizing that success depends on local context rather than ideological blueprints like privatization or cost-reflective tariffs. It contrasts the struggles of Nigeria and Ghana with the more successful, context-specific approaches in Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire, while highlighting the tension between commercial viability and poverty-driven affordability in countries like Zambia and Ethiopia.

Based on workshops in Utah and Colorado, RMI identifies sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) as the primary near-term solution for decarbonizing aviation, while hydrogen and electric propulsion require long-term infrastructure planning. The report highlights that airports are structurally limited in leading this transition because they do not control fuel demand or aircraft certification. Key recommendations include investing in pilot programs, developing long-term master plans for new propulsion technologies, and forming regional airport coalitions to share risks. A preliminary analysis suggests that regional routes under 1,000 nautical miles with aircraft under 90 seats are the most viable early candidates for hydrogen transition.

The paper examines bioeconomy implementation in Colombia, Thailand, and East Africa, highlighting a common gap between high-level strategies and ground-level execution. In Colombia, the focus is on territorial strategies and balancing biodiversity conservation with sustainable use. Thailand emphasizes a Bio-Circular-Green (BCG) model driven by Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), though it faces challenges in including artisanal bioeconomy and smallholder farmers. East Africa utilizes a regional strategy (2022–2032) focusing on circularity and value addition, but struggles with infrastructure and funding. Cross-regional findings suggest that successful implementation requires robust monitoring, tailored capacity building, diverse financial support, and inclusive governance.

The document identifies barriers preventing Indonesian local governments from accessing climate finance, such as restrictions on direct foreign funding and poor long-term financial planning. It recommends strengthening institutional capacity, improving project preparation to meet higher standards of financial viability, and utilizing blended finance and public-private partnerships to attract private investment.

International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

The document argues that G20 climate finance often prioritizes private profit over public welfare, trapping vulnerable nations in debt through loan-based funding and 'de-risking' strategies. It calls for a shift toward grant-based funding and public investment based on the 'polluter pays' principle to ensure a just energy transition.

The Climate Adaptation Plan for the Kassena Nankana Municipality provides a roadmap for addressing climate vulnerabilities in Northern Ghana. It identifies key risks—including temperature rises of 1.5C to 2.5C and erratic rainfall—and proposes prioritized interventions across agriculture, water, health, gender, and infrastructure. The plan emphasizes a blended financing approach and a participatory monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) framework to ensure sustainable and inclusive implementation.

The report identifies a significant gap in the integration of climate action within Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI), noting that while high-level executive interest exists, bureaucratic capacity and policy coherence are lacking. It highlights contradictions between Nigeria's climate commitments, such as its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) targeting a 45% emissions reduction by 2030, and its continued state-led investment in oil exploration. The document argues that the FMITI must align industrial and trade policies with environmental goals, leveraging carbon markets and public-private partnerships to transition away from fossil fuel dependence. It recommends the development of a new 'green' industrial policy and draws on South Africa's experience with the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) as a model for coordinated national strategy and international funding.

The report identifies the necessity of a high-capacity charging network—comprising private depot charging, public charging, and grid upgrades—to enable the adoption of zero-emission trucks in India. It argues that a combination of public and private finance, including blended finance and government intervention, is required to unlock capital and mitigate risks for distribution companies (DISCOMs) and charging point operators (CPOs) to meet India's 2070 net-zero goals.

The document argues that investment treaties function as 'unpriced public insurance' that shifts political and regulatory risks from private investors to host states. Unlike other de-risking tools like political risk insurance or blended finance, treaties often lack pricing mechanisms, performance benchmarks, or environmental and human rights safeguards. This creates an asymmetrical regime where host states face substantial downside risks and contingent fiscal liabilities, which can be exacerbated by large investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) awards. The authors recommend that policy-makers assess treaties alongside other risk-allocation tools, terminate redundant agreements, and coordinate across finance ministries and development banks to prevent 'double recovery' and ensure transparent risk sharing.

The document proposes a functional shift in how investment treaties are viewed, categorizing them as a form of 'unpriced public insurance' that transfers political and regulatory risks from private investors to host states. It argues that unlike other de-risking tools, treaties often lack performance conditions or sustainability safeguards, creating asymmetric financial burdens for states, particularly in the Global South. The brief recommends that policymakers evaluate treaties alongside other risk-mitigation tools to avoid redundancies and ensure that investment governance supports climate transitions and public accountability.

The document proposes a functional shift in how investment treaties are viewed, moving from legal instruments of the rule of law to economic tools of public risk absorption. It argues that these treaties often act as unpriced public insurance, transferring political and regulatory risks from private investors to host states without the conditions, pricing, or performance guarantees found in other de-risking tools. The authors recommend that policymakers evaluate treaties alongside other risk-reduction mechanisms, revise or terminate redundant agreements, and coordinate between financial institutions to avoid double indemnification and ensure equitable risk sharing.