Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme

This policy brief by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) argues that investment treaties should be reframed as public risk-allocation tools rather than mere legal instruments. The authors contend that these treaties function as a form of unpriced public insurance that transfers political and regulatory risks from foreign investors to host states, often without the conditions, pricing, or performance requirements found in other risk-reduction instruments.

• Investment treaties act as public insurance mechanisms that transfer political and regulatory risks from foreign investors to host states, often without associated costs or performance requirements.
• Unlike other risk-reduction tools such as political risk insurance or sovereign loan guarantees, investment treaties provide unconditional and automatic protection without requiring prior control, payment of premiums, or adherence to performance criteria.
• The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) architecture converts political risk into legally enforceable financial liabilities, with damages often based on speculative assessments of lost profits, which can impact the credit strength and debt of developing countries.
• Investment treaties can create redundancies and 'double compensation' when they overlap with other risk-mitigation tools, such as political risk insurance or contractual stabilization clauses, potentially leading to strategic arbitrage by investors.
• While other risk-reduction instruments (like export credit agreements) have begun integrating environmental and human rights safeguards, most investment treaties continue to provide general coverage regardless of the investor's social or environmental performance.
• The IISD recommends that policymakers evaluate investment treaties alongside other risk-allocation tools, revise or terminate those that are redundant or harmful to public finances, and coordinate between finance ministries, development banks, and insurers to ensure equitable risk sharing.

APA

Ostřanský, J., & Schaugg, L. (2025). Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf

Chicago

Ostřanský, Josef, and Lukas Schaugg. Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2025. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ostřanský |first1=Josef |last2=Schaugg |first2=Lukas |title=Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=July 2025 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{ostansk2025les, author = {Ostřanský, Josef and Schaugg, Lukas}, title = {{Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2025}, month = jul, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }