Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme

The document proposes a functional shift in how investment treaties are viewed, moving from legal instruments of the rule of law to economic tools of public risk absorption. It argues that these treaties often act as unpriced public insurance, transferring political and regulatory risks from private investors to host states without the conditions, pricing, or performance guarantees found in other de-risking tools. The authors recommend that policymakers evaluate treaties alongside other risk-reduction mechanisms, revise or terminate redundant agreements, and coordinate between financial institutions to avoid double indemnification and ensure equitable risk sharing.

• Investment treaties function as a form of unpriced public insurance that transfers political and regulatory risks from foreign investors to host states, creating an implicit financial burden.
• Unlike other risk-reduction tools such as political risk insurance or blended finance, investment treaties typically provide unconditional protection without requiring risk management behavior, payment of premiums, or adherence to environmental and human rights standards.
• The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) framework converts political risk into legally enforceable financial liabilities, with damages often based on speculative future gains, which can negatively impact the credit strength and budgets of developing countries.
• There is a risk of 'double indemnification' or strategic arbitrage when investment treaties overlap with other risk-mitigation tools, such as political risk insurance or stabilization clauses in contracts.
• The authors recommend that policymakers evaluate investment treaties as risk-allocation tools, terminate those that are redundant or counterproductive, and integrate financial impact and public interest goals into treaty reform.

APA

Ostřanský, J., & Schaugg, L. (2025). Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf

Chicago

Ostřanský, Josef, and Lukas Schaugg. Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2025. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ostřanský |first1=Josef |last2=Schaugg |first2=Lukas |title=Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=July 2025 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{ostansk2025les, author = {Ostřanský, Josef and Schaugg, Lukas}, title = {{Les traités d’investissement comme outil de répartition des risques le chaînon manquant du programme de réforme}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2025}, month = jul, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-07/investment-treaties-risk-allocation-tool-fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }