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The report provides a comprehensive overview of the climate finance landscape in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, detailing the mechanisms used to fund climate action. It analyzes the roles of multilateral funds (such as the GCF and GEF), bilateral aid, national budgets, and emerging private sector instruments like green bonds and blended finance. The document highlights significant funding gaps, particularly for adaptation, and recommends strengthening institutional frameworks, adopting climate budget tagging, and improving technical capacity to develop bankable projects.

The paper examines how multilateral development banks (MDBs) use policy-based operations (PBOs)—unearmarked budget support provided in exchange for policy reforms—and finds that current risk screening is insufficient to prevent these operations from undermining climate goals. Through an analysis of 126 PBOs and six case studies, the authors argue that policy actions can create path dependence in fossil-fuel-reliant activities and delay urgent climate spending. The document recommends that MDBs integrate long-term climate risks into macro-fiscal assessments, include at least one climate results indicator in every PBO, and provide more concessional finance, such as grants, to support ambitious climate action in vulnerable countries.

The report reviews 24 financing strategies from developing countries, categorizing them into discrete adaptation strategies and general climate action strategies. It finds that while these documents help communicate priorities and attract international grants, there is a significant gap in strategic analysis regarding how to leverage public finance to attract private investment. The report emphasizes the need for stronger engagement from ministries of finance and planning, as well as improved country-level tracking of climate finance to measure the actual impact of these strategies.

The document addresses the investment gap for climate-smart infrastructure in developing countries, where high perceived risks lead to high risk premiums and non-bankable projects. It defines de-risking as the reallocation or reduction of risk through policy measures (establishing rules and mandates) and financial measures (using public capital to bear risk). Three examples illustrate these mechanisms: the Green Climate Fund's anchor equity in Chile's Espejo de Tarapacá project, the Africa Energy Guarantee Facility's multi-layered insurance chain, and Climate Investor Two's tiered tranche structure. The guide concludes that while not applicable to all projects, strategic de-risking leverages small amounts of public capital to mobilize large-scale private investment.

The report analyzes the international public finance (IPF) trends of high-income signatories of the Glasgow Statement, evaluating their fossil fuel exclusion policies and clean energy strategies. It finds that while some robust practices exist, many signatories lack transparent policies, particularly regarding gas exclusions and concrete clean energy targets. The document highlights the potential to shift USD 28 billion annually from fossil fuels to clean energy and uses case studies from Ethiopia and Sri Lanka to demonstrate how this shift can prevent fossil fuel lock-in and support just transitions in low- and middle-income countries.

The authors argue that current international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are not designed to handle concurrent global crises including climate change, pandemics, and debt. They propose a strategic financing framework to increase annual investment in low and middle-income economies by over one trillion dollars, focusing on sustainable infrastructure, human capital, and nature conservation. Short-term priorities include the reallocation of 100 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), restructuring debts for countries pursuing green transitions, and increasing concessional finance. Long-term goals involve strengthening national and global coordination, leveraging public capital to mobilize private investment, and ensuring G7 countries are held accountable for their own domestic climate and SDG policies.

Recourse urges Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to stop all direct and indirect fossil fuel financing and to commit to ambitious climate finance targets at COP26. The statement argues that current pledges, such as the MDBs' $175 billion commitment by 2025, are inadequate. It specifically criticizes the World Bank for promoting gas as a transition fuel through Development Policy Finance, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for a portfolio where fossil fuel spending nearly doubles renewable energy spending, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for approving nearly $5 billion in gas project financing since the Paris Agreement. Recourse also calls for the World Bank to match the African Development Bank's pledge of 75 million new off-grid connections by 2025 to address energy deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The briefing argues that while multilateral development banks (MDBs) have made some progress in aligning direct investments with the Paris Agreement, they remain far from fulfilling their overall commitment. Key deficiencies include a lack of standardized fossil fuel exclusion policies, inconsistent greenhouse gas accounting, and a failure to align indirect investments and policy-based loans. The author emphasizes that MDBs must reform their financial instruments and engage in debt relief to ensure developing countries do not sacrifice climate action due to COVID-19 related debt burdens.

The 2021 Production Gap Report finds that governments plan to produce significantly more fossil fuels by 2030 than is consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, with the gap remaining largely unchanged from previous assessments. While some G20 countries and multilateral development banks have reduced finance for fossil fuel production, over USD 300 billion in new funds have been directed toward fossil fuel activities since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, exceeding investments in clean energy.

The New Development Bank (NDB) emphasizes the use of 'country systems' for project implementation, which shifts the primary responsibility for environmental and social assessments, consultations, and grievance mechanisms to the client. However, the Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) finds that critical project documentation—including risk assessments, management plans, and Country Partnership Plans (CPP)—is not publicly available. While the NDB has its own Information Disclosure Policy (IDP), there is ambiguity regarding its susceptibility to South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), as the NDB's Africa Regional Center has indicated it is not subject to such legislation. The report highlights a lack of transparency in the NDB's decision-making processes and recommends that all project and policy information be made accessible via the NDB website to ensure accountability.

The briefing outlines a strategic framework for the Biden Administration to reengage in global climate action through four priorities: fulfilling and doubling the U.S. pledge to the Green Climate Fund, contributing to other multilateral institutions like the Adaptation Fund, integrating climate considerations across all development funding, and pushing multilateral development banks to align with the Paris Agreement.

The report examines how developing nations can adapt the 'just transition' framework—traditionally focused on developed economies—to their unique socio-economic contexts, particularly regarding high levels of informal employment. Through case studies in Indonesia, Ghana, and Colombia, it finds that awareness of just transition is low among government officials and that Covid-19 responses have generally not been linked to climate mitigation or adaptation strategies. The document argues for a multidimensional approach that places workers and marginalized communities at the center of decision-making and provides guidelines for national governments to build institutional foundations and participatory processes for a fair low-carbon transition.

The report finds that global power sector investment in 2018 was significantly misaligned with Paris Agreement goals, with 29% of new investment (USD 129 billion) flowing into fossil fuels. No major country or region is decarbonizing its power sector at the required pace, and no major investor category is fully aligned with Paris-aligned emissions intensity targets. The authors highlight a critical data gap, noting that asset-level transaction data was available for only 23% of tracked high-emissions power finance due to corporate balance sheet borrowing. To achieve alignment, the report recommends halting new carbon-intensive investments, accelerating the retirement of fossil-fuel plants, and scaling up low-carbon investments through public-private collaboration and improved climate risk reporting.

The document examines how the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing debt distress in Africa, where average debt-to-GDP ratios rose from 60% to 70%. It critiques the G20/Paris Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) for its limited scope, noting that private creditors and multilateral development banks (MDBs) have largely refused to participate. The brief highlights the role of credit rating agencies in discouraging participation due to fears of downgrades and argues that many nations face solvency crises rather than temporary liquidity issues. It recommends extending the DSSI, reallocating IMF Special Drawing Rights, and establishing a permanent UN-led forum for debt monitoring and restructuring.

The report examines the 'adaptation gap,' noting that annual costs for adaptation in developing countries could reach USD 500 billion by 2050, while current flows remain insufficient and skewed toward mitigation. It analyzes how MDBs are transitioning from stand-alone climate projects to a 'Paris alignment' paradigm where all development finance is climate-resilient. Key barriers identified include a lack of technical expertise in developing countries, the high upfront costs of climate-proofing (10-20% of finance), and the difficulty of attracting private sector investment due to a lack of immediate revenue streams. The document recommends increased technical assistance for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and the use of innovative blended finance instruments to catalyze private capital.

The document argues that the massive fiscal stimulus required for COVID-19 recovery presents a unique opportunity to transition to a low-carbon economy. It suggests that climate-aligned investments offer higher returns than traditional spending, citing benefit-cost ratios for adaptation between 2:1 and 10:1. The author proposes seven action areas: managing corporate bailouts with emissions targets, investing in climate-smart infrastructure (such as renewable energy and nature-based solutions), promoting regulatory reform, reforming tax and subsidy policies (including cutting fossil fuel subsidies), integrating climate risks into financial regulations, enhancing the role of development finance institutions, and sponsoring R&D for new technologies. The text emphasizes that green investments can create more jobs than fossil fuel investments, noting that in the US, $1 million spent on renewable energy creates 7.5 FTE jobs compared to 2.7 in fossil fuels.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have established a framework for Paris alignment but face criticism for slow implementation timelines, vague mitigation criteria, and insufficient guidance on adaptation and resilience. The authors argue that MDBs must set firm dates for ending unaligned financing, publish clear positive and negative investment lists based on science, and adopt standardized reporting metrics to ensure transparency and effectiveness.

Civil society organizations have urged the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to extend the Phase 1 consultation deadline for its Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) review from February 28 to the end of March 2020. The CSOs argue that the current timeframe is too short to provide informed inputs based on field data and that the bank has failed to clarify its theoretical approach and methodology for the review. Additionally, they note that a scheduled workshop on March 9, 2020, organized by the German government, should be allowed to inform the consultation process.

The report updates global climate finance averages for 2017/18 to USD 574 billion per year and provides a preliminary 2019 estimate of USD 608–622 billion. It highlights that mitigation dominates finance (93%), with renewable energy as the largest sector. The document also analyzes the disruptive effects of COVID-19, noting a tension between 'green' recovery packages and significant stimulus funding for carbon-intensive sectors.

The document examines the trade-offs for African nations joining the AIIB, noting that while the bank offers a new source of low-cost finance to address an annual infrastructure deficit of $68 to $108 billion, its lack of technical capacity-building and specific instruments for low-income countries outside Asia limits its appeal. It concludes that middle-income African countries are better positioned to benefit from membership than low-income countries.