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The briefing highlights a significant funding gap in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where current climate finance flows represent only 0.5% of regional GDP, far below the 3.7% to 4.9% estimated by ECLAC to meet Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While developed nations eventually met the USD 100 billion annual pledge in 2022, the LAC region's share of international finance (17% between 2016-2020) consists largely of loans (81%), exacerbating regional debt. Financing is heavily concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia, with a strong preference for mitigation over adaptation projects.

The report argues that a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty can catalyze the financing necessary for a global just transition by establishing new funding regimes, creating state obligations, and supporting parallel financial reforms. It categorizes potential solutions into three clusters: debt management, new forms of finance and investment, and the replacement of fossil fuel revenues. The authors emphasize that wealthy nations must assume historical responsibility by ending extraction first and providing financial support to low and middle-income countries (LMICs) to diversify their economies.

The European Union is finalizing its COP29 position, focusing on securing a new global climate finance target to replace the expiring $100 billion annual commitment and advocating for a 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2040. The EU intends to push for increased funding for developing countries, encourage contributions from highly polluting nations like China, and seek specific phase-out dates for coal, gas, and oil.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) provided approximately USD 125 billion for climate finance in 2023, a 26% increase from 2022, yet this represents only about 1% of the USD 8.6 trillion needed annually by 2030. A G20 expert panel and credit rating agencies suggest that reforming capital adequacy frameworks (CAFs)—by increasing risk tolerance and leveraging callable capital—could unlock hundreds of billions of dollars in additional lending without risking AAA credit ratings. Specifically, current CAF progress could unlock up to USD 357 billion in lending headroom over the next decade, while S&P estimates potential increases of USD 500 billion to USD 1 trillion. The briefing also highlights the under-utilisation of guarantees, which attract USD 1.5 of private capital for every USD 1 invested, and equity finance, which currently accounts for only 1.8% of commitments. These MDB expansions are viewed as critical for the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), though experts argue MDB lending should complement rather than replace grant-based finance.

The Civil Society FfD Mechanism calls for a fundamental overhaul of the global financial architecture through the establishment of several UN-led conventions and regulatory bodies. Key proposals include a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation to create a fairer tax system, a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt to resolve debt crises, and a UN Convention on International Development Cooperation to shift the narrative from charity to justice and reparations. The submission advocates for the cessation of Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS) provisions, the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies via an ECOSOC Commission, and the immediate cancellation of unsustainable and illegitimate debts. Furthermore, it demands a transition away from GDP-centric growth models toward ecological stability, urging Global North countries to provide additional, grants-based climate finance rather than loans.

The report assesses the four Vertical Climate and Environmental Funds (VCEFs)—the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund (AF), Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and Green Climate Fund (GCF)—concluding that while they provide essential concessional finance, they are fragmented and often inefficient. It proposes a 'process integration' approach to shift from individual projects to country-driven investment platforms, recommends harmonizing accreditation and reporting across funds, and suggests expanding the use of diverse financial instruments like guarantees and local currency lending to better catalyze private capital in emerging markets and developing economies.

The report finds that while climate finance in Africa grew by 48% to USD 43.7 billion in 2021/22, it remains severely insufficient, meeting only 23% of the annual needs required for NDC implementation. Public finance dominates the landscape, providing 82% of total flows, while private finance is heavily concentrated in energy systems and a small number of countries. The document highlights a critical 'trilemma' where climate-vulnerable countries are also debt-distressed and conflict-affected, further hindering their ability to attract investment. Key recommendations include scaling the use of guarantees, improving domestic capital market regulations, and enhancing the transparency and equity of voluntary carbon markets.

The report argues that the global push to triple renewable energy capacity must prioritize the quality of investments over quantity to avoid 'green extractivism'. It introduces three core criteria for public finance: driving a 100% renewable future by phasing out fossil fuels, ensuring democratic energy systems through grants and decentralization, and centering human rights and nature. The document criticizes multilateral development banks (MDBs) for continuing to fund fossil gas and relying on debt-creating loans rather than grants. Through case studies in India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Indonesia, it contrasts the harms of large-scale, profit-driven projects with the benefits of community-led, small-scale renewable energy solutions.

The report argues that while there is growing interest in adaptation finance, collaboration between international and national public development banks in EMDEs remains limited and often treats adaptation as a co-benefit rather than a primary goal. It identifies structural barriers—such as complex application processes, lack of shared taxonomies, and local currency risk—and proposes five strategic recommendations: complementary taxonomies, country platform approaches, regional adaptation hubs, capacity-building, and the use of blended finance to de-risk projects.

Civil society organisations have written to AIIB President Jin Liqun to express concern over the bank's limited engagement with external stakeholders. The group argues that the AIIB's current internal focus overemphasizes project benefits and underplays risks. They propose several critical discussion topics for the 2024 Annual Meeting, including the bank's fossil fuel divestment, Paris Agreement alignment, and the development of a Gender Action Plan. The letter also highlights logistical barriers for participants in Uzbekistan, including visa difficulties and the risks associated with the country's closed civic space.

The document outlines the necessity of reforming international and African financial institutions to bridge the climate finance gap. Based on policy dialogues held in February and July 2024, it emphasizes the need for increased African representation in Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), improved credit rating methodologies, and deeper collaboration among African financial entities to drive green industrialization.

The document examines the systemic under-supply of funding for global public goods (GPGs), such as climate mitigation and pandemic preparedness, relative to the trillions of dollars required. It analyzes current G20 initiatives and the roles of the IMF and World Bank, while discussing a proposal from the Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to create a consolidated GPG bank. The author provides recommendations for the South African G20 presidency to lead on consolidating funding windows, establishing equitable governance, and exploring global taxes to bridge the financing gap.

The policy brief argues that African countries face a crisis of 'debt that is too expensive' rather than too much debt, which hinders human development and the energy transition. It proposes a Cost of Capital Commission composed of high-level experts to recommend reforms to credit rating agency methodologies, Basel III macro-prudential regulations, and the integration of natural capital and remittances into debt sustainability analyses.

The document argues that the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) must address critical gaps in adaptation finance, which has lagged behind mitigation. It proposes specific requirements for the goal's quantum and instruments to ensure sufficiency, the support of transboundary cooperation for effectiveness, and improved allocation and access mechanisms to ensure equity. Additionally, it suggests enhancing the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) to improve accountability for both providers and recipients of adaptation funding.

The report analyzes the roles of various public development banks (PDBs) in climate adaptation, identifying significant gaps in collaboration between international multilateral development banks (MDBs) and national development banks (NDBs). It highlights barriers such as misaligned project ticket sizes, lack of shared adaptation taxonomies, and local currency risks. To address these, the report recommends developing complementary taxonomies, utilizing country platforms and regional hubs, enhancing capacity-building, and leveraging blended finance to de-risk adaptation investments.

The report identifies currency risk—specifically the mismatch between local currency revenues and hard currency debt—as a primary barrier to climate investment in EMDEs. It argues that while long-term solutions require macroeconomic reform and deeper local capital markets, immediate needs must be met through innovative hedging mechanisms. The document analyzes five specific models: a TCX donor-funded guarantee, Eco Invest Brasil, the Delta onshore DFI platform, FSD Africa's MDB portfolio transfer, and a CPI FX Hedging Facility for India. It concludes that concessional capital is essential in the short term to make these tools affordable and to catalyze private investment.

The report argues that the World Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have policy gaps regarding 'captive coal'—coal plants dedicated to industrial facilities. It highlights how these loopholes risk funding carbon-intensive processing of minerals like nickel, which are essential for the energy transition, thereby undermining global climate goals.

The IEU's 2024 activity report details the completion of evaluations on the energy sector and investment framework, the launch of new evaluations regarding whistleblowers, Indigenous Peoples, and health/food security, and the progress of the LORTA impact evaluation portfolio. A significant portion of the document is dedicated to a synthesis on GCF access, which argues that access has become synonymous with accreditation, creating biases toward countries with strong governance and existing multilateral development bank (MDB) relationships. The report recommends shifting the focus of access from procedural accreditation to country-led needs and exploring alternative models such as National Climate Funds (NCFs).

The report argues that market forces alone cannot guarantee sustainable development from green hydrogen, necessitating a proactive role for multilateral development banks (MDBs). It proposes a framework to move MDB lending beyond 'do no harm' toward prioritizing value addition for producer countries. The analysis includes a Sustainable Development Impact Matrix and evaluations of four specific financing cases: the African Development Bank in Namibia, the World Bank in India, the European Investment Bank’s Green Hydrogen Fund, and Team Europe’s H2Global Instrument.

The document analyzes the first Global Stocktake's signals on mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, highlighting the systemic challenges for the Global South. It argues that while the GST provides historic targets for transitioning away from fossil fuels and tripling renewables, it lacks concrete financial commitments. The brief emphasizes the need for the NCQG to address the 'trilemma' of climate goals, fiscal sustainability, and political feasibility by expanding fiscal space through non-debt instruments and reforming the international financial architecture.