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The lower Winnipeg River basin (LWRB) has evolved from an ancient Indigenous travel and ceremonial route and a 17th-century fur trade corridor into a region defined by hydroelectric power, mining, and tourism. Key developments include the 1906 construction of the Pinawa dam, the establishment of the Pine Falls paper mill in 1926, and the creation of Whiteshell Provincial Park in 1961. The region's economic history is also marked by copper-nickel and lithium mining in the early 20th century and the transition from river-based transport to rail and road networks, including the Trans-Canada Highway.

The lower Winnipeg River basin (LWRB) economy is driven by hydroelectric generation, tourism, and limited mining, with a history of forestry and ongoing agricultural activity. Hydroelectric stations provide approximately 10% of Manitoba Hydro's power, while the Tanco Mine is the only operational mine in the region. Tourism is a critical sector, with the broader Eastman region attracting 2.223 million visitors in 2015. While forestry is currently non-operational following a 2009 mill closure, Indigenous communities are exploring new commercial opportunities. The document emphasizes that future economic expansions in mining, forestry, and tourism must be reconciled with ecological and social priorities.

The report identifies thousands of mining concessions and dozens of coal-fired power plants (PLTU) located in areas high-risk for earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and landslides. It argues that a 'science-policy gap' exists where economic interests of oligarchs override disaster mitigation and environmental safety. The document highlights specific cases, such as the PLTU in Teluk Sepang and the mining in Wadas, to illustrate how these projects exacerbate disaster risks and marginalize local communities. It further claims that the Minerba Law and the Omnibus Law (Job Creation Law) weaken environmental protections and facilitate the expansion of risky extractive projects.

The document argues that the OECD's Pillar Two (GloBE) proposal, while intending to reduce tax evasion, may inadvertently penalize resource-rich developing countries due to timing differences in how mining investments are depreciated. Because mining requires massive upfront capital, local tax laws often allow accelerated depreciation, leading to low effective tax rates (ETR) in early years. Under current GloBE rules, this could trigger 'top-up taxes' payable to the parent company's home country rather than the host country, potentially reducing investment and transferring billions in tax revenue from developing to developed nations. The report evaluates three solutions: a combination of loss carry-forwards and credits, deferred tax accounting, and the use of local tax rules for ETR calculations, while also noting the challenge of permanent differences caused by tax holidays and stabilization clauses.

The statement highlights a gap between Kenya's robust legal framework—including the Constitution and the 2016 Water Act—and the reality of water pollution caused by industrial activities. It cites specific examples of contamination from battery recycling and the salt industry, and warns against the water-related risks associated with oil and gas production, calling for stronger regulatory oversight and corporate accountability.

The transition to low-carbon technologies is highly mineral-intensive, requiring an estimated 3 billion tons of minerals and metals to achieve a below 2°C future. This demand increases the risk of deforestation and fragmentation of intact forest landscapes (IFLs), particularly in the Amazon and Congo Basin. In the Amazon, mining contributes up to 9% of IFL area loss, while in the Congo Basin, the demand for cobalt for batteries drives exploration in high-forest-cover areas. Analysis shows a gap in corporate and government governance, with only a minority of assessed companies adopting specific forest-related commitments and 78% of state and regional governments lacking forest management plans that directly address mining-related deforestation.

The document reports that infrastructure is responsible for 9-17% of tropical and subtropical deforestation, while mining contributes to approximately 7% of global forest loss. Data from CDP's forest module indicates that while many regional governments have forest policies, there is a lack of operational management plans and risk assessments. The most frequently reported impact of mining and infrastructure-related forest loss is increased greenhouse gas emissions, which governments attempt to manage through integrated land-use planning, afforestation, and policy enforcement. Case studies highlight the Piura Region in Peru, where mining has driven deforestation and indigenous displacement, and New York State, where infrastructure and agriculture are primary drivers of forest loss.

The document examines the critical materials required for battery electric vehicles (BEVs), highlighting the risks associated with concentrated mineral reserves and the environmental and human rights impacts of mining. It argues that while BEVs significantly reduce life cycle global warming emissions compared to gasoline vehicles, scaling their production requires a transition toward a circular economy. The author emphasizes that widespread recycling could meet 30% to 40% of the US material demand for passenger BEVs by 2035. The text identifies significant barriers to this transition, including a lack of recycling infrastructure—with fewer than a dozen global facilities—and a lack of comprehensive regulatory frameworks. It recommends policy actions such as setting recycled content targets, standardizing battery labeling, and enforcing international labor and environmental standards for mining.

The study identifies mining, logging, dam construction, and agriculture as the primary threats to biodiversity in the Chindwin River Basin. Using a GIS-based Multi-Criteria Decision Making approach and the InVEST model, the research found that 87% of Key Biodiversity Areas provide a high degree of ecosystem services, with the highest levels occurring in the forested northern region of the basin.

The document evaluates the EITI, a global transparency standard for extractive industries, noting its success in improving investment climates and contract disclosure while highlighting failures in preventing corruption and ensuring civil society participation.

The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting is proposing a two-pillar approach to international taxation. While Pillar One's 'Amount A' excludes extractive industries, 'Amount B' lacks a mining carve-out, potentially misallocating returns to marketing activities. Pillar Two (GloBE) introduces a minimum effective tax rate to curb profit shifting to tax havens, but its revenue distribution favors headquarters countries and its accounting rules may conflict with the depreciation cycles of mining projects. The document urges resource-rich governments to coordinate their positions to protect their right to tax natural resources.

The report outlines a holistic approach to watershed-level water management, emphasizing the need for risk-based planning, stakeholder engagement, and clear legal frameworks. It presents case studies from Mongolia, which utilizes a system of management zones based on water sources, and Antofagasta, Chile, which employs strategic regional planning and technical cost-benefit analyses. Both jurisdictions highlight the challenges of managing water in arid environments where mining competes with community and agricultural needs, particularly under the pressures of climate change.

The report advocates for watershed-scale water governance to balance the needs of the mining sector with those of other users and ecosystems. It details a framework based on risk planning, stakeholder collaboration, and continuous monitoring. In Mongolia, the focus is on integrating surface and groundwater management, particularly in the Gobi desert where mining demands may exceed supply by 2021. In Antofagasta, Chile, the study highlights the use of strategic regional plans and cost-benefit analyses for the Loa River basin, while noting the challenge of water rights assigned without expiration dates.

The report identifies 24 deforestation fronts across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, where over 43 million hectares of forest were lost between 2004 and 2017. It argues that while commercial agriculture remains the dominant direct driver, indirect pressures such as population growth, dietary shifts toward meat, and weak governance amplify forest loss. The analysis evaluates a range of responses, from area-based protections and indigenous land rights to commodity-specific certifications and REDD+ frameworks, concluding that no single approach is sufficient and that integrated, context-specific solutions are required to halt deforestation.

A joint statement from Earthjustice and numerous environmental and community organizations urging the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council to withdraw a proposed rule that would add mining as a covered sector under FAST-41. The commenters argue that mining's unique environmental risks, including toxic waste and acid mine drainage, require rigorous and flexible permitting rather than the accelerated timelines and limited judicial review provided by FAST-41.

The report by Friends of the Earth Latin America and the Caribbean (ATALC) examines how Transnational Corporations (TNCs) drive a capitalist system of accumulation through extractivism and the commercialization of services. It highlights the 'architecture of impunity'—including Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms—that allows TNCs to avoid accountability for environmental destruction and human rights abuses. The document details the impacts of agribusiness, forestry, mining, and energy sectors, noting that more than two-thirds of global territory defenders killed in 2019 were in Latin America. It advocates for a UN Binding Treaty to regulate TNCs and a transition toward an economy based on the sustainability of life and peoples' sovereignty.

The report finds that progress toward reducing deforestation from infrastructure, extractive industries, and basic-needs activities is slow. While some governments and companies have adopted policies and commitments, implementation is often weak, transparency is limited, and large-scale development projects continue to threaten intact forests. The report emphasizes the need for a paradigm shift toward alternative development pathways and the empowerment of Indigenous peoples and local communities.

The report uses System Dynamics modelling to forecast how circular economy (CE) interventions—such as extending product lifetimes and increasing recycling rates—affect jobs in Finland. It analyzes consumer electronics, textiles, food, mining, forestry, and buildings. The findings indicate that while some sectors like electronics and forestry may see net job gains due to the high labor intensity of recycling and refurbishment, others like textiles and food are projected to experience net job losses as reduced consumption lowers demand for primary production and retail.

The document analyzes 'China-powered' agency in the DRC, dividing the period into two phases. From 2007 to 2009, the Kabila regime successfully used the Sicomines agreement to play China and the IMF against each other, securing both infrastructure loans and debt relief. However, from 2010 to 2019, this agency diminished as China shifted toward a more cautious diplomatic approach, prioritizing private investment over state-backed mega-deals and seeking to be viewed as a responsible international actor. The author concludes that such agency is circumscribed and depends entirely on China's own strategic interests.

The report analyzes Russia's strategic return to Africa, driven by Western sanctions and falling oil prices. It focuses on Zimbabwe and Mozambique, highlighting a pattern of elite-directed cooperation centered on extractive industries, arms trade, and political support. While Russia's economic footprint is significantly smaller than China's, it leverages an 'anti-West narrative' and a high tolerance for corruption to secure access to natural resources and political loyalty, often utilizing proxy organizations for election monitoring and paramilitary groups for security.