‘China-powered’ African Agency and its Limits: The Case of the DRC 2007–2019
Summary
The document analyzes 'China-powered' agency in the DRC, dividing the period into two phases. From 2007 to 2009, the Kabila regime successfully used the Sicomines agreement to play China and the IMF against each other, securing both infrastructure loans and debt relief. However, from 2010 to 2019, this agency diminished as China shifted toward a more cautious diplomatic approach, prioritizing private investment over state-backed mega-deals and seeking to be viewed as a responsible international actor. The author concludes that such agency is circumscribed and depends entirely on China's own strategic interests.
Key insights
- Between 2007 and 2009, the DRC exercised 'China-powered' agency by using the Sicomines agreement to pressure the IMF and Western donors, eventually securing both a Chinese infrastructure loan and debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
- The Sicomines agreement was a resource-for-infrastructure deal where the China Export Import (Exim) Bank provided a loan for infrastructure (estimated at $6.5 billion) and a mining venture (estimated at $3 billion), with repayment secured by mining profits.
- From 2010 to 2019, the DRC's ability to leverage China diminished because China shifted its strategy toward 'cautious diplomacy' and away from bold development finance offers.
- China's increased caution in the DRC was driven by operational risks, including the 2012 temporary withdrawal of China Exim Bank and fluctuations in copper and cobalt prices.
- China's broader African strategy shifted toward encouraging private sector investment over state-backed mega-deals, as evidenced by the 2018 FOCAC commitment where only $50 billion of a $60 billion package consisted of state funds.
- China's desire to be perceived as a 'responsible international actor' led it to develop its own debt sustainability framework for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019 to counter 'debt trap' narratives.
- During the 2018 DRC elections, China did not provide the Kabila regime with the kind of political support that would have allowed it to resist pressure from Western donors, instead maintaining a policy of non-interference.
Cite the original document
- APA
- MALM, J. (2020). ‘China-powered’ African Agency and its Limits: The Case of the DRC 2007–2019. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Policy-Insights-96-malm.pdf
- Chicago
- MALM, JOHANNA. ‘China-powered’ African Agency and its Limits: The Case of the DRC 2007–2019. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2020. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Policy-Insights-96-malm.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=MALM |first1=JOHANNA |title=‘China-powered’ African Agency and its Limits: The Case of the DRC 2007–2019 |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2020 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Policy-Insights-96-malm.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{malm2020chinapowered, author = {MALM, JOHANNA}, title = {{‘China-powered’ African Agency and its Limits: The Case of the DRC 2007–2019}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2020}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Policy-Insights-96-malm.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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