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The document assesses the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and African Development Bank (AfDB) against criteria for renewable energy transition, democratic energy systems, and environmental and social safeguards. It finds that these institutions often prioritize loans over grants, maintain gender-blind financing, and continue to invest in 'false solutions' such as large hydropower and hydrogen, despite their stated climate commitments.

The GCHA submission argues that Chile's climate action should be framed through a public health lens to maximize health co-benefits, increase public support, and reduce the disease burden on the healthcare sector. The document recommends aligning emissions targets with a 1.5°C limit, accelerating health-related climate risk assessments, and implementing specific mitigation actions within the healthcare sector, which currently accounts for 6.7% of national emissions. It further suggests phasing out diesel subsidies, accelerating the coal phase-out date to 2030, and deprivatizing water to protect public health. The GCHA emphasizes the need for disaggregated epidemiological data to protect vulnerable groups and suggests using WHO tools to quantify the economic returns of health-promoting climate actions.

The GCHA submission argues that Nepal's climate action should be explicitly linked to public health outcomes to maximize co-benefits and protect vulnerable populations. It recommends strengthening the draft NDC 3.0 by aligning conditional emissions targets with 1.5°C limits, establishing specific targets for black carbon reduction, and creating a dedicated section on air quality. The document highlights significant health risks in Nepal, including a 68% increase in heat stress exposure since the 1990s and rising transmission potential for dengue. It also emphasizes the economic burden of climate-related health issues, noting that heat exposure caused an estimated US$2.8 billion in annual potential income loss between 2014 and 2023, with the agricultural sector bearing 91.5% of that impact.

The policy brief argues that meeting Paris Agreement goals requires a fivefold increase in urban climate finance to USD 4.3 trillion per year by 2030. It identifies critical barriers to subnational integration, including political misalignment, capacity gaps, and creditworthiness constraints. To address these, the authors present a five-stage 'Urban-inclusive Country Platform Framework' moving from initial engagement to implementation. The brief applies this framework to case studies in Egypt, Brazil, and India, highlighting opportunities to shift from fragmented project-based funding to strategic, programmatic approaches that empower cities as active partners in climate action.

The report examines Indonesia's path toward net-zero emissions by 2060, highlighting a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated annual need of USD 73–76 billion. It argues that foreign climate finance is often debt-heavy and unreliable, urging a shift toward domestic funding and structural reforms. The analysis covers the banking sector's limited capacity to finance renewable energy, the underperformance of the national carbon market, and the socioeconomic disparities in energy access. It proposes an "Indonesian Way" consisting of eight strategic actions, including targeted subsidies and the development of a domestic clean-tech ecosystem, to ensure a just and sovereign transition.

The document proposes an "energy park" model that co-locates renewable generation with flexible industrial loads and long-duration storage to replace retiring coal capacity. Using Pueblo, Colorado, as a case study, the authors model a system combining 2,000 MW of solar, 1,600 MW of wind, short-duration batteries, and flexible loads (thermal batteries and electrolyzers). The findings indicate that such a park can achieve 99% reliability in mimicking the dispatch of the Comanche Unit 3 plant while providing significant local economic benefits, including over $40 million in annual property taxes and 350 permanent jobs. Financially, the energy park is estimated to be at least 50% cheaper for electricity ratepayers than a comparable small modular nuclear reactor.

The document examines the 'climate-debt trap' facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where escalating external debt—reaching nearly US$6.5 trillion in 2023—crowds out climate investment. It analyzes existing financial mechanisms such as Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDCs), Catastrophe (CAT) bonds, and debt swaps, while critiquing the G20 Common Framework for its inadequacy. The authors advocate for the cancellation of 'odious debt' linked to fossil fuel projects and propose that a Fossil Fuel Treaty could establish a Debt Resolution Facility to help member nations renegotiate debts in exchange for phasing out fossil fuels.

The document outlines a training curriculum focused on 'energy justice' and 'energy sufficiency' to ensure the transition to renewables does not replicate the injustices of fossil fuel systems. It explores the risks of 'energy extractivism'—where resources are exploited in the Global South for consumption elsewhere—and provides examples of community-owned energy models in The Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK. The module guides participants through a process of identifying barriers to just transitions and developing local projects based on circular design and 'people power'.

The manual outlines a pedagogical framework to move beyond simple renewable energy substitution toward a systemic change based on energy sufficiency and sovereignty. It critiques 'energy extractivism'—the exploitation of resources in the Global South for external consumption—and 'green extractivism,' where climate mitigation narratives justify local land and resource loss. The guide promotes circular design to combat planned obsolescence and provides examples of community energy models in Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK, while detailing Scotland's policy strategy for local renewable ownership.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The document analyzes sovereign debt in the Global South as a tool of neocolonial control that perpetuates structural dependencies in food, energy, and manufacturing. It critiques existing G20 restructuring mechanisms for treating debt as a liquidity issue rather than a structural one. Drawing on the failure of the 1980s Cartagena Initiative, the authors advocate for a Global South Debtors’ Coalition to leverage collective bargaining power. This coalition would pursue 'The Bargain of the Century,' proposing that Global South nations use their strategic mineral wealth and market size to secure technology transfers from major powers like China, the US, and the EU. The paper specifically urges South Africa to use its G20 Presidency to advance this framework, linking debt justice to food sovereignty, renewable energy independence, and regional industrial policies.

The report provides a comprehensive framework for negotiating international agreements on fossil fuel subsidies (FFS), detailing six key building blocks: objectives, scope, disciplines, carve-outs/exceptions, special and differential treatment (SDT), and enforcement. It analyzes various legal approaches, including those based on the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and highlights the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) as a primary precedent for specific FFS disciplines.

The document argues that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy in South Africa's Steve Tshwete Local Municipality (STLM) is 'unjust' for youth due to their exclusion from meaningful employment and productive assets. It highlights how the closure of the Komati Power Station has devastated local livelihoods and how current municipal land disposal conditions effectively bar unemployed youth from ownership. Furthermore, it notes that renewable energy projects, such as solar installations in Doornkop, provide only short-term, low-skill work that fails to create sustainable career paths for young people.

The report finds that none of the 20 largest European and UK banks have developed a robust climate transition plan, with an average score of 41/100. While banks have improved reporting and governance to meet regulatory requirements, they lack concrete decarbonization and engagement strategies, often continuing to finance fossil fuel development. The analysis highlights a significant gap between public net-zero commitments and actual business model shifts, warning that current disclosures are more 'ESG marketing material' than actionable transition plans.