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India aims to indigenize battery manufacturing through the PLI-ACC scheme to install 50 GWh of capacity by 2026, yet remains heavily reliant on imports for cells, components, and machinery. The report identifies six primary challenges: skilled labour shortages, a lack of testing and validation centres, dependence on imported critical minerals, insufficient recycling infrastructure, the need for ESG standards to ensure export competitiveness, and high import dependence for manufacturing equipment. It recommends prioritizing the localization of synthetic anodes, electrolytes, and LFP cathodes, while expanding R&D for next-generation technologies like sodium-ion batteries.

The article examines why many developing countries oppose the WTO moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, which is currently set to expire by March 31, 2026, or the 14th Ministerial Conference. It argues that the moratorium disproportionately benefits developed nations due to the global digital divide and creates significant fiscal challenges for developing states that rely heavily on customs duties for public revenue. The author highlights a critical lack of a formal definition for "electronic transmissions," which leads to uncertainty about the moratorium's scope. Furthermore, the text asserts that the moratorium restricts the policy space for developing countries to use customs duties as a tool for industrial policy and structural economic transformation, while questioning the effectiveness of VAT as a replacement due to administrative hurdles and the loss of competitive advantages for domestic producers.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, first established in 1998, has been extended until March 31, 2026, or the 14th Ministerial Conference. The authors argue that the end of this moratorium would likely lead to a fragmented 'patchwork' of regional and bilateral trade agreements, increasing costs for consumers and businesses. Developing countries have opposed the moratorium to reclaim 'policy space' and recover lost customs revenues, which one 2020 study estimated at USD 10 billion annually for developing nations, though OECD estimates are significantly lower. The document highlights a critical lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions,' which complicates the implementation of any replacement regulatory framework.

A joint open letter from civil society organizations criticizes the Draghi report for neglecting the societal and environmental costs of the chemicals industry, misrepresenting EU regulatory processes like REACH, and overlooking the availability of safer alternatives to PFAS.

The document argues that the EU lacks a long-term strategy for green and social investment, which threatens its competitive edge and the success of the Clean Industrial Deal. The authors call for a comprehensive investment package—including a greener EU budget and a successor to the Next Generation EU programme—to mobilise public and private resources for climate neutrality, biodiversity preservation, and industrial transformation.

The report identifies a strategic window for the EU and UK to reset their climate and energy relationship following recent elections. It argues that the current Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is too limited and suggests a comprehensive new agreement covering industrial decarbonisation, methane, carbon capture, hydrogen, and nuclear energy. The document advocates for an 'options-based strategy' that includes clean firm power to complement renewables, and recommends aligning regulatory frameworks—such as the Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) and carbon removal certifications—to facilitate cross-border trade and infrastructure sharing.

The article examines why many developing countries oppose the WTO moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, highlighting the digital divide, loss of public revenue, and restrictions on industrial policy. It argues that the moratorium primarily benefits developed nations that dominate digital exports and calls for a clear definition of 'electronic transmissions' to resolve disputes.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, first established in 1998, is likely to end by March 2026. This expiration could lead to a fragmented global regulatory landscape, increased costs for consumers and businesses, and a shift toward regional trade agreements. While developing nations argue that the moratorium limits their policy space and public revenue, the authors suggest that the lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions' complicates the transition and that a multilateral agreement remains the most stable path for digital trade.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, in place since 1998, is likely to end by March 2026 due to opposition from developing countries seeking to recover lost tax revenues and maintain policy space for national industrialization. The authors argue that the end of this global rule would lead to a fragmented 'mosaic' of regional and bilateral trade agreements with inconsistent definitions of 'electronic transmissions,' potentially increasing costs for consumers and creating barriers for digital service providers. While some members argue that the moratorium hinders their ability to support domestic digital industries, the authors suggest that alternative taxes, such as VAT, could generate revenue without the trade-distorting effects of customs duties. The document highlights a critical lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions,' which has led to divergent revenue loss estimates—ranging from 280 million USD globally (OECD) to nearly 10 billion USD annually for developing countries (UNCTAD).

The document analyzes why many developing countries oppose the WTO moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, highlighting the global digital divide, the lack of a clear definition for 'electronic transmissions', and the resulting loss of public revenue and industrial policy flexibility.

The report argues that the EU and US should move away from a combative competitive race toward a cooperative agenda for industrial decarbonisation. It suggests a 'softer' path to alignment that prioritises short-term 'carrots' like cleantech incentives and long-term 'sticks' like harmonised standards, rather than attempting to reconcile contentious issues like carbon pricing. The study advocates expanding cooperation beyond hydrogen and carbon capture to include circular economy solutions and electrification, using a policy mix approach that categorises tools by supply push, price signals, demand pull, and systemic enablers.

The paper examines the evolution of EU-Africa relations from the 1975 Lome Convention to the 2020 Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, highlighting a persistent gap between the African Union's goals for industrialisation and the EU's focus on trade and aid. It argues that the EU's preference for market-led growth and its interest in securing raw materials have led to the marginalisation of industrial policy, technology transfer, and skills development in their partnerships. Despite new initiatives like the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, the author notes that foreign direct investment remains concentrated in extractive sectors rather than manufacturing.

The document analyzes the potential for African nations to move beyond the "pit to port" model of mineral extraction by building integrated battery mineral value chains. It highlights Africa's significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, and vanadium, and examines the macroeconomic shift from fossil fuel revenues to transition mineral revenues. The paper identifies Morocco as a leader in integrating automotive assembly with battery material production and discusses the potential for South Africa to act as a regional integrator. It concludes that while a continent-wide strategy is unlikely, sub-regional strategies and national policy instruments—such as strategic non-alignment and targeted industrial policies for e-mobility—can help African countries capture more value from their mineral endowments.

The research paper argues that German-African industrial relations are underperforming due to a skewed German perception of Africa as a crisis-ridden region rather than a diverse set of economic opportunities. It highlights the growth of several African economies and the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), while noting that German business engagement remains low and government strategies are often uncoordinated and paternalistic. The authors recommend that Germany replace aid with trade and investment, particularly in green hydrogen, and that African governments increase transparency and infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment.

The research paper examines the role of vertical industrial policies in Africa, contrasting them with horizontal policies and global value chain (GVC) theories. It highlights how Nigeria and Morocco successfully developed their cement sectors through targeted government interventions, while noting that replicating these specific tools in other sectors, such as sugar and tomato paste in Nigeria, has failed due to different raw material coordination needs.

The report examines the strategic importance of critical raw materials (CRMs) for OACPS member states, highlighting their significant global production shares in minerals like cobalt, platinum-group metals, and manganese. It identifies a critical gap in local beneficiation capacities, noting that most CRMs are exported as raw ores, which results in lost economic value. The document analyzes the impact of new industrial policies from the US, EU, and China—such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act—which emphasize reshoring and 'friendshoring' and may conflict with OACPS industrialization goals. It concludes that OACPS countries must move beyond extractive 'pit-to-port' models through regional cooperation, strategic partnerships, and robust regulatory frameworks to maximize socio-economic benefits while managing environmental and social risks.

The EU is attempting to increase domestic production of net-zero technologies through the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) and other strategies to reduce dependencies on China and the US. However, the author contends that the EU lacks the necessary funding to meet its 2030 targets, such as producing 40 per cent of its installation needs domestically. The document highlights a conflict between 'frugal' member states and those seeking a European Sovereignty Fund, leading to a reliance on the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF). This framework allows national 'matching aid', which the author argues creates unfair competition between wealthy nations like Germany and France and smaller states like Belgium. The text further critiques the use of non-price criteria in procurement and trade defense instruments, such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), noting they can increase costs for taxpayers and slow decarbonization. The author concludes that targeted, conditional European-level subsidies are the only viable way to ensure a just and cohesive green transition.

Germany invested USD 89.12 billion in clean technologies in 2023, representing 29% of total EU investment. While China dominates wind and solar PV, Germany maintains a leadership position in the EU for battery and heat pump manufacture. The document highlights a significant global investment opportunity, with renewable technologies and battery storage potentially reaching USD 5.68 trillion by 2050. However, Germany faces risks from the aggressive industrial policies of the US (such as the Inflation Reduction Act) and China, which may lead companies like Tesla and Northvolt to scale back German operations. The briefing argues that a more robust industrial strategy is required to prevent a repeat of the collapse seen in Germany's solar and wind sectors around 2012 and 2016.

The document analyzes Latin America's potential to transition to a 100% renewable electricity matrix by 2040, focusing on the role of strategic minerals and the development of regional value chains. It highlights the region's vast reserves of copper and lithium and its existing manufacturing capabilities in steel and aluminum as key competitive advantages. However, it identifies significant barriers, including insufficient geological knowledge, low refining capacity, weak industrial policies, and social conflicts related to mining and land rights. The brief recommends increasing public investment in R&D, strengthening regional cooperation through the G20 and RELAC, and implementing binding community participation to ensure a just energy transition.

The paper outlines a strategic framework for Europe to achieve leadership in clean energy innovation, emphasizing that financial investment alone is insufficient. It proposes four pillars of innovative capacity: building human capital, pushing early-stage technology, creating demand-side market incentives, and securing access to key resources. Using Norway's carbon capture and storage (CCS) leadership as a case study, the author demonstrates how aligning these pillars creates a competitive advantage that is difficult for other regions to imitate. The document concludes that Europe should target sectors where it has natural resource advantages and integrate its policies to create a cohesive ecosystem rather than relying on isolated funding or deployment targets.